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For more than twenty years now the Soviet
Union has surprised the world by the rapidity of
its social changes- It would appear, therefore,
!that only the dynamic approach to Soviet Russia's
economic history can claim more then transient relevancy
'The constancy of movement has, consequently, been
stressed throughout this survey which attempts to
depict the changing ways in which goods were being
distributed and consumed within the country, against
the background of the general economic evolution and
its vicissitudes.
The choice of the subject has been prompted, by
the reflection that it is through trade and
distribution that the economic process reaches its
consummation in the act of social consumption, and
|that the most grandiose schemes of production are of
|no avail unless they are supplemented by an efficient
system of transmitting "final" values to the
consumer.
The first part of the investigation is
introductory setting forth the state of Russian
internal commerce before the October Revolution of
1917 (in order to indicate the nature of the
heritage passed on to the Bolsheviks): it then goes
on to a description of conditions under War
Communism (1917-1921), the New economic Policy
(1921-1928 or so), and the First and Second Five-
Year Plans (1928-1937), This forms the subject
matter of Books I and II. In Book III the
descriptive narrative is subjected to analytical !
scrutiny.
The rosin objects of the enquiry are: (1) to
examine how the advance of economic planning in
Russia has affected the sphere of consumption: (2) to•W X / A r
describe the organisational framework of Soviet tradej
and. distribution and their structural changes under
the impact of transformations in production and !
under the influence of political and social
considerations; (3) to assess, as fan as possible,
the results achieved by Soviet trs.de and distribution!
I
and to point to the system's novel features; and
(4) to ascertain how the individual, the various
social groups and society as a whole have been
affected, by the growth of planned consumption.
Much space has been devoted to the study of
prices in all their aspects (inclusive of such
jellied topics as costing and. credit), since it is
thought that they constitute the focus of economic
policy, an important instrument in directing economic
activity, and. an indication of efficiency and
performance.
The treatment is predominantly descriptive,
and when comment is called, for, it strives to be
objective, not necessarily in the sense of refusing;
to make up one's own mind, but of being; aware of the
various arguments involved in the issue.V| l| r
With this in view, full use has been made of
sources published both inside and outside Russia, so
that conflicting accounts and interpretations could
be contrasted, and a more correct appreciation of
actual trends gained thereby.
INTRODUCTION
TRADE BEFORE THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION
CHAPTER I
TRADE I¥ CZARIST RUSSIA
THE GROWTH OP TEE INTERNAL MARKET
The year 1861 marks an important stage in
Russia in the development of an internal market in
i
the modern sense. In this year the serfs were
liberated and almost'at the same time the construction
of the Russian railway system was begun. While
locomotion transport opened up new economic regions
and linked the existing ones with each other, the
emancipated peasants hurried to the bazaars in order
to dispose of their produce and thus to obtain the
'wherewithal for the payment of rent, that token of a
nascent capitalism. The industrialisation of the
country contributed in no small measure to the growth
of the market: it set in about the 'nineties and wasi
particularly intense between 1908 and 1913 which was|
also a period of good harvests.
The increased holding-power of the market called
forth new industrial enterprises, commercial organisations
and trading firms. The latter were predominantly
small-scale ^especially those connected with the
trade in grain which was and remained the chief
form of commercial activity. It linked together
1
tiny farms scattered over the country and petty traders
.
to whom the peasants sold their produce in small lois.
.
/By this we mean the widening of the area within whjj.ch
the forces of demand and supply tend to establish
uniform prices. - For details of internal trade and
prices in the earlier periods of Russian history cf.
e.g., P. Miliukov, Decriptions of the History of Russian
Culture, Vol.1, St. Petersburg, 1904, (R),pp.105 et seq.
JLhn analysis of trade-licenses taken out in the course
of 1912 reveals the following structure of Russian
trade at that time: wholesale trade 0.8%, retail tra.de
14.6%, small shop trade 51.6%, stalls 30.5%, hawkers
2.5%. (Cf. V.M. Ustinov, Evolution of Interned. Trade
in Russia 1913-1924, Moscow 1925, (R), p.4.)
j Immediately before the War, however, a certain ten-
j dency towards the formation of bigger trading units,
; mainly export firms dealing in cereals, could be no¬
ticed. Even railway companies engaged in the grain
trade operations and the banks contravened the law
by openly carrying on trade in grain and sugar on
their own account and^risk. Lastly^trusts and syndi¬
cates of the American type, largely financed by fo¬
reign capital, began to develop.
±n the years preceding the Warathe internal
consumption of such important and representative
commodities as sugar and butter, iron and coal in-
/
creased considerably. This, too, bore witness to the
continuous growth of Russia's internal market.
/ The average increase in the consumption of sugar
in the last five years before the War amounted to
4.38 million poods, in 1913 it was even as much as
6.98 million poods. Figures of butter consumption
are available for the years 1906-1912. The average
yearly increase amounted to 3.1 million poods: in 19H
it was 3.3 million poods and in 1912 4 million poods.
In.sDite of increased output, coal had to be impor¬
ted. Shortage of coal was so acute that in the middle
of 1913 certain classes of consumers were allowed to
receive it free of duty. (Cf. Ustinov, oo.cit.,pn.7
and 8). There was also "iron-hunger" throughout the
countryside, i.e., an intense demand for agricultu¬
ral machinery, setting in soon after the Stolypin
Reforms. But the supply of these goods was cut short
by a strong policy of industrial protectionism. (Gf.
Friedrich Pollock, Die .planwirtschaftlichen Versuche
in der Sowjetunion 1917-1927, Leipzig 1929, p.11).
VOLUME OF TRADE
Trade statistics "before the War were, as a rule,
very inadequate, foreign trade statistics being the
sole exception. Statistical information on the volume
of internal trade at that time was.'thus very scant
and while it has been somewhat enlarged by subse¬
quent investigations, it is still based on indirect
data only. The business tax, e.g., can be considered
as a fairly accurate budgetary reflection of the
state of industry and trade. The yield of this tax
came to 150,118 thousand roubles in 1913, 13.5 ner
cent more than in the preceding year. Another sign
of the growing volume of trade was the rising of
economic organisations. 372 joint stock companies
were launched in 1913; handicraft and small-scale
industry developed turning out about 1000 million
roubles' worth of goods in 1913. According to infor¬
mation of the Ministry for Trade and Industry pub¬
lished in 1912 3,994 commercial partnerships and
161 joint stock trading companies were in existence
at that time. Altogether the registered capital
which was working in retail trade amounted to some
340 million roubles. This figure excludes trading
firms under individual ownershin whose capital was
not subject to registration. The total number of
commercial enterprises may be obtained from the
number of licences taken out. In 1912 it amounted
to 1,224,898. An additional light on the volume
of internal trade is thrown by railway returns. The
State-owned railway system alone carried about
i11,571 million poods of merchandise in 1913. Accor¬
ding to fairly recent calculations by the well-known
Russian statistician Professor Strumilih*'trade turn¬
over increased by 281 per cent from 1885 to 1913
I while population had grown only by 57 per cent. Com-
j merce amounted to roughly 8 ner cent of the National
Income both in 1900 and in 1913. Its absolute in-
3
crease in these 1.3 years came to 74.6 oer cent-
Although undue faith should not be placed in
these figures (which are, at best, but illustrative
approximations), they nevertheless convey a certain
amount of information on the extent of internal trade
in pre-war Russia. They are hardly sufficient, how¬
ever, to enable one to formulate any dynamic laws
appertaining to it, except for the general statement
that to .judge by Strumilin's figures, (1) harvest
fluctuations had, contrary to the common belief, but
little influence on the volume of trade: and that (2)
the capitalist crisis in the 'nineties and the Russo-
Japanese War as well as the Revolution of 1905 per¬
ceptibly retarded its growth.
/Figures from Ustinov, op.cit. - "...the Russian
railway net, which at first clearly exceeded in its
traffic capacity the needs of the trade, was fast
outrun by the growth of the latter and began to lag
behind the requirements of the country. From 1873 on¬
wards, up to the last quinquennium before the Great
War, the goods traffic...was growing at the square of
the growth of the net itself. ... In the course of "fine
last quinquennium before the War, the density of traf¬
fic began to overtake the growth of the net by enor¬
mous strides, having reached the huge figure of 1.2
million ton-miles to one mile of line. This is a fi¬
gure never attained on any railway net throughout the
whole world." (A.A.Bublikoff, The Past of the Russian
Railway Economy, the Russian Economist, 1921-22,
pp. 2491-2). 1 Prof. S.G. Strumilin, Our Pre-War
Trade, Turnover, in Planovoie Khoziastvo /Planned Eco¬
nomy/, 1925, No.1. Cf. also the Statistical Appendix.
3 S.S.Ivlasloff, Russia after four Years of Revolution,
London 1923, p.30. These statistics expressly disre¬
gard the rise in prices.
It should he noted that trade tended to
gravitate towards the populated and industrialised
parts of European Russia, a fact which underlines
the backwardness of the various nationalities in¬
corporated in the Czarist Empire and their stepmotherly
treatment by the Authorities.*^
/"Trade facilities were very undeveloped and unequally
distributed throughout the country. In Tsarist Russia
about 94 % of the commercio-industrial turnover of the
country, and over 68 % of the total number of
commercial and industrial undertakings were concentrated
in populated districts which covered only 24.8 % of
the total population. A total of 6.2 % of the commercjio-
industrial turnover of the country was available for
all the rest of European Russia, not to mention the
Asiatic part of the Russian Empire. The supply of goods
to the distant regions of European Russia amounted
approximately to two copecks a day per capita. The
supply of goods to the Asiatic part of Russia was everi
more insignificant." (Socialist Planned Economy in
the U.S.S.R., London, 1932, pp. 61-2).
TRADE ORGANS
The trade of the country was predominantly in
private hands. Almost the only trading activity car¬
ried on 'by the State was the monopoly in the sale of
intoxicating liouors, re-introduced in 1894.
)
Hubbard describes the organisation of trade ac¬
tivity in Old Russia thus: "In ore-War Russia retailing
enterprises, from the big city shops to the small
country shopkeeper, bought their supplies partly from
the manufacturer direct and partly from the wholesale
merchants. The larger the retailer the more likely he
was to buy direct from the manufacturer, because he
was in.a position to take large parcels of uniform
goods and get better terms than from the merchant who
had to make his middleman's profit. This system re-
I suited in manufacturers establishing their own whole-
|sale warehouses all over the country alongside the■
{establishments of the wholesale merchants. And since
it was the custom for traders in the same sort of
goods to congregate in the same quarter, it was quite
.
possible for a retailer to buy identical goods from
the manufacturer's warehouse or from a merchant's
warehouse next door." This seems to us to be a rather|
'idealised account of actual conditions. It should
! not be imagined that commercial activity in Old
Russia as a whole proceeded neatly on the basis of
a ramified parallel network of wholesale centres. It
/L.E. Hubbard. Soviet Trade and Distribution, London
1938, pp.79-80.
lis a well-known fact that pre-war trade in Russia
was in the close grip of the middlemen because of the
low cultural level and apathy of the retail merchant
- the typical pre-war retail shop was a rather primi-
jtive establishment with a small turnover and poor
assortment - and also owing to the indescribably bad
road conditions which rendered the middleman's func¬
tions well-nigh indispensable.
The peasant bazaars were perhaps the most wide¬
spread form and source of supply to the townsfolk of
agricultural produce, especially of such perishable
goods as butter and milk, fruit and vegetables, and
poultry. Because of the backward state of communica¬
tions the radius of such supplies was fairly restric¬
ted and in course of time intensely cultivated agri-
uR.e>&-\r
cultural belts grew round the more important oonur
S&rrkBM8tJTS . /
be.t ion a like Moscow, St. Petersburg etc.
Another very common commercial (predominantly
wholesale) organisation in pre-war days was the fair.
Fair-trade in Russia dates back as far as the ninth
century. Its rapid growth was caused by the develop¬
ment of manufacturing and handicraft industries in
the nineteenth century. It was then that the fair of
Sfjafani Novgorod attained great fame and enhanced its
international reputation. In 1910 its turnover amoun¬
ted to some 900 million roubles and exceeded the
_
volume of transactions of the other major fairs taken
/ Gf. Hubbard, op.cit.,p.l39. It is interesting to
note that "despite the comparatively poor soil and un¬
favourable climate, the average money yield per acre
of land in the Northern Provinces was higher than in
the rich black-soil regions in the Centre and South."
(Ibid.)
together. The intense growth of fair-trade lasted un¬
til- the 'sixties, then its share in the country's to¬
tal commercial turnover began to subside. The number
of smallish fairs remained on the upgrade, however,
X
until the outbreak 01 the War. Such peculiarities as
inadequate transportation, a defective trade network
and the seasonal nature of the rural economy favoured
this development. The overwhelming number of fairs
was of an agricultural type, operating from one to
three days, often on holidays, so as to enable people
to trade and higgle at their leisure. There was a cer¬
tain amount of local specialisation, but the number
of properly specialised fairs (timber, furs, wool,
cattle, etc.) was rather insignificant. The impor-
3.
tance of commodity exchanges was also negligible..;-;,.
The War put a. stop to the development of Russian fair-
trade .
Our brief enumeration of the various channels
through which'*01d Russia's turnover of goods moved,
would be incomplete without a Tariof mention of the
co-operative movement. r*' .
The first attempts, since the 'sixties, to "im¬
plant co-operative institutions in a countryside still
living under conditions of isolated semi-natural eco-
h
nomy" proved abortive. Only towards the close of the
/Great Soviet Encyclopaedia (R), Vol LXV, p.763.
Jtln 1904 there were about 18,500 of them with a turn¬
over of 1,098 million roubles. In 1914 there were
29,800. (Cf. Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, loc.cit.J
3Cf. Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p.375.
George Pavlovsky, Economic Journal 1930, p. 135
century "the growing commercialisation of peasant far¬
ming , which accompanied the industrial expansion of
I Russia, provided a more favourable environment for
I the growth of rural co-operation." ^
Of the producers' societies the artels of handi¬
craft workers were, according to Paul "of signal im-
D
portance in pre-war Russia and developed to quite an
advanced state. The most advanced of the pre-war ar¬
tels was the Pavlovskaya Artel. ...(which) had its
j1
own warehouse in St. Petersburg."^
In the countryside agricultural societies took
the form of joint marketing and purchase, but the mcm-j
bers retained their individual holdings. Paul mentions!
the case of the Siberian Creamery Association whose
rise followed the building of the Trans-Siberian
Railway and which "ended by controlling virtually'
2
the whole of the Siberian export trade in butter."
The first consumers' societies in Russia were
established along English lines and "received en-
i
couragement from the liberal sections of the aristoc-l
racy and the intelligentsia of the period who saw in
the Co-operative Movement an instrument which in
Russian hands would enable their country to circum¬
vent the capitalist developments through which Wes-
tern European nations were passing." But despite all
the sunport "from above" the workers proved as un-
|receptive as the peasantry to the first attempts of
|TTbTdT "
XLeslie A. Paul, Co-operation in the U.S.S.R. A Stu¬
dy of the Consumers' Movement, London 1934, p.39
jj Ibid., pp. 40 et seo^.
j^Ibid., p. 35.
.
; co-operation. The proximate cause of the revival of
the co-operative movement in the 'nineties was the
I famine of 1891 which practically compelled, the town-
jworkers to combine against a rapacious commercial
class. According to Burrows^ Russian consumers' co-
I operation in pre-revolutionary times was the strongest
in the world. But its vitality was weakened by the
I fact that it was not outside the political and econo¬
mic influence of landloafe and factory owners. The ca-
pital of the Russian Co-operative Movement in 1914
| amounted to £,3 million, its turnover to /30 million
and its membership roughly to over one million and
f
I a half.
/R. Burrows, The Problems and Practice of Tconoinic
Planning, London 1937, p. 912.
1/Paul, op.cit., p• 38.
PRICE MOVEMENTS AND TRADE
j ,
I
| The description of the state of Russian trade 'be-
I
fore the War would remain incomplete without a brief
account of price movements and their influence on
commercial activity. It is in the price-sphere that
I
! the condition of the different branches of the na¬
tional economy, based on a "free" market, reveal them-|
|
selves and latent anomalies and weaknesses are most
easily discovered.
.
Absolute prices had been rising continuously i
|
since the 'sixties and there was a tendency for basicj
articles of mass-consumption to go up at an especially-i. •j X U
marked rate. Prices of these goods doubled during the
i
I
period, under observation and their ascent was parti¬
cularly pronounced in the first decade of the new
century, which registered a 25-30 per cent advance.
In 1913 the price of all commodities taken together
was 36.6 per cent higher than the average price of
(
the 1890-1899 period.
To a certain extent the upward trend was but a
reflection of the rise of world prices. Besides it
I
was natural enough that the industrialisation of the
*
country should have been accompanied by a rise in
j prices. It is, however, difficult to ascertain how
fsr the industrial price-boom was caused by the ex¬
pansion of the home market and to what extent it can
/
be ascribed to railway construction. I
r This group of commodities comprised cereals, ani¬
mal products, oil products, textile materials, mine-I
ral products, chemicals and grocferies. For detailed
information and sources cf.P.B. Struve and others,
Food Supply in Russia during the World War, Newhaven
1930? cf. also the statistical appendix.
Vh. P^krovs^, Brief History of Russia, London 1930, j
Changes in relative prices for industrial pro¬
ducts vese, apart, from being dependent on the varying j
ldegrees of protection, directly connected with mono¬
polistic influences. Methods of monopolistic price-
.manipulation and speculative devices in which the
banks participated prominently, were used in some
!industries such as coal, where the rise of prices was 1
•most conspicuous in conseouence.
! Prices of cereals which constituted the chief
item of Russian exports and paid off the country's
international indebtedness, had been-rising conti-
I
* 1
jnuously in spite of the relatively abundant harvests I
| I
|in the last five years before the War. This again was
.partly the direct result of rising world prices which
enabled. Russia, in the last pre-war quinquennium, to
bring her exports of grain up to 650 million poods
.per annum on the average, and is partly to be ex-




The above general quantitative outline of the j
I
{Russian price-structure, as it existed before the War,
I
does not carry us very far, however. It must be |
supplemented by a brief qualitative analysis of the price
situation which lays bare thcyfealient contradictions i
| . 4 . <
of Russian economy due to the peculiar inter-relations
of industry and agriculture. The position of agricul4
/The per capita consumption of bread by the Russian I
peasant was, however, far lower than that in any other
civilised country. Cf, Pollock,op.cit.,pp. 8 and 9;
The Times Book of Russia, London 1916,pp. 161-625 A. j
Yugoff, Economic Trends in Soviet Russia,London 1930,
table on p. 124 (showing total production of grain per
head of population in various countries). But as I
Vyshnegradsky, the Minister of State, said: "Though
hungry, we shall continue to export grain," (quoted by
Yugoff, op.cit., p. 123).
ture which represented the predominant economic ac-
tivity was precarious owing to the feudal system of
land-tenure with acute landhunger (in spite of na¬
tural abundance), small uneconomic holdings, agra¬
rian overpopulation and very limited purchasing
power"as concomitants. Russian industry, on the otter
hand, was still in its infancy and afflicted with
all the unhealthy traits of the hasty and rapacious
capitalist colonisation of the Russian Empire by
alien investors. Small in relation to the total po¬
pulation it was conducted on a large scale, depen¬
dent on the supply of foreign capital and eauipment,
'
and artificially fostered by a policy of intense pro-;
4
tectionism. Altogether it was a costly and inefficient
machine.
This being so, it is evident that however im-
/ In 1812 14?.2~million or 86 per cent of the total
population of 171 million lived on the land. (Fi¬
gures taken from Otto Hoetzsch, Russland, p. 16;
auoted by Pollock, op.cit., p. 8).
XJThis increased to some extent after the Stolypin
Reforms. Compare n./on p. ¥ . Cf. also L. Lawton, An
Economic History of Soviet Russia, London 1930, Vol.
I, p. 64._
J The traditional organisational form of the heavy in¬
dustries in Russia was the large-scale enterprise.
Prof. J. Mavor in his Russian Revolution, London 1938
goes even so far as to say that "Russia was a pioneer*
in this field long before large-sclae enterprises
were prominent in Great Britain or in Wester Europei1
(p. 306).
4"Russian industries grew up behind a high tariff
wall. In 1853, the percentage relation of customs
duties to the value of goods imported was 33 per
cent; under the influence of the tendency to free
trade principles, it dropped to 13 per cent in 1870:
the renewal of the protectionist policy broughtit
up to 28.7 per cent in 1890, and 32.5 per cent in
1900." (M.S. Miller, The Economic Development of
Russia., London 1926, p. 50). - "Comparing the rates
of import duty in Russia with those in other coun¬
tries, it appears that custom duties are highest in
Russia." (A. Raffalovich, Russia: Its Trade and
Commerce, London 19/<p , p. 308).
[pressive the absolute figures of the growth of inter-
Inal trade may be, the industrialisation of the country
[was hampered both by the high cost of production and
I jI
Ithe narrowness of the domestic market. Industry thus* V
1 could not strike firm roots unless within the bounda-
I
I
jries of Russia, among the peasantry - there should
come into existence a numerically large section of
I ^
effective buyers."
These marked misproportions were reflected in an
excessively high industrial price-level in relation
. +
to agricultural prices, high in the sense of being
untenable on the supposition of free movement of re¬
sources and economic non-intervention on the part of
the State.
The prices for the produce of Russian industry
L
exceeded by far those obtaining in the worLd market.
In 1918 only 5.6 per cent of the total exports was in
I industrial wares. Owing to the dearth of internal pur-
)
jchasing power the bulk of the industrial produce,
largely capital goods, was sold directly to the Govern-
|
I
jment. The manufactured goods that were produced were
absorbed by the cities and their underpaid workers
and only a very small part was taken by the country-
/yfugoff, op.cit., p. 30.
^S.A. Molchanoff, What Factors influence Commodity
Prices?, Moscow 1938, (R), p. 13, illustrates the dis¬
parity, before the War, between world and Russian
I prices for industrial goods by the following figures:
taking the Russian industrial price-level as 100 in
1913, the respective price-levels of the four main
industrial countries at the same time stood as follows!
England (Britain): 64; Germany: 55: France: 66: U.S.A.:
59. a memorandum issues by the I.L.O. for departmental
circulation (La Monnaie e't la Systeme des Prix en
U.R.S.S. /in typescript/) gives slightly different
figures for Britain (62) and France (67). Considering
the tender age of Russia's monetary economy we must
beware, however, of paying undue attention' to compa¬




Owing to the relatively low yields of Russian ag¬
riculture the country's position in facing world com¬
petition was, in terms of comparative cost, extremely
(weurv.
jnisation of export trade the foreign purchasers very often
had the supplies of grain thrust upon them in poor
=>k .besides, by reason of a totally inadequate orga-
(continued from previous page): According to A. Raffa-
lovitch (op.cit., p. 109) the movements in prices of
some manufactured articles and metals often changed
within the country independently of quotations abroad.
A good harvest had a greater influence on textile
prices than a crisis on the world's cotton markets:
an increase in Government orders was more important
from the point of view of the metallurgical industry
that a depression in the American or German metal
trade.
/M.S. Miller (op.cit., p. 109) points out that owing
to the prevalence of domestic or kustar industry the
country was not to any great extent a market for the
manufactured products of the towns and industry could
not become assimilated into the general economic stric¬
ture of the country. This view is confirmed by Pollock
op.cit., p. 13.
ZCf. M.S. Miller, op.cit., p. 56 and statistics on p.
59 which demonstrate "Russia's difficulty in keeping
up with countries in which more scientific methods
were employed" and show "that although her export of
grain increased greatly in amount, there was no corres¬
ponding rise in the price obtained from it. ... Russia!
share as supplier of the world market also showed a
tendency to diminish." These remarks do not match with
the account of the eminent Bolshevik historian M.N.
Pokrovsky (Brief History of Russia, op.cit., Vol. II,
pp. 33-4) according to which the rise in income from
the export of corn was greater thah the increase in
the quantity exported. But then Pokrovsky's statement
is based on a comparison between 1900 and 1910, while
M.S. Miller confronts the years 1909 and 1910. In any
case the income of Russian agriculture from imports is
because of constant fluctuations of world grain prices,
not always indicative of its competitive strength. It
should also be plain that a comparison,in terms of
purchasing power of gold, of the real costs involved
in agricultural production in (say) the United States,
a country with a full-fledged money economy^and Russia,
where money was scarce and credit facilities thorough¬
ly inadequate, hardly conveys very much. A contrast
in real terms (yield per unit of sown area) is there¬
fore to be preferred. Cf. Pollock, op.cit., p. 10,
who makes such a comparison, for different crops,
between Germany and European Russia.
condition, in quantities they were unwilling to accept
and at times when they were least keen to buy. Export
(prices then fell in comparison with those existing in
the domestic market. Being thus compelled to disoose• • • •
of the "surplus" grain at the relatively low export
i
(prices, the grain merchants tried to make good their
i
losses by charging correspondingly higher prices to
^the domestic consumers. This disparity between exoort
»-
and internal prices for grain can to a large extent
be.explained by the introduction of differential ta¬
riffs with reduced pood-verst rates for the transport
•
of grain to the ports. The freight schedule was con¬
structed in such a way as to favour internal and ex-
port movements of grain only within relatively short
distances: it thus weakened the bargaining power of
more remote areas, such as Siberia.
i '
The internal grain market itself, the pulse inv /
the blood circulation of the Russian economy, was
*v ^—*' * ——„ .
/ %N"* — "
characterised by an appreciable difference between4/ *• *—
speculative market urices and the local prices paid
— ••• --
to the small peasant within the country. Such a de-
velopment is indeed typical of a territory where
i
! means of transportation are thoroughly inadequate
for the establishment of a unified market price over
a large sjA Railway construction was hardly instru¬
mental in achieving a greater uniformity of agricul-
/
tural prices and eradicating grain speculation. Be-
/ "As communication increased the process of decentra¬
lisation of markets went on, and the relatively big
buyers having large trade capital at their disposal
gave way to numerous small buyers with whom came a
system of financial credit. Merchant and peasant
strove to cheat one another, and frequently the pea¬
sant, because he was poor, got the worst of the bar¬
gain. Thus the grain market was chaotic." (L.Lawton,
op.cit., Vol. I, p. 65).
pause of Ms extreme poverty the peasant had no other
alternative hut to sell the grain immediately after
he had harvested it. On the other hand, the local grairi
dealer (khlebnv skupshchik), often a mere agent of a
I
big firm in the city, could, afford to wait and availed
himself extensively of his stronger bargaining power.
The peasant, furthermore, was in most cases illiterate!
and without knowledge of the current export prices/
This state of affairs was also responsible for
undue fluctuations between the autumn and spring pri¬
ces, whose "normal" co-efficient amounted to 20 per
cent.*^ In autumn, when they were in desperate need of j
money so as to be able to meet their obligations such
las quit-rent, taxes and other charges, the peasants
[went into the market and sold the greater part of
their harvest at prices 25 to 30 per cent below the
usual local level. Being left without adequate supplies
of subsistence the same peasants had, with the advent
of spring, to buy back their own grain sometimes from
the very persons to whom they had sold it in autumn^
after having had recourse to the money lender and. ul~
U
timately being compelled to accept outside work. In
autumn prices were at their lowest because of the sud¬
den swelling of supplies. Then exports of grain set
in and the consumption of the cities added to the de-
/ C:f. M.S. Miller, op.citT, pp. 57-8.
^Cf. Turetsky, Methods of Price Planning, Planovoie
Khoziastvo, 1936 g^p3.' 115.
3cf. Mavor-y An Economic History of Russia,London 1925.
Vol. II, p. 289.
4"The proceeds from the sale of produce did not by any
means cover the whole expenditure of the peasant popu¬
lation, whose total money Income consisted up to 40 per
cent or more of wage earnings and the proceeds of han¬
dicrafts, cottage industries, etc.According to P.So-
kovnin in The Standards of Peasant Farming"on Allot¬
ment Land (St. Petersburg, 1907)...'the peasants' in-
pletion of the granaries. In January anci. February pri¬
ces began to rise^ reaching their culminating point in j
s ~pvil ri^, •
Another noticeable feature of the agricultural
pice-structure in Czarist Russia was the divergence of
about 25 per cent between market prices of consuming
regions ("The Hungry North") and the local prices of
producing areas/ a consequence of the disordered stain
of the market and the freight policy of the Government!
to which attention has already been drawn. The last
point to be noted is the wide range of price variations
over the different years to which both agricultural
products and raw materials were subjected, a further
Z
jproof of the instability of the rural economy
In view of the aforesaid it may be doubted whether
the peasants benefited to any great extent by the ab¬
solute rise of agricultural prices before the War. If
come from their allotment land, on the whole, falls
one-half or three-quarters short of the amount abso¬
lutely necessary for their existence and the deficien¬
cy has to be made good, as far as possible, by out¬
side earnings and by the lease of land from landowner;,1
(L. Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution, op.cit.,
p. 300),
/According to half-yearly figures for the years 1906-
1910. Cf. Turetsky, op.cit., p. 115. - The following
|table reproduced from An Outline of Political Economy
by I. Lapidus and K. Ostrovityanov, London 1929, p.37
is based on material taken from the Digest of Commodi¬
ty Prices for the chief Russian and foreign markets
for 1913, published by the Ministry for Trade and In
|dustry, Petrograd, 1914. It brings" out clearly both
seasonal fluctuations and regional differences of ag¬
ricultural prices in pre-war Russia:
| PRICES FOR RUSSIAN WHEAT IN 1913•IN MOSCOW AND N0V0-
!NIKOLAYEVSK (NOW NOVOSIBIRSK) IN KOPEKS PER POOD:
in
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Sept. Oct.
_ . _ _ _ _ _ . - - -
'Moscow 132 123 129 125 123 123 - 111.4 104.9




Z Cf. the statistical appendix.
one can give credence to Turetsky'the receipts of the
jsmall agricultural suppliers amounted, to about half
the: market price and if one takes into account that
about one-third of the money receipts of the small
peasants was earmarked for the payment of rates and
taxes, one arrives at the conclusion that the propor¬
tion of the market price for one pood of grain to the
net monetary return derived from its sale by the ori¬
ginal small supplier was 100:35,
A further factor which must be borne in mind is
that the prices which the peasants actually had to
pay for manufactured goods "on the snot" exceeded
those which made up the official, unweighted index of
| average wholesale commodity prices.'*"
The advance of money wages could not keen pace
with the rising food prices. Money wages of Russian
industrial, workers rose by about 18 per cent from
1901 to 1910, whereas the price for food in the same
period went up by 37.6 per cent^and that of goods of
C«©»I>
/ Turetsky, op.cit., p. llfi.JLstrangely enough Turetsky
speaks in this connection of average weighted prices,
[while in fact, the index expressed a simple average.
I On the whole the index-numbers of the Ministry of Com-
merce and Industry, which were started in the 'nine¬
ties, can be said to have. been both primitive and dis¬
torted.They were based on the wholesale commodity pri¬
ces during the decade 1890-1899, The number of obser-'
vation points varied according to the different cate¬
gories of commodities. (There were 7 groups of comrno-
difies comprising 66 items). The index was construc¬
ted once a year. First the arithmetical mean of the
single index was calculated and then the arithmetical
mean for the group-index was arrived at. These data,
are taken from the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol.
XXVIII, p. 91 and a paper by G.A. Pavlovsky (Notes
on Index Numbers of Prices), published in the Russian
Economist, 1922, p. 1885. Pavlovsky says that the 7
groups of commodities represented only 60 items,
while M.M. Sokolov, Soviet Economic Trends, Moscow
1931, (R), points out that the index was based on
prices ruling in the years 1840-1899.
j*Manuilov *s calculations. Quoted by Pollock, op.cit.,
p. 16.
prime necessity ( s. "basket" containing 14 articles)
increased by more that 47 oer cent/
'
Although Russia was selling wheat on the inter-
!
national market, white bread of the best Quality cost |
j
jin London 4-i to 5 kopeks, in Paris about 6 kopeks, in j
Petersburg 6-|- kopeks and in Moscow 7-g- kopeks. This is
(yet another illustration of the existing anomalies of
the Czarist price-structure and also points to the
probability that the retail margin in Old Russia was
appreciably higher then in the Western World.
/Turetsky, op.cit., p. 114.
Z3
CHAPTER II
EFFECTS OF THE WAR
THE DECLINE OF TRADE
The protracted war shook the economic life of
TO
Russia .in* its foundations. Very soon commercial acti¬
vity became paralysed and ultimately was laid in flat
ruin. The trade of a country is, generally speaking",
the most sensitive of all the economic links. Bearing
in mind the oarticularly unstable character of Russian
trade before the War, it is not difficult to see that
it succumbed to the ravages of the military conflict
without much resistance.
Economic life declined. The withdrawal of at
least one-third of the ore-war labour force and the
requisition of horses hit Russian agriculture very
/
badly. Big farms had to be closed down or let on
lease to the small and less efficient peasants. Con¬
traction of the sown area was the obvious conseouence.
Industry worked almost exclusively for the Government
and the exorbitant prices at which it offered a small
prooortion of its goods to the countryside made the
peasants even more reluctant to dispose of their pro¬
duce.
Already in 1914 a dearth of wares circulating" in
the market could be noticed. The army, counting about
15 million neople, diverted an enormous share of the
country's productive efforts. Although exports of
grain in 1915 amounted only to some 18 million roods
and ceased almost completely in 1817, all hopes of
/Cf. arugoff, on.cit., p7~34; and B. Brutzkus, Agrar-
entwicklune: und APrarrevolution in Russland, p. 139
et seq., Berlin 1925.
^/Pollock, on.cit., p. 20.
a sufficient supply of bread during the war-years
were bitterly disappointed. BrsM collections showed
lower yieldsj not only because of the contraction in
the sown area, but also on account of increased con¬
sumption by the countryside. The peasants were en¬
couraged to eat more bread because of the savings
forced upon them by the Prohibition (introduced in
November 1914") and owing to a certain degree of re¬
laxation in the methods of tax collection. The situ¬
ation became even more aggravated by the comparative¬
ly poor harvests during the war-years.
The quantity of grai& which was usually ear¬
marked for the needs of the internal market was
approximately halved by 1915. This^together with a
considerable drop in the supply of consumers' goods^
had the most adverse effects on the stat° of trade?
The disorganisation of the transport system (espe¬
cially after the Army's retreat in 1917 and its al¬
most complete breakdown) was another potent contri-
. !
-button to the atrophy of Russia's internal com¬
merce. Such goods as formed the object of trade in
those days, were very unevenly distributed and deep-
tFigures from Ustinov, op.cit., pp. 10-11. Taking_
gross grain collections at 100 in 1909-13 we obtain
the following declining curve: 1914 - 98.6; 1915 -
90.4; 1916 - 72.7; 1917 - 71.8; 1918 - 71.7. (Ibidv,
o. 11).
; ^Diminution in the quantity of grain reserved for the
market: 1909-13 - 1,100,331 thousand poods (average).
1914 - 802,789 th.p.; 1915 - 542,099 th.o. (Ustinov,
op.cit., p. 12).-"""-
3 M. Bartenev, Senior Factory Inspector for the Pro¬
vince of Moscow, wrote in a report: "Immediately af¬
ter the beginning of hostilities, there was a ground¬
less panic among the manufacturers. A wholesale cur¬
tailment of production^started. ... As a consequence,
production shrank by 25, and even as much as 50 per
| cent, in nearly every class of manufacture." (Quoted
in Foo^ Supply in Russia during the World War, pp.
246-47).
ened still more the gulf between producing and con¬
suming regions. This abnormal, disruption of producing
and consuming markets during the War caused "the effec¬
tive demand to break away from ordinary consumption
demand (and increase) and the effective supply to
break away from the potential supply (and diminish)."
Timely delivery of commodities under such con¬
ditions presented problems bristling with manifold
(
complications. The grain growing regions which could j
not help selling some of their "surpluses" had es¬
pecially great difficulties in marketing them owing
to the failure of the transport system. Flour mills
and sugar refineries were particularly badly hit. All
| kinds of devices were adopted to facilitate the move¬
ment of goods; bribes to transport officials were
| more fashionable than ever and if that proved to be
j of no avail, resort was had to carriage by road.
Traders 1 morals deteriorated in sympathy with
the general economic decline. Speculative purchases,
stock-jobbing and wilful detention of goods under con-
j ditions of an actual goods1-famine created artificial s
I shortages and yielded both illegitimate and excessive
profits. Stocks of comparatively abundant goods were
i kept "frozen" since they could not be exchanged
against a suitable equivalent. Confidence and credit
i became undermined. The banks invested all their spare
cash in buying up sugar, hides, meat, butter,cloth
| etc., in different parts of the country and excelled,
| even more than before the War, in illicit speculative
operations. In all, it was a sad picture of economic
decline, organisational coll.apse and moral, decay.
/"Food Supply in Russia etc.. op.cit., p. 384.
THE RISE IN PRICES
This economic disorganisation and the impact of
War Finance had their inevitable and obvious reper¬
cussions on prices. First, because of the marked con¬
traction in the exports ox' grain^ cereals seemed to
show a certain downward trend but^owing to the changes
I in agricultural production wrought by the War^the fall
was very soon arrested and agricultural prices began
to rise. This rise rapidly spread to other groups of
commodities and, before long, became universal/
The main economic reasons underlying these trends
have already been touched upon in brief. But apart
from changes in production and supply the main exter¬
nal contributory force was the continuous inflationary
money issues and the consequent fall in the purchasing
Z>
power of the rouble. Depreciation of the monetary stan¬
dard soon became cumulative and the speculative demand!
.
for goods, which were considered to be the safest means
of investment, undermined still further the stability
3
of the currency.
/Cf. the statistical appendix.
X-"The depreciation of the purchasing power of the ruble
which set in during the World War progressed at a re¬
latively moderate rate at first. The pressure of an
ever increasing number of notes in circulation, how&er,
compelled the purchasing power of the ruble to beat a
more hasty retreat. By the time that the Provisional
Government had been set up, the ruble's purchasing
power was less than one-third of what it had been in
1913. More than two-thirds of it# had been sacrificed
during the Czarist regime on the altar of the war."
(Arthur Z. Arnold, Bank, Credit, and Money in Soviet
Russia, N.Y. 1937, p. 87. - Cf. also Great Soviet En¬
cyclopaedia, Vol XII, p. 364).
3Still the Government succeeded in creating and main¬
taining the illusion of the rouble's stability, so
much so that a certain amount of hoarding was taking
place among the rural population during the War-years.
It was not until the outbreak of the February Revolu¬
tion that the country population became acutely aware
of inflation. "As the peasants continued for a long
time, in spite of a serious shortage of manufactured
goods, to accept money in exchange for their products,
The rise of prices was extremely erratic and un¬
even in different markets and as regards the various
classes of goods. Local conditions (such as delays in
transport etc.) and the degree of speculative influence
on supply were the main determining factors. Monopolis¬
tic groups (metal, coal) took increased advantage of
their unique position, thus adding to the general up- j
ward movement of prices. Already at the close of 1915
transport difficultiws made prices for grain in con¬
suming: regions exceed those obtaining in producing dis¬
tricts by 70-75 per cent, instead of the "normal" 25
per cent., and spring prices were 80-90 per cent.
higher than autumn prices as compared with the usual
/
20 per cent.
The evolution of prices presented a rather faith-!
ful picture of a dislocated War-economy and a demora-
i
lised trade. Its inflationary aspects made matters
worse. Before very long the position became intolerable
and public opinion began to clamour for Government in¬
tervention, in order to arrest the rise in the cost of
living.
(continued from previous page):we are justified
the belief that the advance in food prices, particu¬
larly those of cereals, must have failed to keep pace
with the advance of prices of manufactured goods, at
least until the early part of 1917." (Food Supply in
JRussia etc., op.cit., pp. 429-424).
/Turetsky, op.cit., p. 115.
CONTROL OF THE MARKET
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The attempts of the Government to regulate prices
wa^rendered difficult, first of all, by the lack of
legal provisions tested by practical experience. All
:
the measures had, therefore, to be hastily improvised
|to meet cases of emergency, such as serious def/icien-i
cies connected with the supply of the Army and looting
of provisions-stores and shops in the cities. As early
as July 31, 1914 the Minister of the Interior, N.A.
Maklakov, recommended the provincial governors "to see
to it that special orders be issued in the usual manna]
regulating the prices of articles of prime necessity
and to use their legitimate powers with a view to com¬
batting speculation and profiteering." Somewhat later
the new Minister of the Interior, A.N. Khvostov, tigh¬
tened up market control by means of direct police su¬
pervision. Thus, in February 1915 a raid on the "pro¬
fiteers" of the Moscow Stock Exchange was carried out
and was followed by similar measures in provincial ci¬
ties.
The formation of various regulative organisations
soon resulted in administrative chaos which the Govern¬
ment tried to stem by creating sundry co-ordinating
bodies, such as the Committee for Food Supply (May
1915) and the Special Council for Food Supply (August
1915). This effort of administrative simplification
failed, however, because the regulative organisations
that had been set up in the first place retained all
their powers.
T^e evolution of price-control during the World
War is not without interest, Its first stage was the
local fixing of prices by provincial governors starting
I
in 1914 on the basis of the ordinance of July 31 of
that year. By the beginning of 1815 as many as 45 pro-;
vinces had introduced some degree of local price-fix-!
ing. Usually price-regulation affected retail trade
only, but in some cases wholesale trade came into its
orbit as well. On the whole it may be said that local
price-control proceeded in a most haphazard, topsy¬
turvy manner. The provincial governors, invested with
extreme powers of intervention, whose scope was rather!
vague and whose legal basis was extremely questionable!,
used them, each according to his particular whim. Some
of them fixed prices of different articles, while
others simply prohibited "undue" price-increases. These
measures and the bases of price-fixation itself not
only lacked uniformity but often contradicted each
other; they only added to the market's degradation
and "made confusion worse confounded"! Furthermore,
owing to the continuous rise in market-prices, fixed
prices soon became totally divorced from economic re¬
ality and subject to large-scale evasion either by
way of illicit price-additions, agreed upon by sellers
and purchasers, or complete cessation of trade in re¬
gulated articles. Since control of shops proved of no
avail, exportation of articles with fixed prices to
other districts was forbidden, a measure which proved
to be very harmful to the national economy as a
I "As regards their areas of operation, regulated prices
sometimes applied only to cities, at other times to en¬
tire districts. ... these prices sometimes covered on¬
ly articles of prime necessity, such as bread and meat,
or bread alone, at other times they applied to an enor¬
mous list of commodities, including even paper, ink
and newspapers. In some places only the retail prices
were regulated, in others, both retail and wholesale.
In the manner of their elaboration, the regulated pri¬
ces were sometimes intended to be based merely upon
whole-'
The major weakness of local price-control lay in
the fact that, since it was, in the main, restricted
to retail trade (the last stage, that is, of price-for¬
mation) , it was powerless to influence in any way
those factors which were actually responsible for the
rise in prices. In cases where it covered wholesale
trade as well it only made matters worse, for it was
applied locally and was devoid of any measure of co¬
ordination, while the chain of wholesale trade opera¬
tions extended over, and cut across, several regions
of the country.
In June 1915 all regulative measures were abo-
lished and freedom of trade was re-established. The
failure of local price-control was thus officially re¬
cognised. Military difficulties, however, which be¬
came acute in autumn of that year, forced the Authori¬
ties again on to the road of price-control. In October
fixed prices were introduced for most cereals and ce¬
real products. Price-fixing became henceforward the
task of the Special Council and its subsidiary local
committees which had to ascertain the volume of food
supplies in different regions ana to supervise and en¬
force food collections at fixed prices on behalf of
the Government. In November 1915 the Special Council
was given the power to fix maximum (regulated) prices
for the commercial sale of foodstuffs and fodder
throughout the empire. The prices thus fixed remained
(continued from previous page): the probable cost of
the commodity to the dealer; at other times they made
an attempt to ascertain the correlation between demand
and supply in the given market and take it into account.
(Food Supply etc., op.eit., p. 38).
/ Cf. the ukase dated February 17, 1915 which severed
producing and consuming regions and undermined still
further existing exchange-relations between districts.
in force until after the harvest of 1916 and were, on
the whole, orientated, towards the market-level; under
certain conditions they could even he raised. The
difference between fixed and maximum regulated prices
resulted in a price-dualism which put a premium on
speculation.
In the autumn of 1916 which brought additional
economic difficulties in its wake, fixed prices were
extended to all agricultural products including sugar,
and covered every kind of transaction concerning their
/
sale. At the same time fixed prices for agricultural
products were introduced in consuming regions; they
were based on the prices obtaining in producing regions
with the addition of 6 per cent, and transport costs.
But they were evaded and market prices continued to
rise quite happily. Altogether this heterogeneous
price-structure had the most detrimental effects upon
trade.
In 1916 many respectable and large commercial
firms began to close down. Besides the S£ate resorted
I in an increasing measure to direct food collections,
while the volume of authorised Government purchases
through middlemen was reduced. Only the consumers' co¬
operative movement seemed to make headway fighting va-
'
liantly against the adverse forces which beset trading
activity. The Government availed itself fully of its
7From the moment of the extension of fixed prices to
all transactions, the significance of fixed and re¬
gulated prices was entirely changed, "...the fixed
price#..became a payment made to the producer of an
article which was recognised as the property of the
State and excluded entirely from commercial transac¬
tions, and not the payment for a relatively free pur¬
chase stimulated by fear of requisition in case of re¬
fusal to sell. ... there was no longer a regulated
price which was obligatory in business transactions."!
services and discovered the great usefulness of its
organisation for the distribution of foodstuffs to the
population. The result of this was what Paul describes
/
as the "unhealthy boom" of the co-operatives. Becaase
of the close relations of the consumers' societies
with producers' co-operatives, retail prices in co¬
operative shops were often lower than in private estab-
lishments. The population joined the movement in great
x
numbers, but despite the great services rendered by
the co-operatives to the state, the Czarist Government
feared their democratic potentialities, gave preference
to private traders in the handing out of their orders
and, generally speakiig, was rather hostile towards
the co-operative officials. The co-operatives tried to
set up in 1915 joint co-operative committees with, a
view to fighting the rise in prices, but these attempts
|were stopped by the Authorities.
The methods of regulating trade were, however, not
confined to administrative tampering with prices alone.
Although direct price-fixation remained the more im¬
portant form of Government supervision, the sale by
the State of government and municipal stocks ("goods-
(continued from previous page):...Fixed and regulated i
prices finally combined, as two different phases of
the same single system of supply, to form the purchase
and sale prices, respectively, of commodities monopo- ;
lized by the State." (Food Supply etc., op.cit.,pp.59-
:61). /Op.cit., p. 51 et seq.
l/i'Some indication of the growth of the Co-operative
Movement is given by the progress of the Moscow Union,!
which was equivalent to over a fifty per cent increase
on the previous total. ...Membership of the whole of
the movement was roughly 1,500,000 in 1914 and J.V.
Bubnoff estimated that this had increased to 13 million
households by the beginning of 1917, an exaggeration
probably, but even a twenty-five per cent erroyin the
estimate still leaves a growth of tremendous propor¬
tion." (Ibid., p. 54).
3Ibid., pp. 52 et seq.
intervention") at artificially low prices was also
applied on many an occasion as early as 1914. These
operations did not, however, attain a scale large
enough to make them important. In the later stages of
the War direct price control was supplemented by ra¬
tioning and ration cards were actually introduced in
various districts/The State gradually tightened its
grip over the market and the sphere of "free" commerce
contracted in proportion.
The regulation of the market had its political
aspects and its social consequences. In point of fact
the economic policy of the Government was influenced
by sundry political factions, but in decisive matters
the administration did everything to avoid the estrange¬
ment of the big landowners, the backbone of the Czarist
Empire. Attempts to fix prices for the more im¬
portant Army supplies, such as bread and fodder, be¬
came the bone of contention between bourgeois and
land-owning cliques. In spite of energetic opposition
on the part of the industrial capitalists and machi¬
nations of monopolistic groups, the landed gentry
fought bitterly for a rise in fixed agricultural pri-
ces. When in Novemebr'1916 a compulsory levy of grain
and fodder was ordained, the Czarist autocracy did
not dare to encroach unduly upon the interests of the
big land-owners. T&e levy requiring the suppliers to
deliver grain and fodder at fixed prices was concerned
not with the needs of the civilian population but
with the provisions of the Army only. While the front
was being supplied at fixed prices, civilians had to
/For particulars cf. Food Supply etc., oprcit., pp.
164 et seq. According to Monograph No. 9 of the School,
of Slavonic and East European Studies in the University
of London (The End of Rationing and the Standard of
purchase their foodstuffs in the "free" and "open"
market at inflationary terms.
The cost of living jumped up by leaps and bounds.
Notwithstanding its price-manipulation the Government
did not, in the long run, succeed in preventing shortage
of provisions in the cities which began to make itself
felt most acutely in 1916 and thereafter. The momentum
/
of inflation was most evident in manufactured articles.
The rise in price of commodities of prime necessity
soon outstripped that for semi-luxuries and luxuries
by 100-120 per cent. This hit the urban working classes
worst of all. In the first six months of the War pri¬
ces for articles of prime necessity went up by 40 per !
cent., while wages, during the same period, rose only
X/
by 1 per cent. Ttte "natural" rise in price of goods
of such importance as tea, tobacco, sugar, matches,
cause by War Economics and inflationary War Finance
was enhanced by the inequitable taxation policy taken
over from pre-war days, and certain supplementary ta¬
riffs introduced during the War which fell most hea¬
vily upon necessaries.
/Comp. p. ,17,note (3).
2-Turetsky, op.cit. p.116. This shows, incidentally,
that the keeping down of wages does not prevent in-
flat ion. under war conditions.
i (continued from previous page): Living.in the Soviet
| union; the mam cause for the restrictive measures
[ was not so much absolute shortage hast transport
difficulties. (P.2). 5-5
THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
One of the main issues in the demonstrations
which led to the Fehruary^Revolution was the organisa¬
tion of food supplies. The chief object of the Provi¬
sional Government's economic policy was to supply the
army and the civilian population with bread. The mono¬
poly in grain was introduced under the law of March
25, 1917. At the same time as this law was promulgated
the schedule of fixed prices for bread was revised and
was extended to wholesale operations. In most cases
the newly determined prices were fixed below the mar¬
ket-level, but market-relations were supposed to be
taken as a guiding principle for these calculations.
As political and economic chaos grew and the prin¬
ting press came to be used more freely than ever, mar-
ket prices rose rapidly, so much so that in autumn
1917 it became necessary to double the fixed prices.
This measure, however, did not prevent them from be¬
coming a mere administrative device, which private
traders sought to evade wherever possible. Neverthe¬
less, with the introduction of more stringent price-
control, private trade became still further contracted.
/According to the Julian calender the Revolution took
place in February. This accounts for the Revolution
being called sometimes the February and sometimes the
Revolution. The same applies to the October Re¬
volution. We have retained the historic designations.
All dates, however? are given in the new style.
-tBy autumn 1917 prices in 15 provinces of European
Russia exceeded spring prices of 1914 by 1 &A- times in
rye, aid 14^- times in oats. The priced of chintz in
Moscow in 1917 exceeded the price of 1914 by 16 times,
sheet iron rose 6 times, wire 12 times. (Ustinov, op.
cit., p. 14). During its short term of office (8mont^
the Provisional Government issued 3,000 million paper
roubles; this equalled the Czarist issues of the pre-
ceeding War-years. (Cf. Pollock, op.cit., p.24).
The control had to be extended to industry to in¬
duce the countryside to part with its grain surpluses
on the basis of an immediate exchange of commodities.
In the absence of nationalisation of industrial pro¬
duction and under conditions of falling industrial out¬
put the scheme of a direct goods' exchange between
town and country at officially fixed prices proved to¬
tally unworkable.
While trade was struggling with death^ rationing
was extended. In April 1917 the distribution of commo¬
dities by means of cards was decreed for all cities
and settlements of an urban type, while maximum norms
of consumption were fixed in respect of rural districts.
In July the Authorities took over the supply to the
population of goods like cloth, footwear, kerosene,
soap,etc. The idea of State trade was put forward and
tentatively discussed but it wras . never tackled se¬
riously.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To summarise the review of Russian trade before
the October Revolution the following features stand
out:
The development and growth of the Russian home
market in the modern sense dated back to the emanci¬
pation of the serfs and the construction of railways,
in other words to the beginnings of full-fledged capi¬
talism. The expansion of internal trade was accompa¬
nied by the formation of numerous industrial and commer¬
cial enterprises along capitalist lines as well as by
an increase in the production of consumers' goods.
Although figures relating to the extent of inter¬
nal trade prior to the Revolution are scant and un-
though top-heavy
reliable, its considerable^growth is beyond dispute.
The trade-network was undeveloped and the role played
by the middlemen was unduly great. The strength of the
co-operative movement was remarkably great.
Side by side with an all-round price advance the
price-structure of the Russian internal market appears
to have been afflicted with certain anomalous features
as, e.g., marked disparities and variations in agri¬
cultural prices, both through space and through time,
caused by the inter-relationships of industry and ag¬
riculture (the countryside being a poor market for in¬
dustry owing to a lack of purchasing power and the
prevalence of local kustar industry); government-in¬
tervention (protection, taxation); monopolistic for¬
ces, speculation and def/icient organisation of the
trade-network.
Russian trade, as a whole, was thus comparatively
unstable. The profits accruing from the price-boom
were largely pocketed by industrial and agricultural
speculators. Neither the peasantry nor the working
class benefited by it to any extent.
Owing to general economic decline during the War
Russian trade suffered a severe setback. Because of
the reduction and dislocation of productive activity^
as well as of general inflation^prices began to rise
all-round. The advance, however, was uneven and the
Ipre-war anomalies of the price-structure became accen¬
tuated.
Attempts on the part of the Government to regu¬
late the market and organise distribution by meanssof
direct and indirect price-control were much less
successful than similar experiments in Western coun¬
tries during the War, if only because of the lack of
an adequate supply of officials with a thorough commer¬
cial training. They were, moreover, half-hearted and
failed to arrest the rise in prices or bring order in¬
to the process of price-formation and prevent the shor¬
tage of foodstuffs. They were socially unjust and not
free from political intrigues.
The position deteriorated during the months of
the Provisional Government. Monopoly of grain was in¬
troduced and rationing extended. The Government was
well on its way towaais a monopoly of supply. Owing to
the acute transport crisis, private wholesale trade
became practically extinct, while the sphere of retail
trade was considerably reduced.
In conclusion it might be suggested that the de¬
velopment of trade in Russia before the October Revo¬
lution reflects the infantile stage in the development
of normal commercial relations between town and country
at that time. Because of Russia's vastness, of her sexii-
feudal methods of cultivation and forms of land tenure,
her inadequate transport system and dependency on fo¬
reign capital, the great economic and political power
of the big merchants and landowners as well as the
illiteracy, subservience and cultural degradation of
an impoverished peasantry and an underfed working class,
the market mechanism could not function properly and
fell far short of the ideal depicted in the text-books
of market economics. These features were intensified
by the turmoil of the War which shattered the frail
framework of the body economic.
The study of trade, as the focus of economic acti¬
vity jinthe old empire helps us to perceive the forces
which led to a complete collapse of the economic order
under the impact of external aggression and internal
social explosion, to grasp the nature of the economic
' ~ "
heritage handed down to the Bolshevks wlm , on Novem¬
ber 7, 1917, they assumed political power and to
appreciate some of the difficulties with which the
Russian Communists were confronted in their attempts
to evolve new forms of trade and distribution.
BOOK I
THE FIRST DKENNIUM:




The history of trade and distribution under what
is generally described as War (or Militant) Communism
can be adequately grasped only if it is presented
against the social and political background of those
momentous days. It is difficult to assess the true
character of this phase in the economic development
of the U.S.S.R. It may perhaps be most adequately de¬
scribed as having been both a Utopia and a species
of War Economics, both an attempt to introduce in¬
tegral communism into all spheres of life and an eco¬
nomic system forced upon the "Dictatorship of the Pro¬
letariat" by the needs of the Civil War then raging.
The present-day Bolshevik historian tends to skip over
the Utopian aspect of War Communism and tries to make
out that it was, almost exclusively, a system of emer¬
gency measures dictated by internal strife and exter¬
nal blockade. An analysis of the economic policy of
the Russian Communists in the first eight months af¬
ter their assumption of power (usually referred to as
the period of Workers' Control) seems to substantiate
this statement for, at that time the main efforts of*) 7 J
the Revolutionary Government were directed not towards
the immediate introduction of socialism but towards
taking over the "commanding heights" in the national
economy/The comparatively moderate course pursued at
i this preliminary stage of War Communism is clearly
/"...these measures were not intended for the imme¬
diate introduction of socialism." (The Economic Po¬
licy of the U.S.S.R., A Textbook for Soviet Party
Schools etc., Moscow 1931 (R), p. 57).
exemplified, as we shall see later, in legislation con^
cerning trade and the co-operative movement.
With the unleashing of the Civil War the period
of War Communism proper set in. Military victory be¬
came the dominant issue of the Revolution and Utopian
dreams of theorising intellectuals and enthusiastic
workpeople seemed to recede, although local schemes
of integral communism were being tried out all the
time. But towards the end of War Communism, viz., in
the second half of 1920 which brought the victory over
Kolchak and Denikin, the conclusion of peace with Es-
thonia and Latvia, and the lifting of the blockade by
the Entente Powers, the Utopian element revived. De¬
spite the restoration of peace the Soviet Government
went ahead, more vigorously than ever, with the orga¬
nisation of the national economy by methods of War
Communism. These consisted chiefly in the renewal of a
frontal attack on the market, a further centralisation
of the distributive apparatus together with the strict
/
observance of the class-principle in distribution,the
intensification of Glavkism and the tightening up of
the Prodrazverstka;? So blind were the professional re-
jvolutionaries to economic realities, so amateurish and
short-sighted in their economic analysis, and so chil¬
dish was their fervent belief in the possibility of
immediately inaugurating a full-blooded communist so-
£oh (NSTAtJce
ciety that they tried, erg., to displace the monetary
/I.e.,distribution "according to the social status of
the recipient.
^The term connotes the concentration of nationalised
industry in, and direction by, chief industrial boards
or departments attached to the V.S.N.Fh. (full title:
Vysshy Soviet Narodnogo Khoziastva), the Supreme Coun¬
cil of National Economy.
3 I.e., the compulsory requisition of grain. The offi¬
cial Soviet translation is "Surplus-appropration sys-
unit by a labour unit of account, the so-called "tred",
devised in strict compliance with the Marxian theory
of labour value; and this at a time of fantastic in¬
flation, illicit speculation and a complete break-down
of productive activity which made any kind of cost cat
culation, let alone of labour cost, totally impossibLa
The height of Utopian folly was reached when the .
Authorities made the attempt to 'shunt' the country¬
side, which after the Revolution was a mass of tiny
agricultural holdings without any proper equipment,
over to an immediate realisation of communism. This
policy was incorporated in the "Resolution concerning
the socialist organisation of agriculture and methods
I |
of setting it up", published on February 14, 1919. The:
Resolution declared that all types of individual/culti¬
vation were dying out. An artificial growth of collec¬
tive farms set in. In 1918 there were only 912 of them
and in 1920 13,607. The collectives were mostly com¬
posed of the poorest peasants and because of the lack
of adequate technical pre-requisites they began to
disintegrate almost immediately from the time of theip
inception; they were thoroughly unpopular with the
masses of the peasantry. Still, when sowing activity
declined as a result of the Civil War and Government
compulsion, the Eighth Congress of Soviets found no
better method of saving agriculture than that of
passing, in December 1920, an equally Utopian "Reso¬
lution concerning the means of strengthening and de-
velopingtagriculture". It envisaged the compulsory
sowing of fields within a general sowing plan and spe¬
cial sowing committees were charged with the supervi-
/ Cf. infra.
sion of the whole scheme - which, needless to say,
could, never be put into practice.
In point of fact, all these efforts of peaceful
economic reconstruction along "War Communistic" lines
(which had to be discontinued because of the commence¬
ment of hostilities with Foland) only increased econo¬
mic chaos and demonstrated howr Utopian it was to ex¬
pect to achieve communism at a moment's notice. "It
became clear", said the realist Lenin, in his Politi¬
cal Report to the Tenth Congress of the Communist Par¬
ty9"that this transition has to be much slower than
we have expected, we need a much more lengthy period
of preparation, ...-this is the lesson we have to
learn." The abandonment of War Communism on March 21, :
1921 dealt a severe blow at Bolshevik Utopianism (but
did not kill it) and meant a victory for Bolshevik
Realism.
These general remarks on War Communism may suf-
;fice as an introduction to the following analysis of
trade and distribution during this period.
LEGAL PRIVATE' TRADE
The general belief seem^ to be that as soon as
the Communists assumed economic control they at once
swept away all that remained of private trade after
the long War-years of decline. This is not quite so
and/shows that although avowed enemies of private
commercial activity, the Bolsheviks did not think it
advisable to oust at one stroke all the remnants of
legal private trade.
Thus they did not, as one might reasonably have
expected, introduce at on| prohibition of all private
trading. On the contrary, as Professor Ustinov points
out in his survey/they issued, on November 11, 1917,
a decree proclaiming a two months' moratorium with the
aim of removing the difficulties forth which trade had;
been confronted owing to the Revolution. Even as late
as 1918 one can discover decrees indirectly favouring
private trade. The decree concerning the reorganisa¬
tion of the Peopled' Commissariat of Supplies, the
I
Narkomprod, expressly stated that private dealings in
articles of prime necessity were allowed, provided
that they were properly controlled and carried out in
accordance with the regulations laid down by provin-
cial supply organs and the general rules of the Nar-
; komprod itself. On August 18, 1918, all commercial
and industrial firms were invited to register not
later than by December 15 of that year. And despite
the supposedly rigorous compliance with the State
: /Ustinov, op.cit., p. 28. /
2/Its full title was Narodny Fommissariat Prodovolstia
A A
Monopoly in grain, which was claimed, to be much supe¬
rior to that practised by the Provisional Government
and which by autumn 1918 was extended to include all
basic foodstuffs, the Government still thought it ad¬
visable to utilise private initiative and called upon
commercial firms dealing in grain and flour-mills to
assist the Authorities in their .^rain-collections.The
Narkomprod's circular of June 7, 1918^which reconmen¬
ded this policy to the executive organs in the provin¬
ces, even went so far as to make co-operation with
private trade compulsory where ah adequate State or¬
ganisation of collections did not exist. As late as
August 1918. the exchange of foodstuffs against manu¬
factured articles could be affected through the
channels of private trade.
As production declined and the question of fee¬
ding the Red Army and the workers became increasingly
acute, organisation of foodsupply came more and more
i under the orbit of the State. A decree, dated Novem¬
ber 21, 1918 ' charged the Narkomprod with the collec¬
tion of products of mass consumption. At the same
time the decree prescribed the procedure connected
; with the nationalisation of commercial firms. The
decree proved to be the beginning of the end of legal
private trading activity under War Communism. But
| while it abolished private wholesale trade completely
j - there was not much ibeft of it anyway - retail trade,
j although severely restricted, continued to exist even
I /"For details of this important and comprehensive de¬
cree cf.The Collection of Decrees and Resolutions
concerning the National Economy, Moscow 1920, (R),
pp. 660-663. By an earlier decree, dated May 27,1918
the Narkomprod was transformed into a general centre
I for catering and distribution.
after the publication of the decree, largely in the
form of bazaar and fair-trade. The number of goods,
however, which were allowed to form the object of
private retail trade, was gradually being curtailed.
In view of the socialisation of industry,'' only a few
articles of the kustar industry remained in legal -pri¬
vate! circulation. As regards foodstuffs,only the so-
l
called "non-normed" articles, i.e., those which were
| not included in the scheme of centralised supply, were
allowed to be handled by private trade. But hostility
among the Communists towards private commerce grew
rapidly as the revolutionary momentum increased: even
in its reduced form private trade was opposed by lo¬
cal executive organs and over-zealous workers who for¬
med so-called "stopping detachments" alongside the
railways. These detachments wrere supposed to requisi-
i tion goods prohibited to private trade. Very often,
| however, it so happened that the "non-normed" commo¬
dities were seized as well. The Central Government de>-
precated these practices', since Government supplies
were very inadequate and the possibility of acquiring
additional food from private dealers was most valuable.
An order issued by the Council of Labour and Defence
3
of Workers and Peasants ("S.T.O.") and a Government
£
decree of January 24, 1919 reiterated the right of
private commerce to trade in "non-normed" goods and
prescribed penalties in case of unlawful seizures.The
"Ekonomicheskaia Zhizn" announced in May 1919 thatpin
/The first comprehensive nationalisation order was
published on June 28, 1918.
/-According to Ustinov (op.cit., p. 37), at the end of
1918 the "non-normed" articles comprised the following
goods: potatoes, milk, sour milk, cream cheese, fresh
and dried fruit, fowls, game} mushrooms, honey and
econo
view of the wide-spread anxiety among the population^
the Authorities had to deny rumours about the prohibi¬
tion of private trade in "non-normed" goods; and accor¬
ding to reports in the same paper, 78 licenses to trade
in "non-normed" commodities, and 169 licenses for
other classes of merchandise were issued in Moscow in
August 1919.
Meanwhile,the movement in favour of the complete
suppression of legal private trade in every form was
constantly gaining strength. This movement was in¬
spired by an increasing shortage of goods coupled with
the realisation that private traders becoming the
centre of extensive speculative activity and illegal
commercial operations of all sorts. Agitation assumed
two forms, positive in the desire to foster complete
State control of supplies, and negative in its demand
of
for a ruthless suppression of speculation and.Athe
illicit market.
THE ORGANISATION OF SUPPLY AND
DISTRIBUTION
An adequate supply of bread to the Red Army and
the working class was a question of life and death for:
the Revolution. In the words of Lenin the fight against
famine was not only a fight for bread alone; it was al¬
so a struggle for socialism/ As soon as Kerensky was
overthrown,the State Monopoly in grain was confirmed
by the new administration, rigorously put into prac¬
tice and gradually extended to all foodstuffs. While,
as we have seen, the market-mechanism remained to a
certain extent intact during the period of Workers'
Control, the State Monopoly in foodstuffs created the
necessary conditions for the realisation by the State
of a unified policy of supply.
Preparatory measures were concerned with the or¬
ganisation of collective exchange of goods between
town and country on a large scale. The decree of April
2, 1918, introduced commodity-barter on a voluntary
basis. With the strengthening of the principles of
%
j War Communism these operations were made compulsory.
At that time the Government had already, by means of
nationalisation of industrial production and whole¬
sale trade, concentrated the bulk of manufactured pro
duce in its hands. Special funds of manufactured goods
were earmarked for purposes of commodity-exchange in
accordance with the agricultural collection plans of
the Government and allotted to the various stores
(State, co-operative and sometimes private) on condi¬
tion that 85 per cent, of their value had to be paid
for in kind, i.e., in agricultural produce.
Th#Dg&gg'"& i8ffiMg,afuM&tv'H3.gjt.B.32
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The scheme did not yield substantial results,
stocks
largely because the. fends of manufactured goods were
by far inadequate and covered only some 20-25 per cent.
/
of the quantity of bread to be collected. Besides, the
disorganisation of transport made it difficult to
carry the manufactured goods to the villages. Both vo¬
luntary and compulsory exchange of goods proved un¬
successful and^on February 2, 1919, the Government
was forced to decree the compulsory assessment of all
grain-surpluses' (Prodrazverstka) .^Shortly afterwards
the scope of the decree was extended to all agricul¬
tural raw-materials. This meant that the bulk of ag¬
ricultural produce was withdrawn from circulation.
/According to Ustinov,(op.cit., p. 34) the population
of Moscow obtained in 1918 only 54 per cent, of the
food which had been promised by the supply organisa-
| tions.
^The introduction of these measures was, of course,
not solely due to the failure of the goods-barter ope¬
rations, but was also dictated by purely military exi-
| gencies. Maurice H. Dobb, writing in the Encyclopae¬
dia Britannica (Vol. 19, p. 707) describes the econo¬
mic results of the system of compulsory levies thus:
"Previously the poor return (in industrial goods) which
the peasant secured for his produce caused him to hold
back grain from the market. Now this loophole was
closed to him; but the lack of incentive merely trans¬
ferred its effects a stage further back, causing the
peasant to restrict his. sowing of grain and to con¬
fine his efforts merely to cultivating and harvesting
; as much produce as he required for his own needs."
| According to Larin and Kritzmann, Wirtschaftsleben und
| Wirtschaftlicher Aufbau in Sowjet-Russland 1917-1920,
j Berlin 1921, p. 153, the harvest yield, expressed as
| a percentage of the last decade before the War, amoun¬
ted to
1917 93% 1919 80%
1918 89% 1920 70%
The immediate results, however, as expressed in the
quantity of grain collected, were rather encouraging.
: A publication of the Narkomprod (Four Years of Supply
Organisation,(r],1922) gives the following figures:
Amount of grain collected (in million pood):
1917/18 47.5 1919/20 222.2
1918/19 108.0 1920/21 366.8
(Other sources give slightly different figures).While
the major problem, viz., the feeding of the Red Army,
I was thus solved to some extent, the threat of famine
in the cities remained.
The already greatly curtailed exchange-relations
between the different branches of the nationalised in¬
dustries were severed. The centralisation of industries
in Glavki excluded monetary contacts among enterprises.
All movements of material values were accomplished by ;
means of orders and decrees from the Centre. The Glav-
ki were not authorised to make any independent purcha¬
ses. They handed over their production to the appro-
priate departments of the V.S.N.Kh. and, at the same
time, sent in their demands for new supplies. The
Glavproduct (chief produce) department of the Narkom-
prod was charged not only with the collection of essenj-
tial consumers' goods, but undertook likewise to supply
the urban population with necessaries as well as with
vital services (e.g., catering, transport, housing,
amusements etc.) directly and free of charge.
The collected foodstuffs were allotted to the main
classes of consumers, e.g. , the Army, the factory wor¬
kers, the urban population etc., and distributed as
rations'by the military bodies, State shops and the
co-operatives. Composition of the rations varied accor
ding to the social category of the recipient, which
was considered as the final test of an equitable dis¬
tribution.^
The structural evolution of the co-operative sys¬
tem in that period is rather noteworthy for it reflect
)
ithe logical completion of the whole complicated system
53
/Bread-rations were on a daily basis.
^Distribution was thus based on the so-called "class-
principle". There were four main categories: (1) fac¬
tory (manual) workers; (2)their families; (3)salaried
officials and employees; (4) the "leisured" classes.
The rations of the second and third categories were
identical, shock-workers were supplied with additional
rations; nursing mothers and children had special cardb.
For details on rationing cf. Larin and Kritzmann, op.
cit., p.71 and Yugoff,op.cit., pp. 38-39.
of centralised supply. With the elimination of private
trade it became the main legal channel of distribution.
Although the co-operative movement has no place in a
a complete communist society, Lenin and his followers
at first not only thought it desirable to preserve
the co-operatives for the time being but actually adop¬
ted a conciliatory attitude towards what they des¬
cribed as its "bourgeois" personnel. In the negoti¬
ations leading up to the "compromise-decree" of April
11, 1918, the co-operative societies undertook to
serve the whole of the population (and not only their
members), in the districts under their purview, hot
more than two co-operatives, one open to workers and
the other to the general public^were to exist in any
one district. From the communist point of view the
compromise consisted, as was pointed out by Lenin, in;
the "bourgeois" officials retaining their positions
!
and their voting powers, and in the Government shel¬
ving its demands for the introduction of membership
without fees and the grouping of the entire population
of a given area in one single co-operative. But with
the stlengthening of the revolutionary regime and the
extension of State regimentation to all provinces of :
the economy, especially to that of agriculture, the
Bolsheviks abandoned their conciliatory mood and in
the decree of March 20, 1919, repeated their major
demands on which they had so unwillingly compromised
for purely}?olitical and tactical reasons. The struc- ;
ture of the co-operative movement was entirely changed!.
United consumers' communes, comprising all consumers'
organisations (workers', general and rural^were set
up, the population of each district being attached,
on a compulsory basis but free of charge, to one single
co-operative. It was almos#3#"ear until this decree
could be put fully into practice. The re-organisation
was coupled with a thorough purge of the staff. The
"bourgeois" elements were ousted and replaced by trus¬
ted Communists, whose fervent revolutionary zeal was
considered as sufficient compensation for their lack
of skill, experience and training. The Centrosoyuz
(Central Union), the co-ordinating organisation, was
turned into a department of the Narkonprod. At the
beginning of 1921 the Russian co-operative movement
had lost all its former relative independence and had
become a mere link in the vast chain of economic in¬
tegration devised by War Communism.
/For a detailed description cf., e.g., The Co-operative
Movement in Soviet Russia. I.L.O. Studies And Reports.
Series H,No. 3, Geneva 1925.
ILLICIT TRADE
AND THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE MARKET
Under conditions of economic decline, the ravages
of the War and the shortcomings, both quantitative and
organisational, of State supply/ the population was dri-
'
ven to resort to the services of the underground mar¬
ket. Illegal private trading activity continued to
exist during the whole period of War Communism and its
transactions reached very considerable proportions^Air-
though the State did everything to curb the activities
of the notorious "bagmen" who smuggled foodstuffs in
sacks from the villages for sale in the towns, it had
to tolerate them at the outset because they supplied
the famine-stricken townspeople with the essentials of
life;? It is characteristic of this toleration that for
/At the end of the period under review the Narkomprod
had to look after 38 million people, a tremendous task
considering the inefficient working of the distributive
machinery. The population lacked all essentials. Accord
ding to Kritzmann's calculations (quoted in Z.B. Atlas*,
Money and Credit under-Capitalism and in the U.S.S.R.,
Moscow 1930, (R), p. 173) the proportion of rations in
the budget of the average Russian worker amounted to
41 per cent, in 1918, 63 per cent, in 1919 and 76 per
cent, in 1920.
j£ln the beginning of War Communism the share of money
wages was considerable enough to make it worth while
for the worker to supplement his short ration by pur¬
chases in the illicit market. According to ZMrmunsky,
The private commercial Capital, Moscow 1924 (R), 52.7
per cent, of the urban population's needs in producing
regions, 62.3 per cent, in consuming regions as well
as 65.2 per cent, of the requirements of the rural po¬
pulation in the consuming districts were supplied by
the "black (illicit) market".Jin an article entitled
"Economics and Politics in the Epoch of the Dictator¬
ship of the Proletariat', published in 1919, Lenin
stated that roughly half of the bread in the cities
was being supplied by the Narkomprod and the other
half by the bagmen. Cf. also L. Lawton, op.cit., Vol.
I, p. 117. For statistics of the relative influence
of bagmen in consuming and producing regionscf. Zhir-
munsky, op.cit., p. 2.
a short period in 1918 the so-called "self-supply" by
imeans of workers' purchase-expeditions to the villages!
and, later on, by private bread-sales to specific
classes of the working population and limited in quan¬
tity were allowed by law.
Besides, the existence of the illegal market made
it possible for the Bolshevik Government to squeeze
the maximum amount of real values out of the propertied
population by means of inflationary levies. At the be¬
ginning of the period of War Communism the chief means
of financing Civil War was the printing-press, "the
machine gun of the Commissariat of Finance that poured
fire into the rear of the bourgeois system." ^As long
as industrial production was not completely national¬
ised and the requisitions of grain were not in full
swing, the Government was, in a sense, favourably in-
ciK
clined towards the maintenance ofAunofficial market-
sphere of fair proportions where the monetary tokens
were still accepted. For, obviously, the profitable¬
ness of a real tax in the disguise of inflation ceases
! "where no goods axe brought on the market for sale
against money (but are bartered or hoarded instead) j
and where consequently the purchasing power of money j
and the ability of the Government to raise real re-
sources by inflation is reduced to zero."
/ E. Preobrazhensky, Paper Money during the Epoch of
the Dicatorship of the Proletariat, Moscow 1920 (R),
p.45 (quoted by A.Z. Arnold, Banks, Credit and Money
in Soviet Russia, New York, 1937, p. 96).
jtM.Dobb, Russian Economic Development since the Re¬
volution, London 1929, pp.92-93. - The following table
reproduced from Arnold, op.cit., p. 95, shows the
share of the printing-press in supplying the State
with revenue during the different years of War Commu¬
nism: (continued on next page)
The illicit market was a market run mad and it
became madder, more perverted and uglier still as the
consummation of that astonishing period grew nearer.
Driven underground, it revenged itself in a terrible
and uncanny way by cutting off all the muscles and
tissues of the economic organism. The vicissitudes of
the military campaign?as well as the absence of a cen¬
tral executive power^resulted in the splitting up of
the territory into parts and districts, severed from
each other and in themselves not units at all. Under
these conditions it was clear that all those who po¬
ssessed secret stores of goods enjoyed a monopoly po¬
sition. In times of economic standstill and disruption,
everything is in keen demand. The "scaLe" of priorities;
in the cities consisted some^times of one item only:
bread. The starving inhabitants were prepared to give
almost anything in exchange for a bag of flour. Things
like jewels, gold etc., which constituted the remains
of wealth in the hands of the dispossessed bourgeoisie
experienced a catastrophic fall in value. These people
were at the absolute mercy of the bagmen and indiscri¬
minately handed over theirprecious belongings in order
to evade starvation. But such sorry remnants of private
exchange were not allowed to exist very long.
* For the last ultra-utopian phase of War Communism
.
inescapably undermined the very foundations of market-
circulation, whether legal, semi-legal or definitely
illicit. Industry was co-ordinated in a gigantic super!
!(continued from previous page):
Revenues in 1918-21 (in millions of pre-war
roubles)
1918-19 1919-20 1920-21
From note issue 523 390 186
253 480
Total 644 —ms 566
centralised, organism, the Prodrazverstka was pushed
to the utmost limit and, in the financial year 1920/21.,
yielded about 70 per cent, of the quantity of grain
that had been available for consumption in the home
market before the War, surely an astonishing accomplish¬
ment. The Narkomprod's sphere of operation was exten¬
ded. Under such entirely and radically altered econo¬
mic conditions "free" goods' exchange was bound to
contract rapidly and progressively. This process can
*.
to some extent be gauged by the measure of decline in
real purchasing power of the total volume of money. 1
Inflation, as a device for extracting real values from
the body economic^became less and less effective, and
monetary'. revenue and outlays played a negligible part
2
as budgetary items in 1920. Inflation became increa¬
singly a conscious method of dispossessing the rem¬
nants of the propertied classes, of demolishing the
monetary token as such and of expediting the building-
up of a purged system of communist distribution with¬
out the intervention of medium and free from "capita¬
list loopholes".
Once the Soviet Government had destroyed all the
essential pre-requisites of a tolerably normal market
mechanism it launched an energetic campaign against
/ Ef. Arnold, op.cit., p. 93. (Table showing the pur¬
chasing power of the total volume of paper money in
the years 1914-1922). The total issue of paper notes
from' November 1917 up till March 1921 amounted to
1,664,911,000 roubles. The purchasing power of the
rouble, already reduced to 1.06 gold kopeks at the
beginning of the November , was further decimated to
0.1 gold kopeks by October 1, 1919, and to 0.01 by
October 1, 1920.
^Monetary taxation lost its importance in 1919. Z.B.
Atlas (op.cit., p. 173) points out that,according to
Galovanov's ai.culations, only 126 million gold roubles
(or 7.3 per cent, of tire total State revenue) repre¬
sented monetary expenses in 1920. The real yield of
inflation was thus very small indeed.
illicit trading. It thus added administrative punish¬
ment to economic annihilation.
The speculative abuses of the illegal market had
surpassed everything of their kind, so much so that
the places of illicit trading were very often supplied
from State warehouses with the help of bribed and
corrupted officials. This state of affairs could not
be tolerated indefinitely by the Authorities. Raids
and confiscations became more frequent/ As an illu¬
stration of this tendency the decision of the Petro-
grad Soviet of July 1920 to exterminate private comm¬
erce with all the weapons at the administration's
command and the closing down, in December 1920, of the
famous Sukharevsky Bazaar in Moscow are indeed typi¬
cal. Punitive expeditions were carried out with a
certain ruthless enthusia^, for the free market in
general was "the supreme abomination to the hard-
shelled communist and anathema according to the dog-
%>
mas of the Communist Manifesto."
/The severity of the regulations can be gathered from
two typical orders against speculation, reprinted in
John Reed, Ten Days that shook the World, London 1926,
Appendix, pp. 311-312.
^Kurt Wiedenfeld, The Remaking of Russia, London 1924,
p. 90.
PRICES, COSTS AND EXCHANGE-EQUIVALENTS
Lenin and his followers regarded the price-poli¬
cy of the Czarist regime, particularly during the War,
as a means of keeping up the profits of the various
vested interests, i.e., of maintaining the margin of
profits over and above costs at least constant, irres¬
pective of whether or not such a policy would lead to
! a. deterioration in the standard of living of the
poorer classes of the population. As regards the Pro¬
visional Government the Bolsheviks considered its dis¬
positions in the sphere of prices half-hearted and
devoid of revolutionary purpose, since en effective
system of price-regulation could only be established
by control of production itself .Having na.tiona3.ised
production, including the production of manufactured
I goods, the Soviet State could, it was said, enforce
the fixed prices for grain far more effectively than
the previous Governments.
There seems to be little doubt that^in the first
I
j stages of War Communism, i.e., prior to the introduc-
| tion of the Prodrazverstka, the Bolshe-\aks hoped to be
able to rely on the possibility of extracting "sur¬
pluses'1 of grain from the countryside by the method
of price-fixation.^An effort was made to bring the
price-schedules into line with monetary depreciation.!
Consequently, on August 8, 1918, the fixed prices forj
cereals were increased threefold. But although valid
for a limited period only, viz., until December 1,
/At the beginning of the collection campaign in May
1918 Lenin urged that each superfluous pood of grain
should be requisitioned by the Government. "How can
this be done ? It is essential that the Government
should fix prices." (Lenin, Collected Works, Russian
edition, Vol XV, p. 340).
1918, they were soon overtaken by prices obtaining on
the free market. At the same time, however, the price-
fixing organisations strove# to revise the price-
schedules in such a way as to make them conform, as
closely as possible^to the pre-war exchange-ratios
between manufactured and agricultural goods. But even
this so very unsatisfactory pre-war position could not
! always be achieved, although the fact that industrial
production was vested in the hands of the State ren¬
dered the task somewhat more practicable than it was
| during the War.
With growing economic chaos and inflation, price
policy as a means of gathering in agricultural re-
| sources and of regulating the economic relations bet-
I ween town and country was resorted to less and less.
The decree of August 8, 1918, concerning the organi-
: sation of State-barter, reduced the volume of trans¬
actions in money to 15 per cent, of the value of in-
I dustrial goods to be exchanged against agricultural
produce. With the rapid deterioration of the monetary
: incentive prices became increasingly a merely nominal
framework of exchange-equivalents as decreed by the
Narkomprod for purposes of barter between town and
country.
When the Bolsheviks finally embanked upon the
compulsory assessment of grain, whereby1 maximum quan¬
tities of grain had to be collected in exchange for
whatever manufactured goods happened to be at the dis
posal of the Authorities at a particular moment and
in a given district, fixed prices began to lo^se their
meaning^even as indicators of exchange-ratios# In
cases where they were retained, they were supposed
"bo serve as units of account, for the goods handed out,
and received by, the State. In view of economic de -
cline and inflation it may be doubted whether they were
in any ways superior to straightforward entries in
terms of simple physical quantities.
The system of economic calculation broke down com¬
pletely. The immediate cause was, of course, the demo¬
netisation of the rouble. Only towards the end of War
Communism attempts were being made to allow for depre¬
ciation by means of price-indices. These were of no
avail, for the difficulties were only superficially
attributable to inflation. The main reason was that
the economic basis of the market had been destroyed
land had not been replaced by any unified economic plan
Which would have made due provision for accumulation,
an impossible scheme under the then existing condi¬
tions .
As things were, industrial enterprises ceased to
I
ibe independent economic units producing for profit in
|the capitalist sense. Their integration in the Glavki
and the Supreme Council for National Economy was justi
fiable only from the point of view of war economy, i.e
as a system of economising existing stocks and concen¬
trating the remains of productive activity in the in¬
terests of the Army and other politically privileged
i
sections of the population. Such a type of planning
could not, however, prevent the dissipation of economic
|resources.
Maurice Dobb, in his Russian Economic Develop-
/'The former unit of account, because of its instabili¬
ty, was useless and even dangerous as a measure, and
no new unit had been found in its stead." (Dobb,
Russian Economic Development, op.cit., p. 131)
ment^ describes the abolition of economic accounting du¬
ring that period by pointing out that the figures of
cost of raw-materials, appearing on the cost side of
a balance-sheet represented merely the arbitrary deci¬
sions of some board or official, so that it was im¬
possible, especially in the frequent cases of joint
I |
demand, to compare costs and to concentrate production
on processes which were both, the most economical and
the most desirable in the social sense. Squally, it
became a hopeless task to calculate the relative im¬
portance of consumers' goods, since the illegal market
could not possibly be taken as a guide and no alterna-|
I
.
jt<jve system of estimating consumers' preferences had
been devised, although the War had narrowed down the
choice to a few primary wants.
The actual basis of accounting seems to have been
rather haphazard at that time and differed in the va¬
rious industries-. But whether supplies were obtained
9
gratis or at fixed prices, made no real difference.
Thus, in the domain of the nationalised industries
and the sphere of State-controlled distribution,prices,
as independent regulators of inter-industrial rela¬
tions and as indicators of consumers' wants^had soon
ceased to exist.
/P. 133 et seq. Comp. also Prokopovitch, The Economic
Condition of Soviet Russia, London 1924, chapter on
the Annihilation of Economic Calculation, pp. 36 et
seq. Prokopovitch quotes a publication of the State
Planning Commission of 1921 according to which the ab¬
sence of accounting and commercial efficiency in the
management of concerns was characteristic of tie in¬
dustrial situation in the middle of 1921. For other
comments on costing under War Communism see Lawton, op
cit., Vol. I, ip 107 et seq.
J^These maximum fixed prices were determined by "the Pri
Committee of the V.S.N.Kh., consisting of the represen
tatives of the Narkomprod and other bodies, and had to
be confirmed by the signatures of the chairman of the
V.S.N.Kh. and the Narkomprod.(Miliutin, History of the
Economic Development of the U.S.S.R.. Moscow 1929. (RU
ce
It is in the illicit market that we find the rem¬
nants of an elemental and degenerate process of price-
formati on.
The price-level of the underground market was^to
a certain degree dependent upon the extent and orga¬
nisation of State-supply in the different parts of
the country, i.e., on the measure in which the most
urgent needs of the population were satisfied by State-
distribution of manufactured goods and foodstuffs.
But^to maintain, as the Soviet economist Turetsky
does, that "the level of speculative prices was in¬
versely proportional to the extent of food-supply at j
fixed prices" ^is both misleading and erroneous. We
| have seen how fixed prices, inasmuch as they were used
at all, became divorced from the reality of productive
processes. Besides no "inversely proportional" re¬
lationship could have been possible under conditions
of a "flight from the rouble". People (including the
peasants) not only gave up their beloved custom of
putting money away in their stockings, but began to
spend it as soon as they obtained it^so that the
astounding fall in the purchasing power of money out¬
stripped the degree by which its volume was enlarged?
The more prevalent simple barter became, the more
currency was available for monetary operations. Thus
both barter and inflation activised the depreciation
(continued from previous page): p. 186). Cf. also
Larin and Kritzmann, op.cit., p. 191. / Op.cit. ,p.ll?.
ASee, e.g., Arnold, op.cit., p. 96.
|J Only in the second half of 1920 was the rate of de¬
preciation below that of the increase in the volume
of money. This is to be attributed, as is shown be¬
low in the text, to the realisation of the harvest.
of the paper notes.
On the whole it seems extraordinary difficult to
make any generalisations on the processes of price-for¬
mation in the speculative markets of War Communism.
!Every attempt to interpret speculative market prices
with reference only to the conditions of production
! and supply and the broad trends of demand in a. state
of unique social, military, organisational and moneta¬
ry chaos is bound to lead one down a blind alley. True,
:the illicit centres of exchange had still preserved
ithe outside appearance of a market. The prices which
emerged at a given place and at a given time equated
demand and supply at a certain point. We have seen
ithat the market offered all those goods and articles
which had escaped requisition in this or that way and
could therefore be "commercialised". The illegal mar¬
ket thus fulfilled, it would appear, its essential
functions under the then prevailing conditions. It
secured the maximum supply of commodities which could
be acquired by money and served the existing effective
i demands for those goods. But it has been indicated
that the way in which that task was accomplished was
bound to destroy a normally working price-mechanism
:at its roots.
Price-formation in the illegal market was deter¬
mined by the local state of demand and supply and the
local degree of inflation. The only broad generalisa¬
tion with regard to price-movements which can reaso¬
nably be put forward is that there was an increase in
the price of grain as expressed in goods and that the
prices of foodstuffs grew at a much faster rate than
those of luxuries J
Prices rose from day to day, from hour to hour.
Moreover, nothing like a unified market price could
exist. It will be recalled that before, and during,
the War there was hardly any unified price in exis¬
tence, but under War Communism not even a remote re¬
semblance ^ between the prices ruling in the different
districts could be registered.
Inflation need not, logically, tamper with the
unified price. The multitude of different price-levels
was chiefly due to disintegration of the economy. Of
course, inflation, as actually carried out, deepened
the preverted retrogression of the market and the un¬
even local price-advances for the same class of goods.
;For there was, at no time under War Communism, any¬
thing that could properly be termed an effective cen¬
tral note-issue. Very often, due to transport diffi-
.
Acuities and red tape, the People's Commissariat of
|Finance could not supply distant districts with the
required amount of paper currency. The effect of that
failure was probably a maddening increase in the velo¬
city of circulation in the district affected or re¬
course to direct barter or both. On msny occasions
the poor organisation of a tolerably even distribution
! of the inflated means of payment >led to the necessity1,
i
chiefly from the spring of 1919 onwards, to resort to
local issues even in regions which were politically
:ruled from Moscow. But there was an infinite number of
villages, towns and districts which had separate and
/In face of commodity-famine it is not surprising that
|gold lost in value. A comparison of the respective in¬
dices reveals that already in 1918 gold bought ten
times less than before the War.
and ever changing political executives printing their
Own tokens and thereby adding to the staggering exten¬
sions and varieties of the monetary output.
The chequered price-structure of War Communism is
perhaps best illustrated by some concrete examples.
Z.B. Atlas notes'that prices for rye-flour charged in
Petrograd were 23.8 times higher thartthose obtaining
in Sare„tov and 15 ,times higher above those ruling in
Ulianovsk at the same time. Each district had, as it
were, a price-structure of its own, and the disparity
of prices between the different parts of the country
increased with the distance of the various regions from
the sources of supply.
The rise of prices for necessaries which could be
noticed in the more important local markets was unevai
according to the chaotic state of supply which, handi¬
capped and suppressed, tried to catch up with the pri¬
mitive preferences of a famine-stricken population.
On the Moscow market, for instance, prices for
butter, sugar, millet and salt herring had risen more
than ten thousand times as compared with 1913; prices
for meat, milk and eggs from five to ten thousand
times, and for cabbage and fresh fish less than five
thousand times. In other markets the development was
different. But it is interstirg to note how, in spite
of the atomistic price-formation,the realisation of
the harvest retarded the speed of the price-advance
TOp.cit., p. 171 et seq.
Moscow and Petrograd are particularly expensive ci¬
ties." (Larin and Kritzmann, op.cit., p. 74). Some¬
times average prices in these two principal cities
exceeded those obtaining in provincial towns by as
much as 75 per cent. (But the concept of the average
price-level had not much meanipg in those days).
all over the country. The upward race of prices slowed
down in the second half of each year so that in 1920
the percentage increase of the monetary issue actually
surpassed the Sovznak's rate of depreciation.''
The more the monetary standard deteriorated the
more the illegal market resorted to direct "barter and,
alongside these barter-transactions?new exchange stan¬
dards, a kind of primitive commodity-money sprang up^
First they were rather casual but soon they began to
develop into common standards in the different dis¬
tricts. In Moscow, about 1920, salt and baked bread
strdve/ for supremacy what Marx has described as
the "general equivalent". In other cities it was ke¬
rosene. Townspeople supplied themselves with this no¬
vel, or rather very ancient cash, before setting off
to the countryside in their quest for goods. Still,
I the different illegal markets were not completely shut
off from each other. Hence illicit commercial activity
I did not dispense completely with the use of paper curren¬
cy, which at least reduced the local standards to one
j denominator.
The casual exchange-ratios in the various illegal
markets cannot reasonably be expected to ^orm a
jsufficiently reliable basis for generalising on the
prevailing value-proportions between town and country
| during the period of War Communism. But some, if only
j inadequate information on this very important questior
can be gleaned from the barter-operations controlled
/Comp. the statistical appendix.
j^For details of these primitive exchange-proportions
under War Communism - e.g. , 1 lb. of soap e 1 lb;.; of
millet etc. - cf. the standard work by Vaisberg,
Money and prices (The Illegal Market in the period
of War Communism), Moscow 1925, (R)j.
by State organs before the introduction of the Prodraz-
yerstka.
It has been pointed out that prices in the early
stages of the era under consideration were guided by
the value-proportions that existed before the War.
Owing to the extreme penury of industrial wares, howfS-
I
ever, certain adjustments had to be ma.de in favour of
the towns. Thus, according to information supplied by
Larin and Kritzmanr/the price-fixing Authorities had
•}
decreed in 1918 that industrial goods worth 100 pre-waij:
roubles were to be exchanged against agricultural pro¬
ducts worth 300 roubles. In August 1919 the proportion
was altered to 1:2, while in the "underground" market
it stood at 1:6 in September 1919. It would appear,
then, that the countryside got the worst of the bar-
gain. But Larin and Kritzmann hasten to add that;so
far as the barter-oprations of the State are concerned
all these calculations were, in actual practice, often
turned into their very opposite. For industrial goods
the peasants paid with cash and supplied far lees grain
than was expected of them. The Authorities had, as was
shown, to tighten up the regulations and to insist on
an 85 per cent, payment in kind. Still, Larin and Krit
U
mann maintain^that.if one considers the total amount7
of industrial wares that were distributed in the years
1917-1920 from the grain-producing districts and com¬
pares it with the State-collections^it appears that,
on the whole, the peasant obtained, on the average,
nearly twice as many manufactured goods as he would
z-
/Op.cit., pp. 34 et seq.
■&Cf. article on War Communism by A. Aikhenvald in the
Great Soviet Encyclopaedia? Vol XII, p. 370.
3Larin and Kritzmann, op.cit., p. 34.
■^Ibid.
liave receivegdn pre-war times for an equal quantity
of grain.'
Whatever the truth of this statement may be, a
closer analysis of the goods-circulation under War
Communism bears out the inescapable necessity of in¬
troducing the Prodrazverstka as the only effective
means of alleviating, at short notice, the famine in
the towns.
Until it came into operation in 1920, and in
| spite of the socialisation of supply and distribution,
I goods circulated in Russia in a form which Marx has
termed "simple commodity-exchange" with the formula
"commodity - money - commodity". This classification
is applicable even to the schemes of State barter and
not only to the the illegal market. The main object of
"simple commodity-exchange" is to exchange values in
/The fact that this observation applies to grain-
jproducing regions only is, of course, a most important
qualification. Moreover, even on the assumption that:
the villagers gave relatively less in return for the
industrial goods they obtained, it is really the
absolute reduction in the quantity of manufactured
goods they received that matters. This reduction had)
caused the diminution of agricultural surpluses. Butj,
if one can trust the figures supplied by Larin and
j Eritzmann, it would appear that the consumption of
the villages had not suffered any severe contraction
| in the period of War Communism. "In grain-nroducing j
I regions it (the consumption of the peasants') amounted
to 105 per cent of the pre-war consumption, in the
other provinces to 78 per cent, while the consumption
of the urban population in the grain-producing district
amounted to 73.5 per cent and in the remaining
provinces to 53 per cent. On the average the peasants
consume 86 per crept and the urban population 60 per
cent of what the respective groups consumed before
| the War." (Op.cit., p. 36). But even if one accepts j
i this account^it must not be forgotten that famine in j
a particular district was brought about not so much
by the drastic reduction of available foodstuffs in
the country as a whole, btrt by the breakdown of
supply in that district. 4S
use against other values in use. Even the appalling
ispeculation in the illicit market was inspired by this
end and not so much by monetary enrichment as such,
which was clearly senseless. The satisfaction of imme¬
diate needs was the prime object.
The reason why State-barter failed and compulsory
levies had to be resorted to was that while the State
controlled the supply of industrial and manufactured
goods, agricultural producer was in the hands of a
mass of small farmers. This contradiction produced
different sets of valuations prevailing in the two
sectors. The individual farmer valued the product of
which he was about to dispose as well as the commodi¬
ty he was eager to obtain in. the traditional way, i.e.
in accordance with the value-proportions, historically
formed. For a pood of bread he expected to get (say)
150 p®-war kopeks, sufficient to buy 4 arshins of
printed cotton. In actual fact he got (say) 500 roubles
hardly enough to buy a half-arshin of the cloth in
question. This sort of thing was bound to impede ex¬
change operations the more so, since^with the decline
of industrial produetion the value-proportions changed
more and more to the detriment of the farmers. The
Prodrazverstka transformed the commercial fund of
agriculture by compulsory assessment into a goods-
fund earmarked for the exchange against the State's
manufactures at decreed equivalents, based not upon
the traditional value-relations but on the norms of
the Narkomprod guided by very rudimentary harvest-
statistics and The most pressing requirements of the
j
Army and the townspeople.
/ The above analysis is essentially similar to that
! given by Professor Liashchenko. The Economics of
| Trade, Its Theory and Organisation, Moscow 1925,(R),
j pp.222 et seq.
OBSERVATION AND CONCLUSIONS
Some generalised observations and conclusions on
the period of War Communism, its trade, its distribu¬
tion and its price-mechansim may now be opportune.
It is easy to criticise the Utopian character of
War Communism and to expose its detrimental effects
on the country's economy. But, in the words of Dobb,
: "this positive difference the period of "War Communion"
had made: it had swept the vested interests of the
old system into the limbo of history: and the stage
was to this extent cleared for the new chapter of
State planning."^ Furthermore, although it did not
solve the problem of economic planning, it represented
ja rich store of planning practice gained by a painful
a
:process of trial and error.
The existence of legal private trade up to the
end of 1919 clearly shows that a marketless economy
cannot be introduced instantaneously. The continued
! operation of the market, for some time at least, was
J taken for granted by Lenin, who believed that in the
_
course of time a new organisational framework which
would correspond to the revolutionised economic sys¬
tem, would gradually evolve. It seems,therefore,rea¬
sonable to assume that the total extinction of pri¬
vate trading activity was not primarily due to ideolo¬
gical hostility, but was rather caused by the exigen¬
cies of the military campaign which rendered the nor¬
mal functioning of the market-mechanism impossible.
At the close of the period, it is true, opposition
/Soviet Russia and the World, London, 193Is , p. 54.
^,The Economic Policy of the U.S.S.R., op. cit.,p.65.
to the market on doctrinaire grounds became all-power-,
ful.
Analysis of the organisation of supply and dis¬
tribution displays all the weaknesses of "consumers'




the dwindling stocks of a society living on its capi¬
tal.^ In the absence of central planning for a sur¬
plus the organisation of supply was essentially un-
d.n.<i cd.
productive, inordinately costly, reduci^ consumption
to the satisfaction of the most pressing needs; it
bore quite clearly the marks of war economy. Food
o
shortage had adverse effects on productive activity,
although Lenin tried to link up supply with produc¬
tive results and opposed the ultracommunist principle
of Uravnilovka, i.e., equal rations to all workers,
irrespective of the productivity of their labour. As
regards the impact of famine there were very marked
differences in the situation as between consuming and
producing regions and the peasant class seems on the
whole to have been less badly hit than the urban po¬
pulation. ^
In spite of severe persecution, the market proved,
to be a social organism equipped with astonishing vi¬
tality and power of resistance. Illicit commercial ac-
/"After the October Revolution we lived to a conside¬
rable extent upon the old stocks inherited from the
bourgeoisie. Then we started working up partly fi¬
nished goods. And only after that did we ourselves be¬
gin to produce raw materials. That process led to a
complete exhaustion of our resources, of our goods'
fund." (A. Rykov's Report to the Eighth Congress of
Soviets, held in December 1920; quoted by Prokopo-
vitch, op.cit.,, p. 47).
^/Jstinov, op.cit., pp. 46-47.
3"The peasants have retained their vitality to a far
greater extent than any other class. ... their numbers
have remained on the same level; peasant husbandry,
although considerably ravaged, still exists; the de-
tivitv was brisk and the "underground" centres of
trade were relied upon as important reservoirs of
foodstuffs end as a source of real values for the
inflationary pump. After the abolition of a normal
circulation of goods speculative abuses grew more and
more scandalous and the State decided to apply very
stern measures against the bazaars.
Price-fixing, originally used as a means of ex¬
tracting agricultural surpluses, was based on pre-war
value-proportions, the scarcity of manufactured goods
being allowed for by mechanical alterations and ad¬
justments in exchange-ratios. In the absence of a
market link between town and country, under conditions
of tremendous inflationary issues (destined to cover
the"costs of the revolution") and the deterioration of
production, however, price-fixing soon became a fic¬
tion. A primitive system of barter-economy developed I
as a kind of retrogression and exhibited all its in¬
conveniences based on the absence of the identity of
wrants that led up to a dislocation between wants and
values. Within such a system the peasants, as the
possessors of foodstuffs and thus capable of waiting,
had a strong bargaining position with the result that
there was often an over-valuation of victuals.
The problem of. cost, i.e., the covering of ma¬
terial outlays by material returns and the presence
of means of assessing the relative costliness of
different and alternative productive processes?was not
(continued from previous page): vastations in agriculj
ture are by no means as heavy as in the case of other
industries." (Masloff, Russia after four years of
Revolution, op.cit., p. 28).
sufficiently grasped, although monetary Utopias, e.g.,
the attempts and schemes to substitute the paper token
by a labour-unit of account and thus to establish a.
new foundation of costing, show that at the close of
the period this problem began to dawn on the Bolshe-
viks. The main reason for the gross neglect of this
most essential economic maxim was the rather naive and
highly optimistic belief that the working class would j
show its appreciation of the blessings of the communist
regime by an immediate increase in the productivity of
labour. In point of fact exactly the reverse happened.
Apart from purely military reasons,this socio-
psychological mistake explains the non-existence of a
unified economic plan which is inconceivable under
conditions of dwindling production, with the absence
of exact statistical data and the division of the
country's economic life into two main compartments,
viz., the highly centralised State-controlled industry
and the system of State supply on the one hand, and
the mass of individual agricultural owner-producers
on the other. The market, during the period under
review^could not be relied upon to bridge the gulf
between the two,and the Frodrazverstka, the compulsory
assessment of agricultural ''surpluses" ( if necessary
by armed force),marks both the climax: and the decline
of War Communism.
PART I




When the Civil War had been brpught to a
victorious end by the Government, the staggering degree
of economic decline and social disintegration became
more evident than ever/ Attempts to carry on and
even to intensify the Utopian policy after the
successful liquidation of the military campaign were
bound to produce dissatisfaction and opposition.
Revolts of peasants gained in strength and workers
began to grumble. Another serious source of discontent
was the. army which, instead of being demobilised, was
transferred to the so-called "economic front" in order
to deal with the food and transport crises. The
climax of this "counter-revolution" was reached in
the rising of the Kronstaat sailors.
The political crisis wras serious enough to have j
wrecked the Bolshevik regime had the Authorities
assumed an intransigent attitude. But the conception J
that their rule must rest on a certain "class basis",
i.e., enjoy the support on the pant of the vital social
groups of the community was too strongly enshrined in I
the minds of the Russian Communists^ to make them
'
forgetful of the sentiments and grievances of the
people.
-
It was not only political expediency, however,
that dictated the abandonment of War Communism. The
/"The gross output of agriculture in.1920 was only
about one half of the pre-war output-that of the poverty-
stricfen Russian countryside of tsarist days. ... The
output of large-scale industry in 1920 was a little
over one-seventh of pre-war. ... The total output of / /. 74 1
pig-iron in 1921 was only 116,300 tons, or about 3 per
cent of the pre-war output. There was a shortage of fuel.
Transport was dirupted. Stocks of metal and textile...exhausted.
(History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Moscow 1939, Engl.ecU,p.248).
change-over to the New Economic Policy (NEP) was also
forced upon the Soviet Government by the vital need
for economic restoration. But it is erroneous to
think that the new measures were introduced haphazardly
and on the spur of the moment. Heated discussions on
the proper diagnosis of the economic situation and
the nature of the economic policy to be adopted
preceded the formal inauguration of the NEP. The
controversy revealed an astounding diversity of
opinion among the leading members of the Communist
Party. '
Lenin's appreciation of the position was always
one of extreme realism. He realised that, however
advanced her working class, Russia was predominantly
ai/agricultursl country. The peasant economy, composed
of millions of small-scale farmers, supplied the
tissues and sinews of her body economic. It was
clear to Lenin that a continuation of the system of
compulsory levies would not only estrange the peasantry
and lead to a stae of permanent food-shortage, but,
by causing a serious contraction of the sown area, might
also destroy the whole basis of agricultural re¬
production and thereby of the entire Russian economy.
While the Kronstadt rebellion was being quelled,
the X Congress of the Communist Party had assembled
2/
to hear Lenin's historic speech demanding the abolition
of compulsory levies and their replacement by the
tax in kind^ On March 15, the Congress adopted a
f Dobb,op.cit., pp. 152 et sec.
JUCf. Lenin's Collected Works, London, Vol. IX,pp.107 et sec.
3 It is significant that one of the main demands of
the mutinous Kronstadt garrison was the abolition of
the grain monopoly.
resolution to tho of foot- that "in order to
guarantee a normal direction of the economy on the
basis of a freer disposition by the landowner over
his economic resources the compulsory assessment as
the method of State collection of foodstuffs, raw
/
materials and fodder is replaced by the tax in kind,"
The decree promulgating the introduction of the tax
in kind was passed on March 17"%nd it is customary to j
regard this date as the official inauguration of the
New Economic Policy.^
Accordirg to Pollock the significance of the
{new tax was not so much that it replaced arbitrary
irequisitions by a contribution fixed according to
the capacity of the farm but that it stipulated for
the freedom of the peasairts to dispose of their
agricultural surpluses. The peasants could lay them
aside or use them for their- own consumption; but they
could also exchange them against industrial, kustar
or agricultural produce. It is significant that the
decree envisaged a gradual reduction of the tax
provided that the restoration of transport and industry
would enable the Soviet Government to acquire agricultural
/ "At first the~tax was of a multiform and cor/plicated
character, taking a proportion of each different kind
of produce. Later it was simplified into a single tax,
assessed in money; and after 1923 it was paid entirely
in money and not in kind." (Dobb,op.cit.,p.l65,n.)
^The passing of the decree appears to have coincided
with the taking of the Kronstadt fortress by the Bol¬
sheviks. ( Cf. Lav/ton,op.cit.,Vol.1,p.1S1).
^In actual fact the reversal of the economic policyTwas far from being abrupt. It was not before May 17,
that a. decree prohibited further confiscation of industrial
enterprises and suspended the general nationalisation
decree. Only in June were such "War-Communist" measures,
as the limitation of monetary circulation and the amounts
which could be held by private individuals and organisations,
repealed. On July,14, i921, compulsory labour service
: was abolished. The process of eliminating the remnants
of ultra-centralism, viz., the replacement of the system
products in exchange for industrial and kustar produce
but it is improbable that the framers of the decree
ever contemplated the revival of a nation-wide system
of internal commerce. The decree provided merely for
the admission of exchange within the limits of local
goods-turnover and emphasised the role of the co~
operatives in the organisation of these operations,"^
But however modest and circumscribed the freedom
of the newly admitted trade activity was originally
intended to be it certainly meant the re-admission of
the principle of exchange-economy. From the point
of view of the Communist Party this was a very grave
decision indeed, for the Bolshevik leaders had
enough commonsense to see the danger of the economic
control reverting to the private capitalists and
traders who were bound to come to the surface as
3
a result even of this modest form of "laissez-faire"J
(continued from previous page): of orders by inter-
industrial monetary settlements, of the food rations
;by money wages, and of taxes in kind by monetary
contributions extended over 1-2 years. (Details taken
from the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol. XII, article;
on War Communism and from Pollock,op.cit,)
/Pollock,op.cit., p. 120. - The amount of the tax had
to be smaller than the former quotas.
jtFor details of this decree cf. Supreme Soviet of
[National Economy. The New Economic Policy in Industry.
Collection of decrees, orders and regulations. With
la foreword by the chairman, P.A. Bogdanoff, Moscow
1921 (R), pp. 11-13. As lEgards penalties for the non-
observance of the decree cf. the order of the Sovnarkom
dated June 15, 1921, concerning the responsibility as
regards the infringement of the decree on the tax in
kind and on exchange$ ibid., p. 70.
JLenin, Collected Works, Vol. IX, p. Ill and p. 260. -
Still, while this development was inevitable if the rest¬
oration of the economy was to proceed via the revival
of an atomistic agriculture, the dialectician Lenin
tried to see the positive elements of this departure,
The pivot of Lenin's political philosophy and strategy
was the conception of the "smytchka", i.e., the
revolutionary contact, link or alliance between the
working class and the peasantry. He realised that
Without the peasants' support the cause of the Revolution
(continued from previous page): was doomed. They had
turned the scales in favour of victory in the' days
of the memorable October, but they had. also voiced
their warning when, by their stubborn opposition and
obstruction, they had caused the ultimate collapse
of the venture of War Communian. The Soviet regime
would always retain its stability, so long as it had
the support or, at least, the benevolence of the
countryside, especially of the middle and poor
peasants. This was impossible without considering
and from time to time acceeding to their economic
demands. Lenin was willing to re-aclmit the market
and the exchange-economy as the only way towards
economic revival, but, at the same time, he was intent
on utilising it as far as possible in the interests
of socialism by strengthening Statgbwned industry.
Lenin also hoped that in course of time the majority
of the peasants would become convinced of the
superiority of the collective forms of cultivation. -
According: to Lenin, capitalism was certainly an evil
as measured by the standards of socialism; but it was
a lesser evil than the Middle Ages and the small-scale
agricultural production. Thus, in effect, Lenin
proposed to transform the commodity-produeing and
capitalist economies,which were to be revived, into
the system of State capitalism and to use that system
as "the link between small-scale production and
socialism, as a means of raising of productive forces'.'
(Quot. by Pollock,op,cit.,p. 119), From this point
of view it can even be argued that the New Economic
Policy was&" return to the path which was being
trodden in the spring of 1918" (Dobb?op.cit., p, 165),
the resumption, that is, of the realistic and moderate
policy whicK v^as attempted during the era of Workers'
Control but/vhad to be abandoned owing to the "strategic"
needs of the Revolution,
HAPTEE I
TAGES OF THE NEP
STAGES OF THE HEP
The New Economic Policy can he broadly divided
into four main phases: (1) the pedod of economic
chaos and crises dating from spring 1921 until
autumn 1923); (2) the period of economic restoration
(from October 1923 until October 1926); (3) the
period of economic reconstruction (from autumn 1926
until about the end of 1928); and (4) the transition
to integral planning (1928-30 or so). This pigeon¬
holing of economic evolution is, of course, to a great
extent artificial in so far as no clear line of
demarcation can be drawn between the different phases.
x. /.
The classification adopted is thus merely used for
purposes of orientation and reference. 1
The first stage of the NEP is not without interest
for it demonstrates the extraordinary vitality of the
market-economy. It is astounding how rapidly the
market recovered, ho?; feverish^commercial activity
sprang up after the long years during which it had
been suppressed. The "body of the capitalist economy
had been nearly strangled by the clutches of War
Communism; but as soon as the murderous grip was
loosened, the victim recovered very rapidly. This
/ Some economic historians identify the NEP with the
process of Restoration and term the ensuing period
that of Reconstruction or Industrialisation. - The
different evaluation of the country's economic history
depends on whether the criterion of classification is
the change in productive forces or the transformation
of productive relationships. Being more interested in
the latter, we consider our classification suitable
for out purpose, in so far as the NEP, i.e., tne
method of utilising capitalist forces in the interests
of socialist development continued to be applied
after the termination of the" Restoration Period and
even later.
excessively speedy recovery produced many undesirable
features. Speculation, fraudulent practices and a
shameless exploitation of human labour by private
individuals were rampant / although private initiative
remained limited to the domain of internal commerce,
handicrafts and small-scale industry.
From the point of view of State industry the
change-over from one set of economic principles to
another was violent enough to produce consternation
among industrial managers/and general economic disorder.
According to the new industrial legislation each independent
economic unit was expected to look after its own
affairs, i.e., procure raw materials and the wherewitM.
for wage-payments. Under the then existing chaotic
conditions of the market "this was a very difficult task
indeed. Lack of trading-capital, absence of normal
banket-relations, and organisational unprepareaness
led to what is called "razbazarivanie", a term difficult
to translate but denoting a process of an.indiscrimina.te
selling-out of products of State industry irrespective
of cost for the purpose of obtaining cash and other
jbadly needed liquid assets. This process started at
the end of-1921 and went on until the spring of the
/Private enterprise, engaged in kustar or small-scale
industrial production, could employ the services of
up to ten and twenty workers respectively. (Cf. the
decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee
and the SovnaEkom concerning kustar and small-scale
industry dated July 7, 1921; Collection of Decrees etc.,
p. 31). But it was not before May 31, 1922, that the
Presidium of the Moscow Council of Workers' ,B.easants'
and Soldiers' Deputies issued a decree concerning the
conditions of employment in trading establshments. (Cf,
Systematic Collection of the mere important decrees,
decisions and regulations of the Central and Local
Authorities relating to Home Trade, Moscow 1923,(R),p.S2).
j^All the important key-positions like large-^cale industry,
banking and finance, and foreign trade remained in the
hands of the State. Only in exceptional curcumstances
following year, resulting in a further dissipation of
turnover-capitale Nevertheless the' process of "raz-
bazarivanie" soon led to an acute "sales-crisis"(in
the spring of 1922.)
In view of the reduced volume of production the
difficulties which arose in connection with the sale
of industrial products were raether baffling on first
sight. On closer examination it appears, however, that
^ they were due to the inordinately high cost of
industrial production, organisational defects of
marketing etc. and the disastrously bad harvest of
1921 which had curtailed the purchasing power of the
population.
It became possible to alleviate the "sales-crisis"
towards the early autumn of 1922, for meanwhile certain
! 9
economic improvements had taken place, chiefly owing
to the good results of the harvest of 1922 and its
beneficial effects on the "holding power" of the market.
The monetary situation was slightly easier, credit-
operations increased, industrial production had recovered
|in many directions /while thanks to the improvement*
JL>
jin marketingf the newly established Trusts were no
longer eager to dispose of their stocks indiscriminately.
:
iEspecially the light industries availed themselves of
the temporary boom and soon prices for their products
began to recover and to exceed their cost-of-production-
level.
(continued from previous page): were big industrial
undertakings leased out to private persons, chiefly
foreign capitalists; but even then they continued to
be supervised by the local councils of national economy.
/Cf. Prof. Isichenko, Industry and the Market for its
products, a statistical and economic study, Moscow
1923,(R),pp.44-5. A marked degree of recovery could
be observed in e.g., wool,linen,rubber,leather,sugar.
be1ow.
But although the irresponsible "razbazarivanie"
had ceased, the desire of the new economic organisations
to maximise sales with a view to augmenting their
turnover-capital remained. This motive was the main
"psychological factor" which contributed to the rise
to
of the industrial price-level and*the fall of the
/
agricultural. This "scissors"-cnsis hit not only the
peasantry, but also the urban population. It lasted
[until the autumn of 1923. Its successful liquidation
by the Authorities put a stop to an egoistic,short¬
sighted and one-sided enrichment of industry and ushered
in a new phase which is commonly known as the Restoration
Period.
h' J-
In order to really restore industry the illusionary
and dangerous "restoration" which had led to a series
of economic disturbances had to be terminated. By
various direct and indirect measures the Government
had succeeded not only in arresting the "scissors"-
movement of prices but also in reducing industrial and
genuine
in raising agricultural prices. Now the/process of
restoration could commence.
At the beginning of the financial year 1926/27
industrial production had roughly attained its pre-war
level. But it would be wrong to interpret the essence
of the Restoration Period as a return to pre-war
Capitalism. Soviet economic textbooks stress the fact
that while on the whole the chief task of the Restoration
Period consisted in "restoring the old fixed capital
/The expression was,we believe, coined by Trotsky. It
compares the movement of the two price indices with
the opening of scissors'blades. A fuller discussion of
the "scissors" phenomenon will be found in the chapter
on prices and costs under the NEP.
(plant).. .gigantic changes occurred in the national
economy of the U.S.S.R. and the inter-relationships
of production were radically altered as compared with
pre-revolutionary times.
On the other hand it would be erroneous to assume
that the Restoration Period put an end to all souandering
and dissipation of economic resources and placed the
enterprises on a rational footing throughout. It was
not before the spring of 1924 that the Monetary Reforms
Were successfuly brought to conclusion, the worthless
notes being gradually eliminated from circulation and j
replaced by a stable currency, while the budgets was
a
balanced. True, these Reforms had the most beneficial)
. op.ciC
/Cf. The Economic Policy of the U.S.S.R.,*p. 71. Some
industries like coal and electricity by far exceeded
the pre-war level: /and (if the Soviet statistics are
trustworthy) the same applies to the productivity of
labour. Soviet economists take pride in asserting
that the speedy recovery, in spite of absence of foreign
assistance and </l the after-effects of the Civil War,
was due to the existence of socialist elements in the
new economy (e.g., State control of "key-positions").
As regards a comparison of rates of expansion in U.S.A.
Britain, Germany, France and the U.S.S.R. 0f. V.E.
Motylev, The Problem of the Speed of Development in the
U.S.S.R., Moscow 1929, (R), table 12 on p. 27. The
figures suggest a speedier and more uniform recovery o]
heavy industry in the U.S.S.R. than in the other countries,
jtThe Monetary Reforms took a considerable time for
completion. So long as the collection of money taxes
yielded but small results, the budget deficit had to be
covered by the issue of token paper money, the so-called
"Sovznak". Politically, the opposition of the Left Wing
Inflationists against the stabilisation of the monetary
system had to be overcome. On November 27, 1922 the
State Bank was empowered to issue the new chervonetz
bank-tootes, the chervonetz being equal to 10 pre-war
gold roubles. The lowest denomination of the new notej
was 1 chervonetz. Until spring 1924 there existed in
Russia a parallel system of circulation of two paper
currencies, for the Sovznaks were still being issued for
"budgetary purposes". This abnormal parallelism (the
Sovznak was continually depreciating in terms of the
chervonetz) was abolished by a series of decrees promulgated
in February and March 1924 (based on a memorandum sub¬
mitted by Sokolnikov, People's Commissar of Finance).
The Sovznaks were redeemed at the rate of 50,000 roubles
of the so-called 1923-notes (or 50,000,000,000 old roubles)
for 1 gold rouble. The Treasury was authorised to issue
91
effects, but since capital investments were not
embodied in a purposeful scheme of planned expansion
jthe growth of production resulted very frequently in
heavy financial losses. The principle of a prudent
^earmarking of funds for purposes of depreciation was 3
often neglected, the reserves being raided with the
object of providing for further industrial expansion.
With the growth of private commerce and the
strengthening of the State and co-operative network
as well as the general normalisation of market-conditions
the scarcity of circulating capital became less stringent.
But the major difficulty of the Restoration Period
seems to have been to arrest the dissipation of fixed
capital and to achieve the full utilisation of existing
plant.' It is admitted that the process of "eating-up"!
fixed capital did not stop until 1925.^
During the Reconstructive Period it was the
'
renewal and expansion of the fixed capital that had
(continued from_previous~"page):currency-notes in 1,3
and 5 roubles gold to be legal tender for all trans¬
actions. 'Their total amount was not to exceed one
half of the chervontzy and, although no fixed relation
between the two types of currency was provided by law,
:the State Bank declared its readiness to exchange them;
at parity with the chervontzy. (This double currency
resembled, incidentally, the English system as it
existed from the beginning of the War until the
(Currency Reform of 1928. Another feature of resemblence
is that the State Bank was divided into an Issue and
a Banking Department). During the financial year
1924-25 the budget deficits ceased to be covered by
inflationary issues. It was not before the beginning
of the financial year 1925-26, however, that a cher-
von^z-budget was drawn unp for the whole of the country.
(For details Sf.,e.g., Atlas, Money and Credit, Moscow;
1931 (R) Prof. L.N. Yurovsky, Currency Problems of
the Soviet Union, published in Russian and English;
S.S. Katzenellenbaum, Russian Currency ancjBanking
1914-1924, London 1925; L.E. Hubbard, Soviet Money and;
Finance, London 1936; A.Z. Arnold, Banks, Credit and
Money in Soviet Russia, New York , 1937).
'During the Restoration Period the average utilisation
of plant did not exceed 50-60 %. (Cf.A.M.Ginzburg.The Problem
of Capital in Soviet Industry,Mo scow 1925? (R) ,p.25.}^The Economic Policy of the U.S.S.R. .on.cit. «x?.69« ;
to be tackled first and foremost. For the main
taM of this third stage of the New Economic Policy
;we^l considered to be the reconstruction of the country's
production beyond the pre-war level as the preparatory
step for the initiation of Soviet industrialisation,'
i.e., the complete overhaul and re-equipment of Soviet
industry in general, and of the heavy industries in
particular. The problem of industrial accumulation
(All these economic changes and difficulties within
the NEP were proceeding against a background of bitter!
controversy inside the Party. Attention was focussed j
on three main conceptions of Russia's future development.
The followers of Bukharin (the Right Opposition) thought
that peaceful co-existence of capitalist and socialist
elements in the Russian economy was possible and that
the bourgeoisie would in the end peacefully "grow into
socialism". The Left Opposition of various shades
(the Trotskyite group and the followers of Zinoviev and
Kamenev) maintained that socialism in Russia was an
impossibility because of the absence of socialism in
the West and the technical and economic backwardness
of the country. On the other hand the "General Line"
of the Party's Central Committee (headed by Stalin)
believed in the possibility of"Socialism in one
Country" (cf. Leninism,op.cit. , Vol. I, pp. 52 et seq.i)
and consequently in Russia, provided her backwardness |
were overcome with alljC possible speed; Stalin con¬
ceded, however, that the danger of capitalist encirclement
Would remain so long as the U.S.S.R. continued to be
the sole socialist State, (cf. History of the C.P.S.U.
|(B).,p.274). The practical manifestation of this
latter conception was the policy of industrialisation '
Which was decided upon by the XIV. Party Congress
(December 1925).
#"...in the restoration period there were three main
shortcomings. Firstly,the mills and factories were old,
equipped with worn-out and antiquated machinery, and
might soon go out of commission. The task now was to
re-equip them on up-to-date lines. Secondly, industry
in the restoration period rested on too narrow a
foundation: it lacked machine-building plants absolutely
indispensable to the country. Hundreds of these plants
pad to be built... . Thirdly, the industries ..were
mostly light industries. Thel^a- were developed and put
on their feet. But, beyond a certain point, the further
development even of the" light industries met an obstacl
in the weakness of heavy industry, not to mention the
fact that the country had other requirements which could
"
e satisfied only by a well-developed heavy industry.
The task now wras to tip the scales in favour of heavy
industry. All these new ts&s were to be accomplished
by the policy of Socialist industrialisation." (Histor;
etc., p. 280).
<?-3
became more urgent than ever, for the resources which
the/government could draw upon were extremely limited;
owing to the demoralising effect of inflation the
population.was not particularly eager to save; foreign
credits were negligible in volume and the "self-
|accumulation" of industry was relatively small by
reason of the low level of efficiency and productivity!.
In spite of all this, however, accumulation in the
U.S.S.R. proceeded at a much higher rate than under
Czardom.^ It was proudly asserted, that "financial
sources were tapped in the U.S.S.R. such as could not
be tapped in any capitalist country..The Soviet stale
had taken over all the mills, factories, and lands
which the October SocMist Revolution had wrested
from the capitalists and landlords, all the means of
transportation, the banksm and home and. foreign trade.
(Their) profits.. .now went to further the expansion of j
industry, andhot into the pockets of a parasitic
..
capitalist class. The Soviet Government had annulled j
|the tsarist debts, on which the people had annually
'paid hundreds of million of gold rubles in interest
■alone. By abolishing the right of the landlords to the
land, the Soviet Government had fre«£the peasantry
jfrom the annual payment of about 500,000 gold rubles
I in rent. Released from this burden, the peasantry was!




But notwithstanding the high rate of industrialisation
_______________________
/Viz. 19.2 % of the depleted national income in 1925/26
iFtfieef8ymS|h^rMrlE- oRf•
. Research on Russian Economic Conditions).
£uistory etc., pp. 281-82. Nevertheless,"primary accumulation ,! i.e., the method of.direct and indirect.diversion of !
economic resources m the interests of industry (mainly
industrial goods remained costly end their quality
poor. Attempts at ration&ising production and raising
the productivity of labour did not yield the desired
results. Another disquieting feature was unemployment
in the cities which industry, short in capital^ could
not absorb. This urban unemployment (affecting mainly
/
the unskilled labourers and numbering some 3 .million)
was due chiefly to rural over-population, and was but
one manifestation of the anomalous relation between
JL
industry and agriculture.
The major contradiction of the Reconstructive
Period was the co-existence of capitalist and socialist
elements in the economy and the struggle for theasP
ottfck, C&riujtr-
extirpation/vwas intensified in all directions. In
fact, this struggle had been continuously going on
since the inception of the NEP. throughout its various
stages. The occupation of the ground proceeded rather
systematically: the"retreating" Government had entrached
itself in its stronghold (industry,finance,transport
etc.); after consolidating its position there it
attacked the capitalist "fortifications' in internal
commerce said then went forward to take the kulaks
flwho had re-appeared in the villages) by assault. Such
was the "strategic conception" of the operations,
but at times the attacks proceeded simultaneously.
(April 1929)
After the XVI. Party Congress/the advance was begun
qn all fronts. Increased Government intervention
marked the dawn of Integral Planning and heralded the
death of the New Economic Policy.
(continued from previous pfige): from agriculture) was
resorted to on many occasions.
■/Cf. Pollock,op.cit., p. 176.
i^he. small and., backward farms could not support the
growing agricultural population.
CHAPTER II
BEGINNINGS OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
BEGINNINGS OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
We have noted that according to the original
intentions of Lenin and his followers the freedom of
commercial activity which the tax in kind had perforce
introduced was to be kept within the limits of local
goods-exchange and that the participation of private
traders in these operations was to be restricted by
entrusting the co-operative movement with the duty of
handling the bulk of the newly established turnover of
goods. Consequently, the recovery of trade proceeded
rather slowly at the outset. The market was somewhat
: suspicious of its regained freedom and did not dare
to show a provocative attitude. The legal conditions
! governing the opening up of shops and other trading
enterprises were at first hardly conducive to the
fostering of the spirit' of security, so vital to trade
and commerce. In the beginning, special permits were
required for the setting up of a trading business and
only in April 1922 was this practice discontinued and
substituted by the system of ordinary trade licences.
Originally, exchange was allowed 'in corn, grain-
fodder, potatoes and hay in the provinces where the
I
assessment has been carried out", and was presumably
to be conducted on a local basis. This was surely a
very modest concession, but the population availed
itslf of it to the full. The impetus to revive ex¬
change came apparently not so much from the peasants
but from the starving population in the towns.
/Quoted by W. Braithwaite, Private Trade in Communist
Russia, Russian Economist, London 192f , p. 1477.
Commercial activity was limited not only as far as
space and the range of commodities was concerned, but
it was also greatly hindered 4y tke principle of
"compulsory equivalents" in accordance with the .decree
issued on May 24, 1921! This principle, whereby the
urban centres, represented by the co-operatives and
the economic organs of the Government and possessing
a monopoly over industrial produce, claimed the right
to determine the exchange-proportions between town
and the very nature of the goods to be exchanged
and country/shows quite clearly that it was not trade
at all, but supervised goods-exchange which was
originally contemplated. But life soon threw the
principle of "compulsory equivalents" into the duatbin
of the past. As soon as the most urgent requirements
of the countryside in industrial produce had been
met on extremely disadvantageous conditions, the
peasants, sensing their growing competitive strength,
began to resent the dictated terms of exchange. The
Authorities yielded very unwillingly,however. Even
as late as 1922 gooas-exchange was considered, in
principle, as the most desirable form of economic
%
contact between the towns and the villages.
The main objection to the principle of "com¬
pulsory equivalents" is, of course, that by forcing
/The new economic policy in industry, Collection of
decrees etc., Moscow 1921, p. 48.
%"To illustrate the application of the principle of
equivalents the following examples may serve.
(.1) Smolensk, June 7th (1921). The work of the or¬
ganisation of trading has started at full speed
throughout the province. At present, a pood of
potatoes is being bought for 3 lb£7salt and 1 arshine
of cloth (yarn). ("Pravda", 11.6,21). (3) Comrade
Matveieff, a member of the Board of the Glavtextile
communicates that in the Siberian factories the
exchange is made on the basis of 1 pood of woollen
yarn for 1 pood of potatoes. ("Pravda",26.7.21). ...
The examples could be multiplied, but what is given
people to exchange their goods against articles which
they do not require and, consequently, are endeavouring
to re-dispose of, the economic advantages of trade are ,
sacrificed and the door left open to manifold abuses.
On the other hand it must be recognised that the
change of economic policy was too abrupt for freedom
of trade to be introduced at once. A certain period
of organisational and psychological adaptation was
necessary in order to cope with the forces of the,
market. The lower executive organs particularly were
loath to put the new economic decree of the Central
Authorities into practice.^ They detested commerce and
did not understand its processes apart from being
convinced that it meant the revival of capitalist
elements.
Towards the close of 1921 Lenin's Government
realised that the experiment of restricting the
market-sphere to a local turnover of goods under the
general supervision by the co-operatives had failed.
The revival of inter-economic bonds had very soon
exceeded the limits of local exchange. The exchange-
relations between different regions, the towns and the
country^began to assume the form of trade pure and
simple, i.e., t^ing and selling. This new and^for
(continued from previous page): here makes it clear that
the equivalents or the fixed prices (or maximum prices)
are established on two principles: either on that of
the existing market-prices or on that of the pre-war
prices. It is clear that both these principles can be
applied in practice only on condition that there exists
no competition whatever. Bothxthese principles will be
effective only until a certain level in the satisfaction
of the peasants' most urgent requirements is reached."
I(W. Braithwaite,op.C2t., pp. 1478 et seq.)
j/Cf. Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol. XI,p. 482. (Article
on the C.P.S.U. (B)J.; Ustinov,op.cit., p. 50; the new
economic policy in industry etc., op.cit., p. 17.
some Communists rather unexpected development was
admirably summed, up by Lenin thus: "A number of decrees
and orders, an enormous number of newspaper articles,
the whole of our propaganda and . all the laws passed
since the spring of 1921 were all directed to the pur¬
pose of improving the exchange of commodities. What
was implied by that term? ... it implied the more or
less Socialistic exchange throughout the country of
the products of industry for the products of agriculture
and by means of this exchange of commodities, the
restoration of large-scale industry as the sole basis
of Socialist organisation. But what happened? You
practical
all know from your own/experience, that the exchange
I
of commodities broke down; it broke down in the
sense that- it assumed the form of buying and selling.
... We must admit that the retreat has proved to be
insufficient, that we must make a further retreat
from state capitalism to the creation of state-
regulated buying and selling and money circulation.
Nothing came of exchange of commodities, the private
market proved to be stronger than we and instead of
the exchange of commodities we got ordinary buying
and selling, trade. Take the trouble to adapt your¬
selves to this, otherwise you will be submerged by
the element of buying and selling, of money cir-
/
culation."
The main practical lessons to be learned from
this extremely frank pronouncement were,firstly, that
/Collected Works, Vol. IX, pp. 288-9. A resolution
:passed by the Party Conference of May 1921 recognised
that local goods-exchange had broken down and demanded
that no impediment be placed in the way of real free j
trade. But only subsequent Party gatherings formulated
the necessity of developing market relations.
both life anc the constellation of social forces were
on the side of the market and that the State had to
assume, willy-nilly, the role of a trader, so as to
maintain its economic power. But, secondly, in order
to be able to achieve this object, the Communist
officials had to learn the art of trading, a distasteful
occupation indeed for former professional revolutionaries.
On several occasions Lenin stressed the urgent need
for the Party to overcome its neglect and disdain of
trade, for only thai could one successfully fight
capitsLism with its own weapons/ Thirdly., it was
patently necessary to supervise and regulate the
activity of private traders.
Since originally free exchange of surplus products
was only permitted to producers, there was, in the
first months of the NEP, no separate merchant class.
The first people, then, to engage in trading were the
"bagmen", the sorry pioneers of the capitd. ist revival!-.
Closely watched by the police they congregated in
market places and sold their goods to the public. In
.
the beginning there was not much difference between
these new markets and the semi-legal bazaars of the
days of War Communism. Slowly but surely, however,
barter operations were superseded by monetary exchange,
Gerrnanoff, a prominent member of the Centrosoyuz,
writing in the "Ekonomicheskaia Zhisn" on September
6, 1921, described the situation thus: "Up to April
and May, the peasantry everywhere were refusing to
/"Our whole State trade and our New Economic Policy
represent the application by us, Communists, of
commercial, capitalist methods. ... The capilaList
could organise supply. He did it badly and rapaciously«
But still the capitalists could do it," And you, can'
you do it ? You can't. ... You should try out the
accept paper money, demanding, in exchange for their!
agricultural produce, to be given certain material
goods. Since the spring an altogether different
tendency becomes noticeable: money is more readily
accepted."^But it took some time until conditions
became more or less normal throughout the whole
country and the b'agmen and dishonest State employees
"having access to the stocks or possessing considerable
%
amounts of ready money" were displaced by the
professional tradesmen with whose appearance the
worst abuses were mitigated and price-movements
unified and evened out, to some extent at least.
It is only too natural, in view of the general
economic condition of the country, that the beginning^
of trade-activity were almost exclusively confined
dot
to foodstuffs. Only in August 1921Aindustnal wares
and kustar produce mafe their appearance in the
market, but their sources were often ilicit.
Even at this early stage of trading it became
evident that the new system was superior to the barter-
economy of War Communism when people were compelled
to accept things they really did not want. The
reasons for the superiority and success of the
Tcontinued from previous page): new methods: we are
not striving after profits, our principles are
communist, our ideals are commendable^ you are real
saints who should go to paradise alive, - but can
you do business ?" (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.
w- 'quoted **-A..
Keimari,
'Quoted by Braithwaite, op.cit., p.
1/Ibid. , p. 1482.
A.r€-
jr-esurgent trade i*r aptly summarised by Germanoff
thus: "The mobility, the elasticity, the individual
adaptability to the customer's requirements, the
skill in obtaining from our stocks those goods, for
I which there is a demand, the utilisation of the
jgrowing home-industry and the possession of the
jamounts of currency, required for trading operations
on a small scale - all these advantages guarantee a
|quick commercial turnoverIt is only too natural
that the Communist leaders were highly perturbed by
this development, the more so as they realised that^
in order to be able to meet private trade on its own
plane, as it were, it was absolutely vital to put an
end to centralism in distribution and build up
autonomous trading organisations which could adapt
themselves to the laws of supply and demand.
It will be recalled that in the beginning of the |
ITSP the monopoly of Government purchases had been
entrusted to the co-operatives as organs of the Nar-
komprod. Very soon it became clear that in so far as j
private economic activity had succeeded in utilising
home-industry^the monopoly position of the co-operatives
turned out to be a handicap rather than an advantage
in practice: the co-operative agencies were not aliovied
to make their own terms with the peasants with the
result that they were gradually being ousted by the
competition of private traders. This created great
difficulties for Government collections of foodstuffs.
Very soon the co-operatives started to circum-
vene the regulations and to engage in independent
transactions. By the decree of April V, 1921, the
/Quoted by Braithwaite,op.cit., p. 1488.
legal status of the co-operatives was altered/ They
were declared independent economic organisations
outside the direct supervision by the Narkomprod.
But this early decree (based on the directives of the
too
X Party Congress) was by- fed? insufficient to take
due account of the changed economic circumstances.
The principle of compulsory membership remained in
force, although the decree provided for certain
modifications in this respect. Besides, the right
of free buying and selling was ensured on paper only^
for the apparatus of the co-operatives continued, in
fact, to be used mainly for the fulfilment of the
distributive functions of the Narkomprod, with the
only difference that the relations between the Nar¬
komprod and the co-operatives were supposed to be
contractual, the co-operatives being entrusted with
the exchange of manufactured goods against
agricultural produce and tKtdistributien^rticles of
prime necessity to the population.
The emancipation of the co-operatives and their
transformation into independent trading organs was
carried a step further by the decree of September
1, 1921, according to which the granting of Government
:ive
and other expenses of the co-operatives was dis¬
continued. But in fact the distributive functions
of the co-operatives did not cease before the food-
<L
subsidies for the purpose of defying the administra
iCf. Blanc, The Co-operative liovement in R.,NY,1924,p.223,
For details of the decree cf. Orloff, The Revival of
the Co-operative Movement in Russia, Russian Economist,
Vol. 2, pp. 1935 et seq«
tThe decree allowed the formation within the unified
co-operative societies, of voluntary consumers'
associations, classified by trades and districts.
scarcity (due to the bad harvest of 1921) had been
overcome.
In the measure as the legal restrictions on
commercial activity came to be removed, it became
evident that the co-operative movement could not bo
expected to cope with the growing turnover of goods.
State industry needed a trading network of its own, so
as to relieve the co-operatives and to supplement and
enlarge the marketing organisation. In December 1821
Government enterprises were authorised to dispose of
part of their goods in the market. Multiform State
trade organs began to spring up, marking the inception
of a State trade proper, whose rather complex mechanism
1 !
we shall discuss later.
The early phase of internal trade under the
New Economic Policy came to an end when (1) private
trade had been granted the charter of at least
relative legal security; (2) when the State realised
that its scheme of goods-exchange (in the form of a
controlled local, regional and even all-Union turn¬
over of commodities) had failed and that it had by
necessity to adapt itself to the growing sphere of
the market and its inherent laws; (3) when in view
of these circumstances the co-operatives were freed
from their purely distributive functions arid given
the opportunity to face the private traders on equal
terms; and^yhen C4) the State decided to build up
its own trading system so as to bring its industries
into closer contact with the consumer.
CHAPTER III
TRENDS OF INTERNAL TRADE
UNDER THE NEP
TRENDS OF INTERNAL TRADE
UNDER THE NEP
Let us now trace very briefly the main trends
in the development of internal trade under the HEP,
after commercial activity had emerged from its state
of infancy.
In its first phase which lasted until about
1923/24 the market was almost free and the outstanding
feature of the development was the emergence of a
national trade network. The speed at which the
formation of trade channels proceeded was, at times,
rather extreme, in relation, that is, to the volume
of goods which could, be handled in those days. In
the first sixth months of 1922 "there were already
584,000 commercial enterprises in existence. About
486,500 of these, or more than 83 per cent were
concentrated in the cities, while the vast agricultural
districts were served by less than 100,000 shops. The
new commercial enterprises were almost exclusively
owned by private persons, viz., 544,000 units or
93.9 per cent. The remainder (6.1 per cent) was
owned by the State (1.9 per cent) and the co-operative
/
(4.2 per cent).
The emerging market-relations were of the most
primitive nature (i.e., local bazaars). In the first
phase these contacts were strengthened by local and
regional fairs, local co-operatives and local Torgjfc.
But toon there arose the difficulty of integrating
/A. Nikolin, About Internal Trade, (R), Moscow 1928,
p. 15.
iPt. below.
the newly created retail trade network with the
wholesale marketing organisations of the State. A
stop-gap measure was the reliance on the help of
State and private middlemen, the private elements
(owing to a better knowledge of the market's
requirements) capturing the lion's share of these
operations. But the necessity for setting up inter¬
mediate trade links remained, if only for the fact
that the system of middlemen led to sundry abuses,
like speculative re-sales and the like.
The enormous number of small trade-units in
relation to a very scant volume of merchandise resulted
in slight individual turnovers carrying an excessive
proportion of trading oncost.
In view of these rather undesirable developments
the Authorities started to regulate the processes of
trade. Although the first phase remained essentially
one of non-interference, the State remained watchful.
In spring 1922 the first central Government department
for deeding with questions of internal trade was set
up.
The growth of the volume of turnover was rather
encouraging. In spite of the harvest failure of 1921,
the slow restoration of industrial production (which
barely covered the requirements of the cities), and
the different economic crises, the volume of trade,
(although ins advance was slowed down, was constantly on
the increase.
The second phase in the evolution of internal trade
under the NEP (which comprises the years 1923/24 and
and 1924/25)set in with the beginning of the Komvnu-
torg's rather weak regulative activities. Party
historians characterise this period as one of a new
arrangement of forces, marking the beginning of the
advance of socialist elements in the sphere of trade.
The aim of the State at that stage was to obtain
a hold on the wholesale trade organisations which
came to be increasingly regarded as belonging to the
species of economic key-positions. Only after the
"conquest" of private wholesale trade were the
positions of the bourgeoisie in retail commerce
eigjfcacked. At the end of 1924/25 the relative shares
of the different social types of trading activity
in reference to the number of trading units had
changed as follows:
State trade 5% \
Go-op* trade 18%
Private trade 77%.
At the same time, while the numbers of trading
units remained relatively unaltered, its distribution
to some extent
as between urban and rural districts was oomowhat
rectified} the number of town shops dropped by
approximately 25 per cent, while the trade network
in the villages was enlarged.
After the liquidation of the sales and "scissors"
crises and the general cheapening of industrial products
commercial turnover increased by leaps and bounds.
The normalised market exhibited an ever growing
absorbing capacity for goods and there were no longer
any unsold stocks in existence. On the contrary:
scarcity of goods, nay, a veritable goods famine
became noticeable, especially at the end of 1925.
The market did its best to circulate the available
/Cf. below.
output of commodities as rapidly as possible, but its-
of trade turnover
expansion was held in check by the existing shortage
of trading capital. Thus trade lagged behind the rapid
development of the productive forces of the country.
The strain imposed on the market's capacity was
particularly great in the case of agricultural
commodities. At that thgjp of revival every additional
pood of increase in yield meant approximately the same
increase in marketable surpluses. Without the existence
of a co-operative apparatus which was an ideal instrument
for combining the commercial interests of the
I agricultural producers with their interests as
consumers the market would probably never have been
able to cope with the ta.sk of effecting the exchange
between the countryside and the towns.
In the third phase of the growth of trade under
'
the REP which lasted until the beginning of the
Reconstructive Period, the schemes of the State
Authorities to regulate and plan trade became more
purposeful and unified. Whereas,formerly,planning
measures, as applied to different markets, were
isolated from one another, they became increasingly
co-ordinated as regards contiguous markets anc^later
as regards whole groups of markets (e.g., grain,
industrial goods etc.). At that time attempts were
being made to embody annual forecasts conceding the
i
growth of commerce in the General Control Figures
of the Rational Economy (which were first compiled
for the year 1925/26) and to sketch out roughly the
contours of the plan for the development of trade as
a branch of the whole economy for a quinquennial!, period
up to 1931/32®
The number of enterprises grew rapidly, while
the numerical proportions of the three main types of
trade remained nearly the same as in 1924/25 (private
trade: 78 per cent; co-operative trade: 16 per cent;
State trade 6 per cent). Owing to the preponderance
of private trade in small-scale retail' like hawking
and selling from travelling vans, the actual importance
of the private trader was gradually on the decline, how¬
ever .
In 1925/27 private trade began to contract
numerically as well. Data for the R.S.F.S.R. for this
year show that the general contraction of the trade
network was attributable to the closing down of private
shops. The number of co-operative trade units declined
slightly, but it^tepecific weightf"' increased nevertheless.
State trade grew both as regards the size of the net-
!work and the volume of its turnover.
The reduction in the number of trade units
continued in 1927/28 and the State and co-operative
trading organisations were fully occupied in filling
the gaps so as to insure an adequate trading service
to the consumer.
The next (fourth) more or less distinct phase
in the development of trade under the NEP coincided
with the beginnings of the Reconstructive Period.
During this period the regulative grip on trade by
the State was tightened still more and the fight
against private commerce intensified. The volume
of turnover handled by private commercial capital
/ITiltplin, op.citT, p. 177
continued to decline in the absolute sense. By that
time the private merchant was almost completely
removed from wholesale operations and his elimination
from retail trade was carried on a step further. The
rate of growth of co-operative trade outstripped
that of State trade. Go-operation easily held the







©n the whole it may be said that the influence
of private wholesale trade during the NEP was, at no
time, significant to any extent. As early as 1923
handled
its turnover amounted to 20 per cent of that
by State wholesale agencies/ In that year the influence
of the private wholesaler seems to have been greatest
in the organisation of meat and cattle trade in the
bigger cities end in textiles .(in commodity groups,
that is, which were most directly orientated towards
the consumer). But, as we know, the State soon realised
the economic importance of wholesale trade by the early
attention which it paid to the setting up of wholesale
trading organisations of its own. Private wholesale
trade, therefore, really never had a chance and its
stubborn vitality in the restricted sphere of activity
in which it was placed straightaway, is the more
astonishing.
Although it proved to be relatively easy to
remove it from the more important wholesale trans¬
actions, it retained, for quite a long time, its
positions in the "intermediate" wholesale dealings,i.e.,
dealings which were put through by the Torgi, viz.,
:/The volume of wholesale transactions effected between1
State Trusts and Syndicates on the one hand, and private
persons on the other, declined rapidly: (cf. Nikolin,op.cit.,p.65),
1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27
























wholesale enterprises of the State tra.cling system
organised on a provincial basis/ In 1925/26, in the j
total wholeeaLe trade of 52 Torgi, sales to private
merchants represented 16.5 per cent.^
Step by step, but nevertheless relentlessly, private
commerce was being severed from the State-controlled
industrial supplies. But when the merchants realised,
I '
that they could no longer hope to replenish their
stocks from State-owned warehouses, they retreated
from wholeslae trade only in so far as they now tried
to obtain from tie kustar industry all the raw material.s,
semi-manufactured goods and finished articles that
were available. In the beginning, the kustar industry
: was largely privately owned and^not, as was later the
case, organised in producers' co-operatives'; it was
therefore more easily accessible to private wholesale
traders. Besides, since it turned out, almost
exclusively, goods for the immediate use of the
consumers, it was stranded without the help of
private commerce which possessed superior knowledge
of the market's requirements.
But^by and by^the Torgi became acquainted with
the peculiarities of the local markets and the
kustar industry was re-modelled along cooperative
lines, so that the private wholesaler became more
and more superfluous.
Being thus driven from the wholesale dealings
in industrial commodities, private commerce concentra.1
its efforts on the trade in agricultural produce, but
/ Cf. belowt
ipt. Nikolin, op.cit., p. 65.
ted
in the measure as the State and co-operative agencies
succeeded in securing the lion's share of the agricultural
collections, the position of private wholesale dealers
became untenable in this sector as well.
Private Retailing,
Since in the beginning of the revival of private
trade the market was characterised by an acute
deficiency of trading units of the "socialised" sector,
the private retailer, sensing that his newly granted lease
of existence would not be of long duration, tried to
make as much profit as possible. Consequently
he tended to set up his business in the towns, the
town market being obviously more lucrative as far as
scale and range of activity were concerned. On the
other hand, it was in the towns that the private
retail merchant first began to feEL the growing com¬
petition on the part of the socialised trade sector.
The XIV Party Congress (December 1925) registered the;
tendency of the private trading activity to transfer
its operations to the village. In 1924/25 the
"specific weight" of the village sector of private
j trade increased to 37.2 per cent in relation to the
total number of private trading units (25.4 per cent
in 1923/24) and to 20.9 per cent in relation to
V
turnover (13.5 per cent in 1923/24). At the end of
1925/26j of the existing private shops etc .^61 per cent
or 368,000' units were in the towns, while the
3
corresponding figure for 1924/25 was 69.7 per cant.
/Cf. below, for details, (ch.: socialised versus private trade).
^Gromyko and Riauzov, Soviet Trade during 15 years,
(R), 1932, p. 17.
3liikolin, op.cit., p. 62.
In this connection it is also interesting to observe
that while in the three years 1923/24 until 1925/26
urban retail turnover rose by 10 per cent only,
| rural trade turnover (including wholesale operations)
/
: more than doubled.
It would thus appear that the private retailer
transferred his base to a territory where he was not
nrwjiC
likely to be-nset with such / serious opposition and
with" so many rstrictions as in the towns.
The principal commodity-group retailed by the
private merchant in those days was textiles which
came to about one-seventh of the private trade turn¬
over; another important commodity-group was groceries
(about one-fifth); meat and game made up nearly a
| quarter of retail dealings (but only 6,5 per cent of
i
[wholesale transactions which were chiefly in livestock).
What was the mental make-up of the new class of
illuminating
private traders, the "REP-men"? - Mgood and poignant
description of their mentality is given by Professor
z
Karlgren: "...those who, when trade was freed,...
appeared in the market...were all...smart folk, but
at the dame time an exceedingly uncrupulous, crooked
species from whom any moderation in the profiteer's
appetite would be the last thing to be expected. ...
the nepmen have to be pardoned if they considered it
not worth while to try to be better that their
reputation. And, moreover, there was the fact that
sound and sterling business methods were incompatible
with the practical conditions that Bolshevism gave to
fRikolin, op.cit., p. 637
^Bolshevist Russia, London 1927, pi 140.
private traders. ... Their motto, then, must be: -as
quick and large profits as possible, and no work with
sn eye to a distant future."
It was obvious that this rapacious profiteering
of the private retailer, manifesting itself in uncounted
examples of speculative abuses, was in itself a
sufficient cause for the intervention of the
Authorities who were too short-sighted to see that
many of the undesirable practices of private retail
trade were due to the conditions of its economic,
social and legal modus vivendi.1
li J
Private Commercial Capital.
During the period of War Communism private
commercial capital was extremely scattered but it
nevertheless provided, the basis on which private
trade made its appearance in the market after the
REP had been proclaimed. This new trade apparatus
was extremely insignificant and primitive in size and
equipment but owing to the pre-occupation^ of the
State with the restoration:' on of industrial "key-
positions" and the red-taped incompetence of the
co-operatives, the working conditions turned out to
be very favourable to the private merchant. Industry,
especially that of a local character, preferred a
swift marketing of its products to a protracted sales-
operation via the provincial Torgi. This situation
accentuated the process of the "selling out" of industrial
products at low prices and facilitated thereby the
formation of private commercial capital. Moreover,
/Comp. ch.: Socialised versus private trade.
by means of all kinds of fraudulent practices and
because of their close contacts with the well-to-do
peasants, the private traders managed, in a relatively
short time, to concentrate in their hands considerable
stocks of consumable goods, grain and agricultural
raw-materials (like cotton). The commercial
operations in raw-materials were particularly
profitable and favoured the formation of private
commercial ccapital. Last but not least, the strong¬
hold of the private merchant in the money market
and the extreme dearth of commercial credit-facilities
as provided by the S&ate„intensified private commercial
J
accumulation.
Many Soviet economists very soon bed'ame alarmed
by this situation. They warned the Government not
to let this state of affairs go too far, lest the
private capitalists secured too influential a position
and thus exceeded the economic functions that had
been assigned to them by the New Economic Policy.
Several surveys of the activity of private
commercial capital were undertaken during the first
years of the new era ; the size of private accumulations
was estimated in 1923 at 300 million gold roubles
(Larin and Preobrazhensky) and at 450-500 million
gold roubles in 1924/25 (Zhirmunsky). For the pur¬
pose of comparison we may point out that before the
World War Russian commercial capital amounted to
about 3,400 million gold roubles. According to an
enquiry of the Commissariat for Trade prepared at
the end of 1925 private commercial capital was









It is to he expected that, considering the semi
permanent and migratory nature of private commerce,
the circulation of its capital was rather rapid,
much more so than that of the unwieldy State and
co-operative trading. According to Larin the net
profits of private capital in 1925 were 100 million
gold roubles, the intitial capital for that year
having been assessed by Larin at 350 million gold
roubles.
Such is a brief survey of private trade/ under





Autonomy of State industry and the substitution
of centralised supply and distribution by free
exchange of goods made the creation, by the State, of
a commercial apparatus of its own imperative. The
weakness of the co-operative movement and the political
end social stigma attached to private middlemen as
well as the determination of the Communists'to learn
how to trade" provided an additional impetus to the
growth of State trade.
The main organisational forms of State trade were
the Trusts and Syndicates on the one hand and Torgi
on the other. We may conveniently describe them in
turn.
Trusts.
Practically all State-owned industries were
organised into Trusts. With their European "proto¬
type" they had hardly more in common than the name
which was merely supposed to convey the strong
connection and contact between the State and these
new economic agencies which held a certain group of
State industry "in trust".
The trustification of Russian industry began
as early as July 1921 and the most intensive period
of Trust building was between December 1921 and the
following March. ' By that tine the former 59 Glavki
of the Supreme Council for National Economy (V.S.N.Kh.)
had been liquidated and replaced by 16 central boards
/For details Cf. Dobb, Russian Economic Development
etc., op.cit., p. 201, 202, 204; also pp. 196 et seq.
j which were charged with the carrying out of the
industrial reorganisation and the supervision of the
Trusts. These - ere endowed with the powers of
operating in the market, "both as far as the purchase
of raw materials and the sale of their products was
concerned. Thus, while th^Industrial managers of
the Trust's component parts concentrated on all the
various matters affecting production, th^Trust
administration (supposed to be working on a "commercial
basis") co-ordiiB. ted the productive activities of the
| given group of industries with reference to the
requirements of the market and thus controlled all
commercial dealings and determined the commercial
policy to be adopted.
It has already been explained that the position
of the trustified Russian industry turned out to be
extremely precarious on account of acute shortage of
circulating resources arid that the first appearance
of State industry on the market partook of the
nature of a cut-throat competition between the
different Trusts. So great was their hunger for
circulating capital that they began to set up
branches and retail establishments (small shops and.
stalls), especially in the bigger towns, and even
went so far as to engage the services of hawkers in
raw
order to obtain/material and precious foodstuffs from
the countryside,'
The importance of Trusts as organs of State
trade, however, declined rapidly with the emergence
of the Syndicates.
JCTZ Dobb, ibid., p. 210.
Syndicates*
The proximate cause for the formation of the
Syndicates was the realisation that the "razbazarivanie"
of State industry could not go on for ever and that
in order to stop it it was vital, to set up a really
efficient commercial organisation of the growing
industry. From a wider point of view the commercial
Syndicates were the inevitable outcome of the division
of labour within the new forms of industrial
organisation. The more industry expanded, the more
■
complex became the problems of internal co-ordination.
These tasks soon required so much attention and care
that the Trusts were forced to enlarge and subdivide
their scope of operations. Accordingly, they began, in
the sp/fng of 1922, to form Syndicates which took over
all the duties connected with the supply of the factories
with raw materials etc. and the sale of the products
in the market.
In the year 1922/23 20 of the most important
Syndicates were formed (e.g., Textiles, Matches, Salt,
Leather, Tobacco, Coal, Oil/Fats etc.) In some
cases they inherited part of the property of the
old organs of War Communism, e.g., the Textiles Syndicate
from the Glavtextiles,the Leather Syndicatesfrom the
Glavleather etc., a clear indication of the direct
link between the distributive apparatus under War
Communism and the NEP's State trade organisations.
On the whole it seems that the Syndicates v/ere
/The independence of the Coal and Oil Syndicates
was merelyTAformal. In effect they represented commercial
offices of^planning department of the V.S.N.Fh., the
Chief fuel Department. (ILiashchenko, op.cit., p.235.)
jjjbid.
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formed by the spontaneous action of the Trusts
themselves.' This is most noticeable in the case of
the Textiles Syndicate which had to deal with a wide
and fluctuating peasant market. But there were cases
where the formation of the Syndicates was ordered
i
from above, as e.g., in the case of the Salt Syndicate
(which traded in a product whose regulation was clearly
essential).
The Syndicates did away -with the unco-ordinated
market-operations of the Trusts. There was no longer
the need to earmark a part of the Trust's capital for
the purpose of defraying; the cost of marketing. This
was now done by the Syndicates which were, in effect,
a union of Trusts, possessing their own capital
subscribed by the various Trusts concerned and charged
by these with the different commercial functions. These
Seemed to have varied considerably*and the degree of
ihe Syndicates' dependence on the Trusts, too, grew
j
Stronger or weaker in accordance with changing market trends
and conditions.
The principal economic ta&s of thqSyndicates
consisted in the creation of a State trading capital.
'The pooling of the commercial funds of the Trusts in
the capital funds of the Syndicates and the consequent
reduction of trading- oncost economised resources. But
even so, trading capital of the State remained totally
inadequate and the growth of the Syndicates was curbed
by this shortage. The Syndicates tried to overcome
this deficiency by various artificial means, like
/Nevertheless many Trusts continued to sell their _
products behind the back of the Syndicates. (Cf.Niljolin,
op.pit., p. 24). 0__ £lbid.,p.26, Liashchenko,op.cit.,p.22S,Dbbb,op.c'lt., p. 216.
the raising of prices and. the retaining of commercial
profits. To judge by the figures supplied by
Liashchenko (op.cit., p. 240) the ratio between total
production and the capital of the Syndicates was extremely
unsatisfactory: moreover commercial capital was
distributed unevenly between the different industrial
groups, so that a balanced process of industrial
v - '
expansion was hampered.
Under these conditions the credits granted to
the Syndicates by the Gosbank and the Prombank were
extremely helpful, but not sufficient to remove the
difficulties from the realisation of production by
!the Syndicates and to enable them to make possible
an extension of production by ever increasing sales.
Nevertheless, even in the beginning of the process
of syndication the beneficial effects of this new
type of independent and specialised commercial agency
became manifest. In the measure that the Syndicates
concentrated the marketing of the bulk of industrial
production, the State strengthened its regulative
grip on the market, for it was now in a position to
influence the flow of goods, to transfer goods from
one district to another, to determine trade routes,
to assure an uninterwp"tect. supply of the Trusts with
raw materials etc. Without the help of the Syndicat esj
the State could never have conquered the market.
By 1926/27 100 per cent of the Oil andSalt
industries were syndicates, 94.5 per cent of Textiles^
93.1 per cent of the match industry and 47.9 per cent
3
lof the makhorka industry.
If Op. cat., p. 240. jEPrombank is the long term credits ?40
bank for industry. Fpr details of. Liaghcnenko,°p• c •
'^Inferior brand ox tobacco, popular in Russia. :
/x6
When the most pressing financial difficulties
and organisational shortcomings had been overcome,
the volume of transactions carried on Toy the Syndicates
began to rise rapidly: on the average it doubled, in
about two years and in some commodity ^goups (silk,
%>
linen, hemp) it exhibited even higher rates of growth1.
J
Data of the turnover of 14 Syndicates are available











In the first years of the Syndicates' existence
the market was characterised by a hypertrophy of
central markets and an extremely poor service of the
u
provincial districts by the State. This was rectified
when the decentralisation of the system was decided
upon and thenceforward the volume of transactions in ;
the provinces began to rise at a faster rate than in
the cities.
The problem of conquering the market, not
merely in the political sense of ousting the private
trader but also in the technical sense of actually
establishing permanent contacts with the consumers,
presented itself to the Syndicates before long. The
decentralisation of the system and the movement towar
the provinces was the first step in tin desired
direction. But it was also essential to establish
contacts with the retailer. One obvious solution
consisted, in the building by the Syndicates of a
ds
/There was an initial tendency to set up big and unwieldy
Syndicates. Upon the recommendation of the XII Party
retail mechanism of their own. But, in point of fact,
the importance of the Syndicates always lay in their
trade
hold on wholesaled Particularly in the first years
of the Syndicates' functioning their retail network
was extremely insignificant.^
As regards the contacts•with the consumer the
Syndicates lived through different phases which can
be distinguished by the different methods employed.
there is evident
In the first period wo can register a strong
participation of private middlemen in^he work of the
jSyndicates owing to weaknesses in organisation and
finance. Then followed the attempt of the Syndicates I
to transfer part of their marketing work to the
co-operative centres (which were, at that time,
entirely unprepared to tackle the tasks so entrusted).
Later followed a phase, when the Syndicates tried to
bring about a short-cut contact with the consumer by
means of direct dealings with the lower co-operatives}
over the heads of the Co-operative Union and the local
centres. These attempts apparently made for a further
local decentralisation of the apparatus of the
Syndicates^ From 1925/26 onwards the main flow of
goods of the Syndicates was marketed by means of the
3
so-called general contracts with the co-operative
centres and the bigger local co-operative unions
'
as well as through the system of the Torgi which
latter we shall now proceed to discuss.
/Nikolin, op.cit., p.30.
JJlbid., p. 28; cf. also Great Soviet Encyclopaedia,
Vol. XI, p. 787.
J I.e., long-term contracts regarding future production
and deliveries.
Torgi,
The Torgi which can best be defined as local
wholesale enterprises of the State trading system,
began to be formed at the time of the creation of
the first Trusts. The biggest Torgi, like the
hostorg and the Petrotorg commenced their operations |
in October-November 1921. The Torgi were organised
on a provincial basis and were subordinated to the
Provincial Governing Bodies, the so-called Gubtorgi
(which, in their turn, were departments of the
Provincial Councils of National Economy). Already
in the first financial year of the NEP the number of
the Gubtorgi reached 48; in 1922/23 this figure went
up to 78 and in 1926/27 the Council of Local Trade
counted 71 Regional and Gubtorgi which figure did
not include the smaller district and local Torgi/
The main function of the Torgi was to serve the
interests of the local, and rural industry by the
'
purchase of raw materials, fuel etc., and by dis¬
posing of its products in the market, a taSfc which
(apart from its local limitations) was almost
identical with that of the Syndicates, with the
possible difference that in the case of the Torgi
commercial activity was perhaps more a means to an ^
end than an end in itself,
Torgi were also set ujx. in outlying districts
(e.g., Central Asia, Far East, Siberia etc.) where
local industries were almost absent, so that attention
to their needs was superfluous, and where the co¬
operatives were too weak to furnish the population
/Ifwith articles of ordinary use. These Torgi were
almost entirely confined to the local, market and were
characterised by a high "specific weight" of retail
operations in their turnover (about 50 per cent).
The volume of transactions handled by this category .
of Torgi came in 1926/27 to only about 27 per cent
of the Torgi's total turnover. The representative
category of Torgi concentrated its efforts on the
local industry and was chiefly engaged in wholesale
operations.
The volume of transactions of the Torgi was
constantly rising, the rate of growth being particularly
intense in the years 1923/2^ - 1924/25 and slowing
/
down somewhat in the following two years. In 1923/24
the turnover amounted, to 470 million roubles (100 %),
in 1924/25 to 833 million roubles (177 %), in
1925/26 to 1, 272 million roubles (270 %); in 1926/27
■
it reached the figure of 1,336 million roubles or
Xj
284 per cent as compared with 1923/24. Towards the
clo^fse of the NEP the Torgi controlled about 16
per cent of the total commercial turnover of the
U.S.S.R.
The Torgi (belonging to the representative
category) soon started to transfer their operations
beyond their local boundaries and in 1925/26, according
(op.clt,,p.31).
to figures supplied by Nikolin, they made more than
half of their purchases and sold nearly 40 percent
of their goods outside their assigned areas. In
1926/27 a. certain diminution of these extra-regional
.
operations took place, a consequence, presumably,
/Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 71. The slowing_
down v/as due to the growth of the co-operatives and the Syndicates.
Xlnterri a l Trade during 10 Years, op.cit., p«225.
of the resolution of the Council for Labour ana
Defence, passed on August 18, 1926, v/hicli underlined
that the main function of the Torgi should be to
serve the local non-syndicated industry and the
tur
kustari and Ait was advisable for the Torgi to
limit the range of their work to their own areas.
If one analyses the assortment of commodities
infehich the Torgi deals, its close connection with;
consumers' goods market becomes apparent. According
to data, for the year 1926/27Anore than 50 per cent
of the goods were articles of common demand (e.g.,
24.4 per cent textiles and 24.5 per cent foodstuffs));
of the remainder only 40 per cent were destined for
productive and technical uses.
The relations of the Torgi with the Syndicates
and other agencies of State trade as well as with
the co-operative system were rather complicated
owing to the absence, especially in the early
period of the 1TEP, of a sufficiently clear delimitation
of the functions of the various organisations.
Besides^there was always the necessity to adapt
oneself to the laws of the market. As long as
I
competition remained strong and but little interfered
with, so long as commercial autonomy was allowed to
foster egocentric tendencies within the different
economic branches of the national economy, the interests
of the different channels through which the flow
of goods, producers' and consumers', was directed,
were bound to clash.
Although the Torgi supplemented, to some extent,
/Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 77.
ISO
the work of the regional branches of the Syndicates,
thus adding to the efficacy of the system as a whole,
friction between the Torgi and th^Syndicates was
inevitable, so long as the principle of competition
between State enterprises was kept intact. The
same applied, as far as retail operations were
concerned, to the relations of the Torgi witlythe
co-operatives.
It is interesting to observe .that when the
peripheral network of thqfeyndicates began to come
in contact (and conflict) with the Torgi, the latter
began to change their organisation breaking': away-,
more and more, from tie Provincial Departments of
the V.S.Ii.Kh. and turning into share-holding joint
stock companies sanctioned and registered by the
Authorities !
The Torgi remained essentially wholesale trading
agencies. From the point of view of commercial
policy their significance lay in the displacement of
private wholesale trade. Consequently their turnover
with the private retailer continued to be considerable
until the letter's disappearance.^ The Torgi were,
in fact, specially entrusted with the duty of
influencing the private market by supplying the
private retailer over the heads of the private
3
wholesale merchants.
Other State trading organisations.
Although the Syndicates and the Torgi were the
/Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol.11, p. 109. The
shareholders were public bodies.
£For figures cf. Nikolin, op.cit., p. 34.
3 Neiman, op.cit., p. 112.
i
major forms of State trade under the NSP there
were other types of State trade organisation which are
worthy of mention in so far as their description
reveals an unexpected and extraordinary diversity of
State trade.
There was, of course,all the time.a continuous
evolution of the new forms of organisation. New
agencies we re being set up daily and scrapped or
fused with others after a brief existence. In the
beginning of the period under review the decreed
enthusiasm for commerce seems to have got hold of
the various Government departments. The old Ministry
of Supplies, the Narkomprod, was not liquidated
a consider
until 1924 and up to that time it included quite-a-
number of trade agencies (for chalk, salt, guts,milk,
fish,etc.)» After the Commissariat's liquidation thes
various trade agencies were reorganised and their
supervision taken over by the newly formed Narkom-
vnutorg (see below). The Ministry of Agriculture,
the Narkomzem, also set up different trading organs
of various types (Syndicates and share-holding
companies) and through them established contacts with
the co-operatives. Of the remaining Commissariats,
the market dealings of the Narkomzdraw (Health) and
the Narkompros (Education) are noteworthy. The
Municipalities, likewise, were engaged in commercial
transactions and the Gosbank took a very prominent
part in (wholesaLe) trading. The variety of operation^
at that time kept within the "best capitalist
traditions". Owing to the monetary difficulties of
the Syndicates the Bank received on numerous occasion
able
the exclusive right to the local realisation of
their commodities. (This happened, e.g., in the
cases of sugar and oil). Besides, the Bank was
frequently compelled to enter the market in order to
dispose of mortgaged goods which had been forfeited.
Furthermore, before the successful completion of
the Monetary Reforms, the Bank engaged in trade for
the purpose of saving its capital, from the effects
of inflation. But it also carried out purely
commercial operations, such as the purchase of
grain«.
Broadly speaking and with the exception of the
Gosbank (which, obviously, is a special case) the
following forms of State trade existed during the
NE'P in addition to the Syndicates and the Torgi:
(1) share-holding or joint stock companies; (2) pure
State retail organisation and (3) what is very in¬
adequately translated as "commercial enterprises".
The quantitative importance of these various agencies
.in the market was at no time at all appreciable, but
they all had specific tasks to perform in serving the
interests of different economic brandies.
The. share-holding type of commercial organisation
arose because of the economic need for concentraiting
the assents of different Government departments which
could not be fitted into a Trust or a Syndicate. This
had to be accomplished by special semi-independent
organs. Besides^there was the urgency for accumulating
additional resources and the share-holding company
was considered the most suitable form from this point
of view. The first share-holding companies began to
spring up in 1923 end their growth went on uninternptejd
during the ensuing years. At one time the "mixed"
companies became fairly prominent, "mixed" irythe sense1
of their capital being composed of Government funds a.nd
private resources of predominantly foreign origin/
hot only was the form of the share-hoiding
companies varied, but their tasks were likewise highly
manifold. It can be said, however,that they concentrated
ma.in.l3/ on collection of raw materials for the
different branches of the national economy (wool, linen,
tobacco, rags, etc.). The purely commercial companies!
of this kind were of a universal nature, the statute
covering the whole range of commercial operations and
granting them fairly wide powers of independent action;.
The State retail organisations were usually
separate and relatively independent commercial
enterprises within the legal framework of share¬
holding companies. At this stage it seems appropriate
to sajr a word or two about State retail trade in
general during this period. We know that State trade
during the NEP was essentially wholesale and that the
bulk of "socialised" retail trade was carried on by th
consumers' co-operatives. But right from the beginning
of the NEP the' different economic organs of the State,
especially those of industry, did engage in retailing
as well. They set up shops for the purpose of selling
/This "mixed" type was particularly common in export-
import trading enterprises^ they were mainly monopoly
enterprises for the sale of imported, goods ancl. for the
exportation of domestic produce. Some of them traded
in particular goods like grain ("EKportkhleb") and tin
(LesoexportO or were of a more general character ("Gos
torg"). Though separate legal entities, they remained
under the general supervision of the Commissariat
for Foreign Trade (Narkomvneshtorg).
ber
| their produce directly to the consumer. This was
necessary because the co-operative apparatus was weak j
and. unable to acquaint the industry with the demands
of the market, the velocity of goods-circulation etc.
i Besides, the co-operatives were piot particularly
[reliable as regards their monetary commitments. By
its
setting up the fer own retail shops industry established
a very valuable direct contact with the market and
insured a steadier flow of monetary income, so essential
|in those days of financial strain and depreciating
currency.
Then there were occasionally special retail
undertakings of the State such as the G.U.M., (i.e.,
the organisation of State Universal Store§), but such
[ were rare. The year 1924/25 seems to have been the
; peak year for this type of State retailing. Subsequebtl
the co-operatives began to take over, more and more,
I the retail functions of the "socialised sector". The
! State retailing that remained underwent a certain
: re-orientation in the sense that it became more in¬
dependent and specialised. Legally, it assumed the
form of share-holding companies formed by the Syndicates
'
so as to be able to devote the maximum of attention
to retailing.
The reasons for the formation of these retail
trading companies were often purely local considerations
but the desire, on the part of the State, to "conquer'
the retail market was constantly present. After
1926/27, in consequence partly of the resolution passed
«
by the February Plenunj of the C.P.S.TJ.(B). (J927) and
the resolution of the S.T.O., dated August 26, 1927
/ 3>b
concerning the relations of the co-operative and thej
State trade systems, there was a tendency for the
elimination of "parallelism" in the work of co-operatives
and State r'tailing. The existence of State retailing
had to he justified in every case, say, by local
weaknesses of the co-operative machinery (e.g., in the
such as there was I
outlying national, republics). State retailing/(tended
,to concentrate in the Torgi and was, on the whole,
limited to specialised commodities like technical
equipment and building material whose marketing called
for initiative as well as for careful and specialised
handling. Only very few industrial departments
retained their own retail shops, e.g., tie Food
Trusts (confectionary, wine etc.) Necessaries, however,
wrere, as a rule, being retailed by the co-operativesi.
Only the large Universal Stores, the Univermagi,
continued, to thrive and to grow. They were usually
formed, in the more important centres as model shops,
organised by the Local Authorities and run by, or on
behalf of, them. But the share of State retailing
in the "socialised sector" and in relation, to the
total turnover of the country continued to fall, as
may be seen from the following table (taken from
the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol. XVIII,p.370).
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The "commercial enterprises" were another form
of State trade during the MSP, noteworthy not so much!
for the volume of their transactions, but for their
widespread network of shops. We have drawn attention
to the trading activities of the various Commissariats
and departments«. These operations were handled by
the "commercial enterprises" with funds allotted to
them by the departments concerned. The Narkomzdrav,
e.g., maintained a large number of chemists' shops:
several publishing enterprises (Gosizdat, for instance)
carried on a book trade of their own.
Regulative orgsns.
The first centralised trade department to be
set up after the liquidation of War Communism was
the Central Commercial Department of the V.S.N.Kh.
which had evolved from the V.S.F.Kh.'s Central Board
of Supplies. The Central Commercial Department was
originally supposed to combine both operative and
regulative functions, but it was soon found that
.
this fusion of functions was impracticable. A special!
section for the regulation of trade only was
accordingly created within the Department. This
solution, however, proved likewise unsatisfactory,
since the Central Commercial Department" wa$6oncenned
merely with the commercial transactions'of enterprises
under the purview of the V.S.N.Kh. The first general
2
centralised. Government department for the regulation
of trade was the Commission for Internal Trade (Kom-
vnutorg) attached to the Council for Labour and
Defence and formed in the spring of 1822. It was
entrusted with the unification and codification of
commercial legislation as well as with the supervision
and the study of trade and trade turnover under the
completely changed economic conditions. Meanwhile?
the Narkomprod was still in existence and, as we
j know, it was engaged in rather extensive commercial
| activities5 it was liquidated in April 1924 and the
I Komvnutorg was replaced by a new All-Union Commissariat
for Internal Trade, the Karkomvnutorg. This trans-
i formation was effected, by virtu/e of the decree of
the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.,
dated May 9, 1924. The functional the new
Commissariat were wide and varied and it would go too,
far to discuss them in detail. Its basic tasks were i
"
the following: the planning of internal goods turn¬
over and its regulation within the whole territory
of the U.S.S.R.* furthermore, the direct administration
of State enterprises of All-Union importance that
had been transferred to the Commissariat," the
elaboration of the general rules concerning the
collection and the realisation of commodities: the
collaboration with the ITarkomf in (Commissariat of
Finance) in the financing of trade and in questions
petaining to taxes, insurance, transport etc.,' the
registration of commercial enterprises, the framing
of an All-Union commercial legislation and the
regulation within the limits determined by the
S.T.O., of wholesale, and retail prices of a certain
number of goods®
The Harkomvnutorg functioned until the end of
1925 when, by a decree of the Central Executive
Committee (dated November 18, 1925).it was united
with the Commissariat for Foreign Trade (Narkomvnesh-
torg) into a general Commissariat of Trade (Narkoni-
torg). The reaons for, and the implication of, this
unification will be discussed in another context.
The decree which ordained the fusion stated that this
was rendered unavoidable owing to the growth of
internal commerce and the extension of trade relations i
with the outside world. The unification was
supposed to strengthen the economic bonds between
S town and country - presumably by taking- into account
|the interests of the village in the distribution of
TkSLT
the "productive" imports and itrf structure (agricultural
machinery and implements)-and to make possible the
elaboration of a unified plan of trade turnover,
comprising the exchange between town and. country as
well as that with the world economy. These were
indeed gigantic tasks and, in point of fact, the
difficulty of adjusting import plans and the plans
of internal trade remained. By virtue of a decree,
passed in 1926, the Narkomtorg as an All-Union organ^
was granted the right to influence decisively the
price policy for the whole of the U.S.S.R. The task
of grain collecting which up to 1925 used to be per¬
formed by the Provincial Commissariats for Internal
Trade, was, however, not transferred to the newly
formed unified Narkomtorg, but, as we know, to in-
dependent State trading organisations (Khlebprodukt,
Gostorg), the Centresoyuz and the Goshank. Thus, in
the matter of agricultural collections at least, the
attitude of the Narkomtorg remained one of non¬
interference and. its activities were limited to gener
supervision. On November 11, 1930 the direction of
the whole of the internal trade was placed in the
hands of the new Commissariat for Supplies (Narkom-
snab). But its description belongs to another phase
in the history of Soviet trade.




It was to be expected that the revival of trade
| generally and of State trade in particular would have
called into being certain subsidiary institutions
| designed primarily to faciliate trade operations.
| Aridjsince these institutions were of a public nature
it seems fitting to include them in a survey of
State trade.
Commercial Banks and Commercial
Credit Institutions.
Trade, by its very nature , is impossible withou
credit and we have already pointed to the urgency of
: this problem under the extremely precarious economic
conditions in which the country found itself after
the termination of War Communism. One of the main
functions of the Gosbank, founded by virtu/e of the
resolution of the All.-Russian Central Executive
Committee, dated October 13, 1921, was the crediting
of trade turnover. The original intention was
I
apparently to grant the Gosbank the exclusive fight
of commercial crediting. This was quite in keeping
with the still vigorous "tradition" of centralism
in those days, but very soon it became evident that j
the Gosbank was not able to cope with the heavy strain
put on it. Decentralisation and specialisation of
credit was consequently decided upon and actually
carried out: in February 1922 the Consumers' Co¬
operative Bank ("Pokobank") was instituted, to be
reorganised a year later so as to comprise all
types of co-operative enterprise("Vsekobank"). The
! Rub si an Comrnerc ial~ Indus trit.l Bank (Torgovo -Promyshlennyi
Bank or Prombank) was inaugurated on October 19, 1922J
|as a share-holding concern. Around these centres of
commercial credit a system of provincial banks began
/
to spring up,
In the first years of the NEP the absolute extent
of commercial credit was very small. In view of the
Iacute dearth of industrial capital the earmarking •
of funds for the use of trade was not easy of achievement.
Butjso rapid was the development of trade of all kinds
that after some time a considerable (though absolutely
Ivery inadequate) proportion of the total volume of
credit was assigned to trade. The methods of commercial
credit were similar to those employed in other countries
(discounting of bills, long-term obligations, credit
against goods etc.)
Commodity Exchanges.
Another important auxiliary organ of State trade i
(and to some extent of private trade) was the Commodity
Exchange. The first Commodity Exchange under the
Soviet system was that of Saratov, opened in July,
1921. Commodity Exchanges of Viatka, Rostov, Moscow
and other cities followed. The first period of their
growth was chaotic, until their legal status was
clarified. This was done by a decree of the S.T.O.
/We cannot possibly record all the aspects in the
development of Soviet credit during the REP period
(e.g., agricultural credit, export credit etc.), but
it may be mentioned in passing that the financial
interests of private trade were looked after by private
Mutual Credit Associations which functioned under close
supervision by the Authorities up to their final legal
suppression in 1929. They never attained any importance,
however.
. . _
^According to Liashchenko (op.cit., p. 283) commercial
dated August 23, 1922, whi ch, by dec1 ari ng the
Exchanges to be extra-departmental public institutions^
ended, the controversy as to their exact nature and
9
functions in trade. The legal status of the Commodity
Exchanges, as they existed at the time of the HEP,
can perhaps best be compared with public corporations
of the British type: i.e., they were neither private
nor governmental organs, but set up by different
organisations and persons on a voluntary basis, not in
the narrow interests of their members but for the
benefit of the public. The Authorities retained the
right of general supervision only. The Governing
Body was composed of State and co-operative organisations
private enterprises 2
andbometimes even included/.^ As a rule, State and
co-operative organs had equal rights, but after the
consolidating legislation of 1925 there was a certain:
diversity in the manner in which the statute of the
different Commodity Exchanges was drawn up.
The different administrative organs of the
Exchanges were as follows: (1) General Meeting of
Members; (2) The Commodity Exchange Committee; and
(3) the Presidium. For the purpose of price-fixing the
so-called Quoting Commissions were formed by the
Committee, composed of members as well^s of prominent
and habitual dealers. The settling of disputes arisipg
out of the business transactions was entrusted to the
Xcontinued from previous rage): credits of the Soviet
banks in the first yean of their operation did not
exceed 3-8 million pre-war roubles. Before the war
bank credit for commercial purposes was 700 times as much.
/For details on Commodity Exchanges cf. Great Soviet
Encyclpaedia, Vol. 6, pp. 382 seq. and Lezhava, Internal
Trade in 1923, Moscow 1924 (R).
^Prior to the decree the Exchanges appear to have been
:regarded as co-operative institutions.
3? This was rare, .however; in. any case the private members
!were invariably'in the minority;
/4-r
Arbitration Commissions, the litigants having the right
of appeal to the ordinary judicature: the constitution
of these Commissions was governed by special instructions
issued by the S.T.O. For the purpose of registering
dealings outside the Exchanges, Registration Bureaus
were created in conformity with the respective order
of the Narkomvnutorg. The observation and analvsis
of the transactions and general market research was
carried out by the Statistical and Economic Department
of the Exchanges/ In addition, there existed the
jBrokers' Association, whose duty it was to fulfil
the clients' orders and to act in a consulting
capacity, but also to watch over the nature of the
transactions and to see to it that they conformed to
the then existing commercial legislation andAthe
State's commercial policy. Some Exchanges organised
so-called Operative Bureaus which had the special
duty to collate all available information concerning
the demand for, and supply of, various merchandise.
The volume of transactions of the Commodity
Exchanges rose by leaps and bounds judging by the
official statistical data; these were inflated,
however: according to an order issued by the S.T.O.
on November 1, 1922, all Government organs and enter¬
prises were compelled to register all their dealings
(with the Registration Bureaus of the Exchanges,
irrespective of whether they were carried out inside
(XT
and-outside the Exchanges. In fact, the yield from
fees for the registration of outside transactions soon
exceeded the collection of ordinary fees.
/For details of other auxiliary departments cf.
Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol.6, p. 381.
l/f-6
Here are some figures relating to the volume of
internal transactions only (taken from the Great
Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol. 6, p. 377):
Years Moscow C.E. 70 Provincial C.E.
(In million roubles)
Total of 71 C.E.
1922-23 : 435.1 : 203.6 638.7
23-24 : 791.7 : 756.7 1,548.4
24-25 :2,056.3 : 1,875.7 3,923.0
25-26 :2,855.9 : 2,432.8 5,288.7
From an analysis of these statistics according j f •-ity
to the different categories of dealers it appears that
State trading held the predominating position right
from the beginning and that in course of time the
transactions of the co-operatives'greatly increased
j in importance with the "specific weight" of private
■
and "mixed" transactions constantly declining. Thus,
it would seem that the operations of the Commodity
Exchanges reflect#^ fairly accurately, the general
trends of trade in the country as a whole.
The main significance of the Commodity Exchanges!
lies perhaps in their general services rendered to
the country's commerce, like consultation, market-
.
I regulation and research (bringing out the relations
of demand and supply). The scope and magnitude of
■
| this kind of work - quite apajrt from the much wider |
measure of Government supervision - distinguishes
the Soviet Commodity Exchanges from analogous
institutions in capitalist countries.
The "indirect" functions of the Exchanges were
bound to come to the fore, as "socialised" trade grew
and the inter-relations between State commercial
enterprises and the co-operatives were more and more
: developed along contractual lines; for this meant
that the "intermediary" services of the Exchanges werje
no longer required to the same extent.
But, while the"intermediary" functions in the
industrial market (which was much more easily brought'
: under the sway of Government control) soon lost in
importance, they remained decisive and from the point
| of view of the State ..most useful in the organisation
| and regulation of the agricultural market. This,
I incidentally was quite in keeping with pre-war condition
| when the Commodity'E^changes had been, in the main,
concerned with agricultural 'products. The concentration
i on agriculture inevitably produced a certain degree of
j departmental specialisation, but in principle and
in contradistinction to their capitalist contemporaries
the Soviet Commodity Exchanges remained, on the whole^
: universal in character.
l|i may be added that the market researches and
the statistical investigations undertaken by the
| auxiliary organs of the Exchanges proved of the utmost
value to general trade statistics. Without the data
supplied by the statistical and. economic departments
rc^arttoyj
| of the Exchanges, the records as?<vthe volume of
I wholesale trade under the NEP would have been much
j more incomplete than they actually are.
)
.(EXCURSUS 13". TO CHAPTER V
THE PROBLEM OF STATE TRADE CAPITAL
THE PROBLEM OF STATE TRADE CAPITAL
Trading requires capital of its own in the form
of the goods themselves and in the shape of additional
liquid means (money, instruments of credit, etc.) for the
purpose of attending to the merchandise and also for
the dispatch of the commodities to the consumer. In
an ordinary exchange economy the source of accumulation
consists in the commercial profits that accrue to thef
trader for his services. Historically, commercial
capital was the originator of industrial capital, in
l so far as the trader and the producer used to "be one
and the surplus resulting from the exchange operations
| was invested in production. With the growth of the
exchange economy a. division of functions took place
with the result that commercial capital, became^not
an independent, out a separate and distinct economic
category.
In Soviet Russia this process was reversed in so
rar as industrial capital became the source of the
State's commercial capital. In the beginning of the
NEP it appeared that private trade was small and
elastic and rather inexpensive to run, so that the
concentration of the scattered reserves and surpluses!
of goods, valuables and money (partly carried over
from prevolutionary days) wes~e sufficient at least
to make a start. For the State the ta.sk was much
more complicated. While private enterprise had, in'
the main, been re-admitted only to the domain of
exchange, the State had to solve the additional
difficulty of putting the derelict productive
j apparatus into operation end at the same time to
| attend to adjusting it to the newly created economic'
environment.
The problem of industrial capital was relatively
easier to tackle since the new Trusts had at least
inherited the old equipment. But even so industry had
to resort to the "razbazarivanie", in order to obtain
i the requisite circulating funds. When the sales-crisis
of 1922 had been liquidated, the conditions of produetin
improved owing to various factors which we have discussed
j Industry was soon confronted with the problem of earmark!
i part of its capital resources for the facilitation of
| its market transactions. First, this was done by
/
I advancing credit to its customers. When a special
| State trading apparatus began to emerge, the problem
became one of creating special commercial funds for
the exclusive use of the new trade organs. This was
done partly'via the Budget,both central and local,
but it appears that the direct contributions of industry
to the syndicated capital played a bigger role than
budgetary grants. With the spread of commercial
joint-stock companies all other resources of industryj
that were as/ail able to trading were gathered together.
As time went on (and especially after the Monetary
Reforms) the various credit institutions began to
|participate in the formation of commercial capital.
The capital of the Torgi was first made up, in
strict adherence to the traditions of War Communism,
/Disposal over amortisation funds enabled industry to
do so. (Cf. N.N. Vinogradsky, Problem of Commercial
Capital, Plano\gi.e Khotiastvo, 1925, No.1,p.109)
! almost exclusively by administrative grants of local
organisations, i.e., the Provincial Councils of
I National Economy. On October 1, 1923, out of a
total of IS.6 million roubles 17.6 million roubles
or 94 per cent were put at tie Torgi's disposal by
administrative arrangements. This capital structure
I was in direct contrast to that of the Syndicates, where,
on the same date, the share of budgetary grants in
the capital of 17 Syndicates (excluding the Oil
jSyndicate) amounted to 5.6 million roubles or 28.S
/
I per cent of the total. Later on, when the Torgi assuijned
the form of share-holding companies, the capital was
| made up by contributions from local industries and ,to
I a lesser extent from credit institutions. Still
■»
]later, when the Syndicates and Trusts had secured a
greater degree of financial and market stability,
they came to the financial assistance of the Torgi
which were set up in outlying districts and national
republics. But administrative grants retained their
jdominating position. On October 1, 1928, the sources
of the capital of 48 Toi'gi were as follows:
Commissariats and various local administrative
departments - 50 per cent: local industry - 23 per
cent; Union industry - 14 per cent; banks etc. - 13
. Ay
per cent.
The composition of capital belonging to joint-
stock trading companies was more motley, but, as in
the case of the Torgi, budgetary and departmental
grants were most prominent at the beginning (viz.,
~Cf. Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol., p. 371
£lbid.
17.1 million rouble.-- or 71.6 per cent of the total
on October 1, 1923). In the ensuing years other
organisations replenished the companies' resources.
All these data point to the development of
credit centres and of commercial crediting by industry,
but it is significant for the financial strain of
State industry that, in spite of the growth of
industrial production, the total State trading capital
was, on October 1, 1925, made up as follows:budgetary
grants - 71,4 per cent (these were chiefly in respect
of a few but very big trading establishments),
contributions of industry - 22.2 per cent: banks -
2.8 per cent; other sources ~ 3.6 per cent.^
It should be noted, furthermore, that the capital
of State trade remained smaller than that belonging
to the co-operatives (including the co-operative
societies of producers) and was endowed with a less ;
rapid velocity of circulation, the latter fact
explaining the relatively few attractions which the
trade agencies of the State offered as depositories
of loans. In addition, the development of the credit
system did not proceed at ta pace commensurate with
the growth of the national economy.
Altogether, from the view-point of the formation
of an adequate stock of commercial capital, the
conditions were most' unfavourable. The scarcity of
capital resources in the country as a whole compelled
industry to mobilise and economise to the utmost its
internal resources, so much so that on occasions
measures were being taken with a view to re-diverjstimg
/ Ibid.
the grants erstwhile allotted to the trading organisations
so as to make them available for industry.
The potentialities of State trade for accumulating
| sufficient capital resources without help from outside,
were extremely limited. It is true that during the
period, of ,frazbazarivanie" and/t^lie general disorganisation
of the market (1922/23) State trade had managed to
pocket big speculative profits. But, when, in
pursuance of methods to overcome the "scissors"-crisijs,
the Government decreed an all-round reduction of
! prices, it thereby impaired the profitableness of
| State trading. Besides, the greater part of such
profits as were yielded in the process of .exchange
! and could conceivably be used for the purpose of
accumulating commercial capital, had. to be handed
over to the Treasury. At the same time, the Exchequer
ceased to grant fresh long-term loans which were
I necessary to supplement the stock of trading capital
I that had to serve an ever expanding volume of merchant
ise.
What could the trading organisations do under
such circumstances ? They tried to obtain as much
short-term credit from the banks as was available
and to extend the practice of being supplied with
j goods on credit. But clearly these methods could be
no more than palliatives.
All these difficulties and adverse conditions
| taken together produced (in 1925 or so) the"problem
of commercial capital" which was extensively debated
I at the time. The tangible manifestations of the
d-
^ieSf?l§siS°tSiifi5fegT!?laSE0SJe?h§fu5Sg^gWcoto)
! I925)the problem would have arisen in 1923, but for the Mon.fief
difficulty consisted in the impossibility of moving
|the whole volume of commodities from the producer
to the consumer and in their uneven distribution in
the country. The crux of the problem of commercial
capital was thus the disparity between the growth of
the volume of commodities and the potential possibilitjie
of its turnover together with, and because of, the
non-existence of adequate sources of commercial
|financing. Several methods of dealing with the problem
;were advanced One of them was the so-called "new
commercial practice". We have already mentioned the
fact that owing to the pressing needs of industry^
a portion of the advances made to trading organisations
had to be re-diverted into industry. Nov/, the "new
|commercial practice" tried to fill the gaps which
I had thus been created, by attracting .the investment
of private capita].. On the face of it, this was
certainly a very ingenious method. In point of fact,
| however, private capital refused its co-operation.
Another method of solving the problem, or rather
j of mitigating it, was of a monetary nature. While
credit inflation was condemned, it was suggested ±*7
To
judiciously^increase money and credit issues in
accordance with the grwoth of goods' turnover in
the country including the commercial funds of the
countrysideAt the same time, it was held, industry;
/The position compared very unfavourably with the
pre-war situation: in those days the ratio between
commercial capital and trade turnover was much more
satisfactory. For details cf. S.L. Fridman, Capital
Resources of the State trade of the U.S.S.R., Moscow,
1927, (R),p. 142.
^But, since the Soviet leaders were highly apprehensive
lest these issues should lead to a repetition of the
inflationary period they tried to ascertain, as
correctly aa{oossible, the real requirements of trade
should develop at such afepeed as to leave enough
commercial capital to market the finished article whenI
it emerged from the sphere of production. Every slowing
however,
down of industrialisation/ran counter to the political,
demands of the Party. Industrialisation of the Soviet
Union constituted thus the major objection to these amp.
similar suggestions.
Hence, under the then existing conditions the only
solution appears to have been the attempt to increase j
and foster the internal accumulations of State trace
jitself. Though these were not considerable, it was
[pleaded that if they were not claimed by the State,
I
trade could conceivably achieve at least a partial
solution of the problem of trading capital (not, of course,
in a short space of time, but ii^4 few years). Self-
jaccumulation of State trade would have meant a decrease
lin the proportion of borrowed capital and would thus
i
[have exercised the most salutary infl^mce on the
stability of the system and would have indirectly
i
contributed to the smoothing out of market .fluctuation^.
On the other hand it was justly pointed out that x while!
self-accumulation of the trade organisations could
possibly solve the difficulty of how to finance the
I
existing turnover of goods, the increase of trade
(turnover constantly required additional resources
^continued' from previous page) :for circulating capital].
Bliakhov, in his"Problem of circulating resources in
(the internal trade of the U.S.S.R.") tried to calculate(these requirements on the basis of what he called
("rouble-days", expressing the resultant of the volume
of marketable goods and the time it takes to place the
(in the market under "normal conditions". He assessed
the figure at some 200 million roubles for the whole
trade network of the country, i.e., including private
trade. Jn the abstract, his ipethod of calculation
m
from various credit institutions. Thus the vicious
circle was re-started, for industrialisation continued
!to claim its own. "Realising this, the advocates of
commercial crediting linked their demands for additional
resources with a plea for a thorough rationalisation
of the whole State trade machinery so as to shorteC
the period of moving the goods from producers to
consumers and thereby to achieve a maximum utilisation
/
jof commercial credit.
The problem of trading capital remained unsolved j
(during the FEP and it continued to occur/y the minds of
(Soviet economists in the subsecuent periods.
It would seem that the problem can be solved
(permanently only if and when the growth of the national
(economy is a balanced one, i.e., when adequate funds
are earmarked for the purpose of exchange and.
distribution and every increase in marketable production
(is balanced off by corresponding additions/ to liquid
trading resources. This balance could not be observed
industrial
under conditions of primary/accumulation on which
■
(Russia had, for good or for evil, embarked. But.even' j
then it became abundantly clear that the task of re-
y
(construction would defeat itself, if the requirements




GO ~OP '■ r ■ AT IVE TRADE
General.
As distinct from state trade, the consumers'
co-operative movement had the immense initial advantage
of having gathered, a rich store of practical experience
in the pre-war era and this was perhaps one of the
reasons why the Polshevik Party, at that time, held tie
opinion that it was up to the co-operative movement to:
conquer the retail market from the private trader. But
apart from technical superiority there \ &S/ a host of
political considerations.which prompted the Soviet
j
• /
Authorities to pay special attentions# to the co¬
operatives and their reconstruction, Lenin, in
particular, was always fully alive to the great
,
importance of the co-operative!for the new regime.
The main lines of development along which the co-operaiives
should proceed were summarised in Lenin's last article|
which he wrote before his death under the title "On
co-operation". There he said: "... By adopting the
NEP we made a concession to the peasant as a trader, a
Concession to the principle of private trade; it is
I
precisely for this reason that co-operation acquires
such, enormous significance. ... Politically we must
place the co-operatives in the position of always
enjoying not only privileges in general; the^ privileges
must be purely material privileges (bank rate, etc.).
The co-operatives must be granted loans which, if not
large, shall exceed the loans we grant to the private
fAs early as March 1919 (at the VIII Party Congress) h4
voiced the opinion that the co-operatives represented the
onlv democratic mass-organisation which capitalism had
developed, and that they were the only mass-movement wt
Ijtad deep roots in the peasantry.
ich
I entrepreneurs... by assistance we must mean assistance!
for co-operative trade in which real masses of the
.population really take part. ... The whole thing now
is to be able to combine the wide revolutionary range
of action, the revolutionary enthusiasm...with (I am
ialmost ready to say) the ability to be an efficient arid
literate merchant, which is sufficient to be a good
co-operator.11
Problems of growth.
From the Uarkomprod the co-operatives had received
ja certain "commercial fund" which.together with the
'goods to be collected^was supposes to lay the foundations
of the co-operatives' commercial operations. But in
so far as the Narkomprod was not liquidated until
1924^the co-operatives remained dependent on its mercy,
ja fact which hampered their badly needed freedom.
Besides, the co-operatives suffered from the now
familiar infantile diseases of the new era: organisational,
economic and financial weaknesses, unwieldy trading
jt
junits, excessive trading oncost, indiscriminate
profiteering, in brief: "commerce for the sake of
| profit «
:«onimoroQ."
The restoration of the co-operative apparatus
proceeded slowly and painfully, the co-operatives
being in constant competition with State trading and
private merchants/ The organisational weaknesses of
/Collected Works,op.cit.,Vol.9,pp.402 et sec.
i/Liashchenko mentions the early tendency of the co¬
operatives towards super-centralisation. The turnover
of the Centrosoyuz amounted to 31% of the turnover of
regional and district organisations as compared with
5% in 1916. (op.cit., p.252). 3 Ibid.,p.255.
^The attitude of the Trusts towards the co-operabives
[was extremely frigid. They preferred to dispose^their;
the co-operative framework consisted chiefly in the
inadequacy and, as often as not, in the non-existence!
of the intermediary links uniting the small local
co-operatives with the system of the provincial co¬
operative union and the central authority, the Centro-
soyuz. This was the main reason why State industry
was simply compelled to build a wholesale and retail
trading network of its own. Originally it had made
the attempt to hand over its produce to the Centro-
soyuz on the basis of general contracts, but this
experiment turned out to be an utter failure.
Another factor which crippled the freedom of thej
co-operatives and prevented their effective adaptation
to the new conditions was the system of compulsory
membership. Up to the end of the year 1913 any kind j
of voluntary co-operation was considered illegal.
Later, the principle of voluntary co-operative ""as
association was formally recognised by the Soviet
Government on two occasions ( December 18, 1923, and ;
May 20, 1924 ). Yugoff complins, however, that thisj
Magna Charta was illusory to a great extent, especially
in the cities/ But, in point of fact, the decision"/©
allowed voluntary membership, at least in principle,
exerted a salutary effect on the growth of the co¬
operative movement. This measure coincided with decisions
to go ahead with the strengthening of the co-operative
network. The December (1923) Plenum of the Party's
Central Committee, the XIII Party Conference and the
XIII Party Congress (1924) stressed the importance of
KoO
(continued from the previous page): goods on the
free market (at higher prices). This attitude
favoured the growth of private intermediaries and who
merchants. /Yugoff,op.cit.,p. 187.
lesale
the co-operatives. The "Resolution on Co-operation"
; passed by the XIII Party Congress, in particular,
'
stated that the foremost task of the co-operative
; movement consisted in ousting private commercial
capital from the trade turnover with a view to •
| welding a direct link between the socialised industry
and the .peasant economy.
A certain amelioration of the position occurred
in 1923. In 1922/23 the turnover of rural, and urban
co-operatives^including the provincial and district
unions as well as the Centre was only 691 million
? «>
roubles; in 1923/24 it amounted to 1,502 million
roubles, a noticeable advance in spite of the
extremely negligible absolute proportions of the
turnover. The network of shops also grew, but the
number of co-operative branches, especially in the
entirely
villages, remained by inadequate.,
A distinct improvement in the work of the co¬
operatives took place in 1924 as a. result of the
successful completion of the Monetary Reforms, the
greater attention paid by the Communist Party to the
co-operatives and the overcoming of the economic
difficulties of 1923.
The recovery of the co-operatives manifested
itself in (a) the size of the membership; (b) the
growth of the network; (c) the increase of turnover;
(d) finance; arid (f) the strengthening of contacts
with State industry.
As regards the first "index" of co-operative
strength, the number of members belonging to the
/There was one co-operative shop per 3-4 villages or
about 4,500 inhabitants. At the beginning of 1924
consumers' co-operative movement increased from
:7,093,000 on October 1, 1924 to 12,462,000 on October
.1, 1926. In 1926/27 it exceeded the 16 million mark.
In the villages the rates of growth in membership were
particularly high. In 1926 11 per cent of the adult
'rural population belonged to the co-operatives (as
compared with 5 per cent in 1924). In the towns the
I growth was less rapid, but the proportion of the
INS ■
I co-op era/tee?-population was much larger than in the
villages (viz., 51 per cent of the adults in 1926).
|Most members of the Trade Unions belonged to a co-
/
I operative store.
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Thus we see that in the towns the co-operative
network was strengthened by the combination of the c
different, co-operative societies and by an appreciable
; increase in the number of .shops, while in the country-
| side there was an increase in the namber of co-operative
societies, desirable in view of the scattered rural
(continued, from previous page): only 3.15 million
peasants etc. belonged to the co-operatives as com¬
pared with 2.6 million in the towns. (Cf. Liashchenko
op.cit., p. 251).
/Data taken from Nikolin, op.cit., pp. 37 seq.
population. But the position in the rural districts
remained unsatisfactory: the number of shops
per society was far toe insufficient.
Turnover went up in both town and country.
Actually the rate of advance was higher in the rural
co-operatives^ this was understandable since their
recovery had proceeded from an extremely low level.
In spite of this noticeable progress in all
directions it appears that the growth of the co¬
operatives did not fill the gaps which were created
I
by the contraction of private trade. One of the main :
limitations of growth seems to have been the in¬
sufficient number of trading premises especially in
the outskirts of the cities. This was explained by
the fact that^during the operation of the "commercial
principle" before the Revolution the network of urban !
shops taken from pre-war days was marked by an undue
concentration in the centre of the towns and that
because of the high building costs it was not easy to
jerect a sufficient number of new shops so as to
'
eradicate the existing misproportions. By way of a
temporary solution the harkomtorg suggested in March
I
1928 to pay greater attention to the development of
the peripatetic trade (stalls, booths.etc.) of the
co-operatives for the purpose of supplying the
Z
population with foodstuffs and other necessaries.
In 1827/28, owing to certain attractions, the




J Mo dividends were (or are) paid by Soviet co-operatives
Great Soviet Encyclopaedia, Vol.22",p. 267.
jprofits fell from 147 million roubles in the year
/
ending October 1, 1926 to 85 million roubles in 1927.
I
During 1922/23 - 1926/27 turnover rose by more than
12 times, Ariz., from 1,123 million roubles to
j14,255 million roubles and amounted to 36 per cent of;
jthe total turnover of commercial and industrial under4
takings in the country.^
The contact with State industry was greatly
:strengthened by the extension of the system of general
contracts which enabled the co-operatives to dispense
I with the middleman services of the local Torgi and
local branches of Syndicates.^ The value of trens-
I actions comprised, by these contracts grew from 528
million roubles in 1925/26 to 1,049 million roubles
in 1926/27, and 2,032 million roubles in 1927/28. in
1&27/A11 this is surely a clear proof of very
tangible achievements. Progress was not easy and
could hardly have been attained without the assistance
administered by the Government on various occasions.
Still, many fa/lings remained. Fraud and bureaucratic
inefficiency could, only be overcome by a lejgthy and
persevering process of education.
What did the co-operatives trade in ? It appears
that cloth and articles of clothing represented the
major commodity-group, both in rural and urban societies,
viz., about 25 per cent of the total turnover. Other
representative goods were household utensils, chemical.s?
/"To achieve a surplus on its trading was sometimes a
very difficult matter. Prices of staples were regulated
by the State, and... the profit often disappeared in over¬
heads or was lost through mismanagement. ...retail prices
(of unrationed articles) were never very far above whole¬
sale prices... (Paul, op.cit. , p. 63). ,£Nikolin,op.cit.
p. 40. 3 Cf. Great Soviet Encyclopaedia,Vol. 15,p.159.,
Nikolin, p. 43. ^Economics or Soviet Trade,op.cit. jp.X.
tobacco and. makhorka, leather and leatherware, sugar
I etc. Agricultural commodities, with the exception of
cereals, did not figure prominently in co-»operative
trading. The fact that only a relatively. small portion
of agricultural produce, especially of a perishable
character, was handled by the co-operatives, was
deprecated by the Authorities, since these goods
occupied a large part of the workers' budgets. But
I the organisation of the sale of' industrial goods by the
co-operatives was hailed as a great success/, although!
owing to the then existing shortage, en extension in i
i the sale of these.goods by the co-operatives frequently
meant a corresponding reduction of State retail "trade,
Another limiting factor remained in the shape of
lack of' circulating capital, a question which was
discussed with special reference to State trade.
Bank credits being insufficient, the co-operatives
often financed their operations by commodity credits
some
! granted by industry. In measure, however, that
I the co-operatives achieved a certain degree of
internal accumulation.
The inadequacy of resources had its "de¬
moralising" effects on the conduct of business by the
some of
co-operatives, in so far as /lEbem tried to "finance"
themselves by imposing excessive and unauthorised
retail additions on wholesale prices. This procedure
not only ran counter to the interests of the consumer
but defeated the whole object of the co-operative
movement during the NEP, namely to dislodge and repls
private trading by low prices and superior service ar






to become the trade link between town end country*
heedless to say, this narrow "market orientation" had
nothing to do with a true co-operative spirit*
However, with the tightening-up of price control and
regulation by the Government "Uve easy device of'
-
j internal accumulation became more end more difficult
to exploit end there is evidence to show that in
1926/27, incite of the still existing shortage of
credit, the State showed no leniency and enforced its
price control and its limitations of retail price
additions with considerable stringency.
Thus,the NSP witnessed, on the whole, a
in*
remarkable advance the consumers' co-operative
movement, although its financial weakness and general;
inefficiency persisted.
PART II
THE REV/ ECONOMIC POLICY : CONTINUED
 
■INTRODUCTION
In this part of the study we propose to discuss
certain special features of the growth of commercial
jactivity under the NEP with a view to bringipg out the
continuous evolution of the "beginnings of planned con¬
sumption.
The history of trade under the NEP is an incessant
struggle, weaker and stronger at different times, con¬
ducted by all the means and methods available, between
two economic spheres of influence, viz., the State ("socialised")
^sector and the private sector. The overwhelming part
of industry being nationalised or organised on co-ope¬
rative lines, the State enjoyed^from the outset^an
advantage over private trade. On the other
jhand, the private trader, although but inadequately
!armed, had a superior knowledge of terrain and stra¬
tegy; he was alert and evasive- and entirely without
Iscruples. For this he can hardly be blamed, for the
|State did not treat him with undue leniency. The
|struggle between socialised and private trade was
really at no time fought by the State with purely eco¬
nomic or purely administrative weapons. Both devices
were used according to the strength of socialised
trade and the political propriety of this or that
course of action.
b. /
But planned consumption did not only grow through
the clash of the contending forces. In fact, the ele-
ments of struggle and reconstruction were constantly
present, as we hope to show, in all the Government's
I
.. '
measures taken in relation to trade.
CHAPTER I
PLANNING ATTEMPTS AND THE
RATIONALISATION OF TRADE
PLANNING ATTEMPTS AND THE
RATIONALISATION OF TRADE
Although, when the New Economic Policy was adop-
ted?the State,^while legalising the exchange of goods)
retained all economic key-positions, it did not make
any serious attempts at regulating the market at once.
We know that the first phase in the growth of trade in
Soviet Russia was marked by an acute disorganisation
of the market, so much so that trade at that time
showed a very close resemblance to the worst type of
capitalist commercial profiteering.
The subjective will on the part of the Govern¬
ment to obtain control over the processes of exchange
(which in its then existing forms it rejected very
strongly both on doctrinal and political grounds) re¬
mained unyielding however. Consequently, as soon as
the Bolsheviks had recovered from the severe shock of
their political reversal in 1921, they began to consi¬
der and explore the most suitable and efficacious
me^s by which they could gradually extend their re¬
gulative influence to the sphere of the market. But^if
they wanted to remain realists they had, with forces
and factors determining the beginnings of commercial
activity in those days, to limit themselves to indi¬
rect and preparatory steps of organisational guidance
and general supervision. To this preliminary period
belong such measures as the gradual shaping of State
trade and the drawing up of commercial legislation
which might circumscribe the different functions of
the various channels of trade and grant a certain mo¬
dicum of security to private commercial activity as
well as fix the scope of unrestricted market-exchange;
the partial emancipation of the co-operative movement
to suit the new conditions, the gradual normalisation
of monetary circulation and the building up of the
credit-machinery; the improvement of transport and the
attempts to restore trade-links by means of fairs and I
goods-exchanges. The range of these measures suggests
that all the State intended doing was to create such
conditions as would-foster trade initiative of both
the socialised and the private trade-sectors. The
State had no desire to intervene too much in the mar¬
ket's functioning, for it realised that otherwise the
main initial object of the NEP - the restoration of
economic activity on the basis of the market-economy -
could not be achieved. Furthermore, the development of
the new autonomous trade-organisations along "commer-
cial" principles could only take place by granting
them a certain measure of real independence and free-
dom. It was equally plain that any resolute planning
|"offensive" was bound to be reduced to nnaught in the
absence of a sufficiently strong and well-conceived
planning organisation.
But while a comprehensive scheme of direct
!planning and regulation of trade was absent in the
.
first years of the NEP the State carried out certain
immediate measures in the sphere of agricultural
collections. Qn account of the extreme importance of
this question for the Russian economy, it might be
worth while to sketch out briefly the history of ag¬
ricultural collections during this period.
Planned agricultural collections.
It will be remembered that in the beginning of
the NEP the State collections of agricultural surpluses
were effected in accordance with set quantitative
iplans on the basis of goods-exchange and, later, by
ordinary sales and purchases, and that the collecting
organs were the co-operatives acting on behalf of the
i Narkomprod and in close contact with agricultual co¬
operative societies. After the goods-exchange opera¬
tions had ceased, the collections were financed by
J monetary funds of the Gosbank. For the 1922/23 Collec¬
ting Campaign special collecting organisations were
set a-going, e.g., the Khlebprodukt! The success of
;these "planned" agricultural purchases is brought out
! oy the fact that in 1923/24 they exceeded the compul¬
sory levies on the basis of the tax in kind, but un-
j fortunately the same year exhibited also certain mal-
| adjustments brought about by various State collecting
organs competing with one another and failing to ob¬
serve the decreed prices, this because of the non¬
existence of any rational plan of dividing up the mar-t-
various
I ket among the eight collecting agencies which were
I functioning at that times. A further complicating
feature in the situation was the competition on the
part of private capital as well as the general clum-
! siness and costliness of State trade. These factors
j naturally led to violent disparities between collec¬
ting and sales prices in time and space. In view of
these disquieting phenomena the State introduced^in
1924/25^certain measures to insure more effective
/ Filcolin, op.cit., pp. 76-77.
planning of agricultural collections. They consisted
| mainly in a drastic reduction in the numbers of autho-
/
| rised collecting agencies, the strengthening of co¬
ordinated and disciplined operations and in the pur-
I
ging of the collection campaigns from private inter¬
ference, especially in connection with regional collec¬
tions. These reforms brought about a noticeable im¬
provement in the Collection Campaign of 1926/27 which
disparity
could be seen from the diminished 446-e-ord as between
spring and autumn prices and as between the prices
ruling in different districts, although this# remained
considerable. The proportion of grain which was collect-
Zed in a "planned" way grew from 58 per cent in
1924/25 to 75 per cent, in 1925/26 and to 83 per cent
in 1926/27c^Absolutely planned collections amounted
to 10,590,007 tons (being 270 per cent, of the quan-
J
tities which had been collected in 1921). These
quantitative successes were accompanied by qualitativb
achievements, such as the reduction of trading on¬
cost from 20.9 kopeks per pood in 1924/25 to 9 kopeks
per pood in 1926/27.
/ By 1923/24 the number of basic collecting organisa¬
tions alone had risen to sixteen. In 1924/25 this nun.
ber was reduced to nine, the Gostorgi and the Gosbank
being eliminated from these operations. (Gf. Nifcolin,
op.cit., p. 77).
£The supply with bread of peasants residing in con¬
suming regions continued to ren%a.n in the hands of
the private traders. (Neiman, op.cit., p. 129). The
so-called "unplanned" collections of the State, which
were intended mainly for purposes of local supply (elf.
Nifeolin, op.cit., p. 78)^neutralised to some extent
the influence of the private trader; they were much
more "commercial" than the "planned" collections and
subject only to local instructions.
I For figures and details cf. Neiman, op.cit., pp.
125-26: The Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p.88
and Nifeolin, op.cit., pp. 73 et seq.
//The Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p.88.
There were weighty reasons why the Soviet Govern-
I
ment was so very firm in trying to subject the grain
I
^market to a certain degree of planning. The Revolution
did not diminish the great influence which the volume
of harvests exerted on the development of the national
'economy and on national well-being. In fact, the
;emancipation, both economic and social, of the pea¬
santry enhanced the economic and political importance
of the agricultural market under the Soviet system.
The output of grain determined the standard of li¬
ving of all classes of the population; it had the
I most direct bearing on the quantity of grain and
other agricultural produce which could be set aside
for purposes of export, thus providing the wherewith¬
al for the importation of equipment, agricultural
and industrial, and also of absolutely indispensable
/js
consumers' goods. Agricultural trade, furthermore, wej.s connected
with
affee4e4- other important branches of the economy, such
as transport (in so far as a full realisation of the
crop cannot be achieved without a fairly elastic
and efficient transport system), the financial machi¬
nery (which has to adjust its monetary issues and its
credit-advances so as to facilitate peasants' pur¬
chases just when the farmers are about to dispose of
their produce), and industry (which similarly has to
"tune in" its productive rhythm, so as to supply the
necessary volume and assortment of manufactured
articles against which the peasants will fully and
readily exchange their goods).
Now we can appreciate the Government's energy in
dealing with the grain market, even when, as regards
the other domains of economic life, the Authorities
had assumed an attitude of waiting non-interference.
Indeed, the State's determination not to let
private trade take possession of the grain market is
easily understood, if one considers that such a domi¬
nation by private merchants would have given them in¬
direct control over the productivity of 24 million
farms. This would have been fraug;ht with incalculable
political dangers, since,without sufficient bread to
feed the growing army of industrial workers}the Soviet
programme of restoring and reconstructing industry
would have been doomed to fail straightaway. "The
fight for bread was the fight for socialism." (Lenin).
But the determination to oust private trade from
agriculture was not sufficient in itself. Government
collections of grain were inconceivable without the
tackling, by the State, of a whole number of vital
problems of planning technique. Nikolin enumerates
five of thenf: (1) the synchronisation of collections
and sales, both as regards volume and dates of realisa
tion; (2) the linking up of collections and sales with
the finance and transport systems; (3) the fixing, at
a certain level, of prices offered by the collecting
agencies and those demanded by the peasants and their
correlation during the campaign as well as their ad¬
justment acordipg to the price-levels for other agri¬
cultural and industrial produce; (4) organisation of
the trading apparatus for collecting and disposing of
grain, sufficiently ramified and elastic, in order
/op.cit., p. 72.
fully to comprise the market without causing collision
or friction "between the various collecting agencies,d-*-d
[working with the utmost capacity and with the lowest
Ipossible expenses.
The planning and regulation of the grain-market
lay in the hends^first of the ilarkomprod, later of the
jNarkomvnutorg and then of the Narkomtorg in co-opera¬
tion with the Council of Labour and Defence (S.T.O.)
and the State 'Economic Planning Commission (Gosplan) (
Towards the end of July 1924 Gosplan began to work
out, subject to subsequent sanction by the S.T.O.,
iannual^and later monthly^col] ection plans, valid
for the whole of the Union and comprising such cereals
%
as rye, wheat, oats, barley etc.
This kind of work equipped Gosplan with the
necessary schooling in planning technique which came
in very useful later on. First?Gosplan divided the
territory of the U.S.S.R. into producing and consuming
agricultural districts, which division served as a
H>
basis for the differentiation in treatment'and the
degree of supervision in^the various regions. Ob¬
viously the collections in consuming regions were
mainly local in character (in so far as they remained
and were consumed in that district), while collections
in producing regions were of an All-Union importance.
• Putisky, Planning of Internal Trade by Gosplan,
Planovoie Khosiastvo, 1925, fjojt. 5, p. 296.
/The Gosplan was instituted by virtue of a decree
dated February 22^ 1921-.- It is "an expert advisory
body, similar to a" permanent Royal Commission or a
group of standing commissions. ... The closest pa¬
rallel in this country to the work of these two
bodies, S.T.O. and Gosplan, is probably the suggested
Committee of Economic Policy and the Economic General
Staff wrhich are outlined in the Report of the Liberal
Industrial Inquiry of 1827-28." (M.H. Dobb in the En¬
cyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XIX,p.709, article on Russia.)
This division necessitated further^ a close realistic
study of the economic geography of the different parts
of the country, such as the average volume of harvests^
climatic conditions, means of communication by land
and water, the various types of cultivation prevailing
etc. Gosplan's work in this field included also central
^financial and transport dispositions and the. fixing of
jprices at which grain was to he collected and sub-
sequently sold.
The results of planning the trade in grain were
far-reaching for the Soviet system. Not only did the
!Authorities manage to concentrate in their hands the
/
greater part of the countryside's marketable surpluses
they likewise succeeded in reducing the very harmful
speculative reserves, which were being formed by the
more well-to-do farmers in the hope that they might
dispose of them in the spring or even in the ensuing
year when a diminished supply and an increased demand
(especially among the poorer classes of the popula¬
tion) would enable them to charge higher prices. In
the hands of the State these reserves were turned in¬
to the so-called "manoe^rirg funds", especially for tie
use in consuming regions, where the influence of
private grain traders was rather noticeable. .
Under the then existing individualism in farming
the Government did not, of course, attempt to extract
from the peasants their legitimate reserves, i.e.,
/ On the occasion of the XIV Party Congrees (December
18 till December 31, 1925) the socialised sector occu-f
pied the basic positions in relation to a number of
the most important agricultural goods. The report of
the Trade Commissariat given at the Congress, proudly
observed that the State organs had succeeded in occu¬
pying the "coramandirg heights" in agriculture; 66 per
cent, of the commercial production of grain, for in¬
stance (excluding the trade turnover among the peasants
Carry-overs from abundant harvests. This, it is true,
imade the State dependent on the richer group of far¬
mers, hut since it had the political and administrative
means of compulsion, the Authorities did not particu¬
larly grudge the peasants these normal stocks. Still,
the Central Economic Administration could not for very
long escape the absolute need of building up a national
reserve of grain for cases of emergency, in spite of
the considerable cost which such a "freezing" of re¬
sources entailed. In 1925 the "State Bread (Grain)
Fund" was formed and was held at the disposal of the
harkomtorg to provide for harvest failures, sundry
extraordinary requirements and occasionally^for the
facilitation of grain export operations. To a certain
extent the Fund was being used for routine market-
manoeuvring, such as eliminating hitches in the supply
of consuming regions and the regulation of prices* In
1925/26 the Fund amounted to 50 million pood, while
the total reserves held by the different collecting
agencies came to about double that amount in 1926/27/
As regards the quality and extent of agricultural
planning, it should be plain that in those days of
extreme market-fluidity the Central Economic Adminis¬
tration had to be capable of deeding very quickly with
extraneous market-forces. Although, in view of the
"scissors"
sales crisis of autumn 1923 Gosplan set up a special
"Conjuncture Council" (i.e., a body charged with study
and analysis of market-trends and conditions by means
(continued from previous page): themselves) wea^e
handled, by Government agents. (Cf. Weimar, op.cit.,
]p • 12^
ICf. "Grain-Market", 1925, Vols. 17-18, p. 70 and
"Soviet Trade", 1927, Vol.35. (Both quoted by Neiman,
op. cit., p. 131.)
of observation points placed all over the country)
whose data were taken into consideration when the
plans of agricultural collections were drawn up, these
surveys were, especially in the early years of planning
practice, not very dependable. Therefore the Authori¬
ties, in order to meet a quickly changing market-si¬
tuation, had to resort to speedy transfers of cereals
from one part of the country to another ^ or to such
more "roundabout" measures as increasing or diminishing
the exchange-funds of industrial goods, changing rates
of taxes and the dates of their payment, revising freight-
charges, adjusting the credit-policy etc. At times,
however, blunt administrative intervention was applied,
in the shape, for instance, of prohibitions to import,
into, or export from, particular districts.
Nifcolin mentions that sometimes the Planning
Authorities could not foresee or take into account the
various "psychological" causes for the fluctuations
in the volume of marketable grain/ In 1926/27 external
complications (e.g., the breaking off of diplomatic
relations with Britain etc.) contributed without a
doubt to the diminution in the sales of grain by the
pea,sants. It is questionable whether the quantitative
effects of these "scares" among the farmers were at
all considerable. But this sort of thing indicates,
^nevertheless, the kind of qualitative limitations
which became patent in the course of the Collecting
Campaign 1927/28, when the kulaks attempted to use
their economic power to slow down or even to under-
/Nittolin, op.cit., p. 73.
mine the industrialisation of the country. Political
hostility on the part of the kulak class and the fetter3
placed upon production by small-scale and backward •
individual farming were the basic subjective and ob¬
jective causes of the relatively slow accretion in
marketable agricultural surpluses/ This, in face of
the ever expanding demands of industry for raw-materials,
ultimately led to the collectivisation campaign.
Notwithstanding these structural limitations in
planning agricultural collections, however, a material
basis was doubtless created for the growth of industry
and the suppl^ if" indgptrial workers whose food, situation
improved c on si de rab ly
/In 1827 grain-growing was only 91 per cent of pre-war,
while marketable grain, i.e., the amount of grain sold
for the supply of the towns, scarcely attained 37 per
cent of the pre-war figure. (History of the C.P,S.U.,op.cit.,p.2S6).
ZThe food supply of the industrial workers remained
precarious even after the liquidation of War Communism.
In 1922 the main items of a worker's diet were bread,
potatoes and cabbage, but these necessaries of life were
at least more plentiful than -before the new economic
orientation. A marked improvement in the supply of
workers with foodstuffs occurred in 1923. Consumption \
of meat increased considerably and in 1927 it exceeded
the 1922-level by seven times, while the consumption of
butter had gone up by two and a half times and that of
sugar by five and a half times. Besides, the worker
relied less and less on the private merchant as regards
his day-to-day needs. • In 1923 52.2 per cent of the
worker's requirements in foodstuffs was met by the
private merchant, and in 1927 only 33 1/3 per" cent. In
so far as the prices of the private traders were on the
whole higher than those of socialised retail trade, the
increase of the share of socialised trade in workers'
supply was e^en more considerable ten would appear on \
first sight. It is interesting to note thai.,as late as
1927, such products as sugar,salt, bread, flour, butter, fish i
and meat were mainly supplied by State and co-operative 1
trade, while the bulk of such goods as vegetables and \
milk were purchased from the.private trader. It seems that
the supply of perishable foodstuffs remained for a long
time an extremely unsatisfactory feature of socialised
trade (although the influecne of the State in the butter
and egg market was co nsiderable). (Cf. Neiman,op.cit.,pp.
127 et seo.; Budgets of Workers and Employees, Vol.1, The
Budget of a Worker's Household in 1922-1927, Moscow
1929, (R): Internal Trade and its Regulation in 1924/25,
Moscow 1925, (R).)
In course of time, also, planned collections were
.
extended to "industrial." crops and animal productslike!
cotton, sugar-beet, hemp, linen, wool and leather.
Summarising it can Toe said that in the sphere of
agricultural collections during the EBP a vast store of
planning experience .and technique v'as accumulated. Methods
of dividing the market into districts and contingents, the
system of the plpnned- transmission of grain to consuming
i
and to some "specialised" producing regions were tested
and greatly perfected.
'
The Regulation of the Industrial
Market.
During' the HEP the planning on a. large scale of
j
agricultural trade had to precede, both logically and
l w
economically, the regulation of the industrial market.
The State occupied the "key-positions" in economic
life and there were also direct links between the
autonomous State enterprises. Hence there was no
desperate or immediate need planning the industrial
market. Agricultural surpluses, on the other hand,
could only be obtained by way of exchange.
Very soon, however, it became increasingly evident
that the planning of.agricultural trade was inextricably
linked up with the control and direction of the industrial
market. However much collecting technique improved,
the crux of the matter (which no organisational or ad-
all
ministrative trick could solve) remained at times
the .earmarking of funds of manufactured goods sufficiently
sufficiently
big in volume and offered at terms /inducive one ugh to
the peasants to part with the bulk of their marketable
produce.
The first attempts to regulate the market of
to -say
industrial goods were very modest, // not'timid and
were dictated by day-to-day needs. It will be remem¬
bered that the first Government body regulating the
market-contacts of State industry was the Central
Commercial Department of the V.S.N.Kh. which funct¬
ioned rather unsatisfactorily in the very beginning
of the NEP. More serious was the planning activity
of the Komvnutorg of the S.T.O., whose setting up
coincided with the trustification, syndicalisation
and "torgisation" of Soviet industry. The Komvnutorg
was concerned chiefly with the regulation of the .ex¬
change of industrial goods and paid special attention
to the revision (lowering) of the delivery prices of.
State industry/ There was no grand planning scheme
.
■behind this work end its actual execution was determ¬
ined by the requirements of the moment, i.e., by
those major economic and financial difficulties which
!found their expression in the various commercial and
financial crises in the first years of the NEP. The
j solution of the sales-crisis was^to a great extent^due
to the price lowering campaign instigated by the Kom¬
vnutorg. It is stated that after the liquidation of
ftazbazarivanie^State industry recovered so much that
it sustained on the whole no losses in the financial
year 1923/24, This was a very laudable achievement
considering the adverse conditions with which the
/At first the lowering of delivery prices was only
attempted in the case of very few commodities (salt,
sugar, vegetable oil). Later on the number of goods
whose prices were controlled by the Komvnutorg was
widened. (Cf. Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit. ,
p. 90).
m-
Komvnutorg had to contend in those days.
The realisation of the Monetary Reforms gave a
new impetus to the regulation of the industrial market.
The greater determination to oust private capital was
shown in the liquidation of the Komvnutorg aid the
setting up of the Narkomvnutorg which was invested
| with the powers of "regulating the whole of trade and
of assuming the principal rol/e in the determination
of the commercial policy of all economic organisations
f
founded with the help of the State." Shortly after
the inauguration of the Narkomvnutorg Trade and Co¬
operative Sections of the losplan were set a-going.
Apart from price-regulation (which will be dis¬
cussed separately)^ supervision of the industrial mar¬
ket assumed the form of planning the transport of in¬
dustrial goods. The first plans of this kind date
back to the third quarter of the financial year 1924/25.
They were, of course, inextricably intertwined with
the then beginning regulation of agricultural collect¬
ions. Before that the distribution of funds of in¬
dustrial goods wras effected by the various trading or¬
ganisations in a rather haphazard way, causing over¬
lapping, confusion and economic waste. The problem
which arose in 1924/25 consisted in extracting the
maximum of agricultural surpluses and exercising ut¬
most economy in the use of the scant manufactured
articles ("deficit goods") which had to serve as equi¬
valents. The first plans were too clumsy and too
ambitious (comprising, as they did, too wide a range
of products). They were actually never sanctioned by
fSaveliev and Poskrebyshev, Directives of the C.p.S.U.
(Bj on^r^Que^i^ns, (R) ,p. 156. (Quoted m Ecqnomics
the V.S.N.Kh. The next series of plans was worked out
|for the last quarter of 1924/25, this time duly approved
by the S.T.O. and put into operation* They covered
the three most important agricultural producing regions
and included such commodity-groups as cotton fabrics,
metal goods, le&therware, sugar and agricultural machi¬
nery.
The planning of the industrial market did not,
however, stop at these regional plans of distributing
industrial products. In 1925 the regulative organs be¬
gan to insist on more stringent and more clearly defined
relations between industry and the trade-network, es¬
pecially between the former and the consumers' co-ope-
ratives. This meant that industry had to undertake the
supply of the co-operatives with a specified volume and
Assortment of goods at specified dates on the basis of
'
"general contracts". At first this interference with
the ^freedom of the PEP was greatly resented by thgTrusts
and Syndicates which were apprehensive lest contractual
discipline might interfere with their aptitude to ad¬
just themselves to the ever-changing market-situation'.
This, in a nutshell, reveals the contradictory forces
which the NEP had .engendered. Having broken class-mo¬
nopoly and retained the "commanding-heights" of th e
economic battlefield after the bitter, cruel and dis¬
appointing years of War Communism the Bolshevik Party
Was ■ultimately driven to adopt a firmer attituSI/ eco-
homic "fluidity" in the measure as its position was con-
as
solidated and/the private capitalist elements began to
.
■
behave in (what the Communists thought) a rather pro-
-tkjL
irocative fashion, likely to threaten/stability and
I authority of the regime. But the contradiction con-
! sisted in the very fact that the revival had been
achieved not by the cold and unimaginative admini strati-
ion of War Communism^but by the lively and intuitive
: methods of State Capitalism, working with profits,
commercial accounting, bidding and higgling in the
I market etc. As we have described, the switch-over had
been difficult and often distasteful. But once the
| adaptation had been painfully achieved the Trusts and
! Syndicates began to like the new practices. They
revelled in the freshly discovered thrills of commeuc-
| ial adventure, the more so as the conditions pf those
days offered ample opportunities to the managers of
commercial enterprises to enrich themselves by clever
market-machinations. Small wonder then that the
Trusts arid Syndicates strongly deprecated the conclus-j-
ion of general contracts with the co-operatives which j
| while vital to the commercial policy of the State,
acted as millstones to the autonomous economic or¬
ganisations which were loath to forego their easy
•
gains by subjecting the bulk of their output to
binding arrangements and by determining beforehand
the circle of clients with whom they had to trade.
But gradually the State broke the resistance; in¬
dustrial production became concentrated in syndicated
'
I trade and contractual discipline was enhancede
These measures assured the progress that was
.
I being made in connection with the planned regional
distribution of manufactured articles which grew in
importance as planned agricultural collections (with*
out which industrial accumulation was unthinkable)
were extended. The distributive plans became more sys¬
tematic covering ari ever extending territory and assort
ment of goods, but^since they were still being con¬
fronted by incalculable market-factors ,they had to
remain restricted in their time-range. The first
^en-
All-Union plan distributing industrial produce was
put forward for the second quarter of 1925/26.' This
plan was divided into two uneven parts, viz., the so-
called "basic" part, comprising about 80-85 per cent,
of the planned volume of industrial produce which was
to be distributed over the different districts, and
the so-called "reserve" consisting of the remaining
15-20 per cent, of the planned merchandise in the
form of stocks to be held at the disposal of the
various commercial agencies and later (first quarter
of 1926/27) of the Narkomtorg and to be used by them
for supplementing the supplies of the different dist¬
ricts in case of need. These plans of commodity-distri¬
bution played an important part in the stimulation of
commercial activity (along lines desired by the State)
in distant parts such as Asiatic and Northern disricts
which depended entirely on the importation of manufac¬
tured goods from other regions. It is obvious that
the plans catering for these regions had to be ad¬
justed to their specific requirements (transport and
climatic conditions etc.). As a rule the supnly of
such far-flung regions could not be carried out con¬
tinuously, but had to take place at certain intervals.
£
In the 'Economics of Soviet Trade' the signifi¬
cance of planning the industrial market is surrmed up
/Cf, Internal Trade during Ten Years, op.cit. , p. 198.
!p« 95.
as follows: " There is no doubt whatsoever that the
plans for distributing industrial goods over the
country during the Restoration Period played an impor¬
tant positive role and were one of the means of
strengthening the ties between town and countryside.
The organised direction of agricultural collections
...required a flow of industrial goods reciprocal to
the flow of goods emanating from the villages to the
fa
towns. The plans of distribution played an important
part in extirpating the private merchants from the
I manket of (agricultural) collections; they enabled
the socialist t: sector to concentrate in its hands the
I greater part of the rural economy's marketable pro¬
duce and to incorporate it later on into the system
« i)
of contractation; thus they constituted an essential j
link in the chain of measures that were applied by the
i
Party with a view to preparing the ground for the
hv
Kolkhoz Movement, By having secured.the introduction
:of the principles of planning into the distribution
of commodities the plans of distribution facilitated^!
the same time? the task of introducing the principle
of planning into other spheres of goods-exchange -
movement of goods, prices, finance etc. - and made it
possible for the regulating organisations to deal
energetically with the problem of rationalising
channels and forms of the movement of goods and to
strengthen the economic regulation of prices."
This is,indeed;a very idealised description of
the wider and ultimate significance of planning the
exchange of industrial commodities by the State. In
actual practice the plans had a more immediate purpose
in view, such as the mitigation of the cleavage ( in
separate regions and districts as well as in the
country as a whole) between the demand for, and. the
supply of, industrial commodities. Furthermore.the
execution of the plains left much to be desired. Regions
in which the increase in the circulation of goods would
have required the advance of considerable sums for the
purpose of "building up of an adequate stock of working
capital/ tended to be undersupplied. Generally speak-
ing^the authors of the plans laboured under the delus¬
ion that a simple administrative device was sufficient
to solve basic economic difficulties.
On the other hand it would be a great mistake
to overlook the fact that the methods which the
Russian Communists employed in planning the market for
industrial and agricultural products exhibited a slow
advance from the initial indirect guidance of the
market to the direct interference with the forces of
demand and supply and then to the actual moulding of
those forces. The whole process was thus a truly Bol¬
shevik mixture of trial-and-error procedure, practical,
expediency and long-term economic and commercial
policies.
Rationalisation of Trade.
The urgent need for rationalising the Soviet
trade-network arose not very long after the introduct¬
ion of the NEP and can easily be explained. The
growth of the State-controlled trade apparatus had
been nervously chaotic and lacked inherent purpose ancft
order. The difficulties of marketing in those days,
caused by the severely curtailed holding-capacity of
the market and the economic heritage of War Communism
led to unnecessary parallelisms in socialised tradirg
to
. .
and/the indiscriminate formation of trade-agencies and
branches without due regard to their rational working
and to the efficiency of socialised trade as a whole.
Both the trading centres and the lowest distributive
branches explored every conceivable avenue whereby
they could get into direct toiach with the sources of
I supply of consumers' goods with the ultimate object
of dumping them in the market and thus obtaining the
precious circulating resources. There was no proper
division of functions between the centres and the
branches, a state of affairs which was clearly cont¬
rary to the most elementary canons of economic ration<£tyiy.
plication.
As regards the distributive organisation of in-
I
dustry itself the position was hardly more satisfacto¬
ry. The NEP had brought about a marked decentralis¬
ation in distribution and marketing, so much so that
-
the Trusts continued selling their own goods even aft^r
| the floating of the Syndicates. This led to duplic-
| ation of functions and, to make matters worse, the
|
Trusts began, as we know, to encroach upon the domain
■
of activity that was properly assigned to the inter¬
mediate branches of the co-operatives.
It wa.s clearly necessary to concentrate and
^centralise supply and distribution. This, of course,
.
did not amount to a relapse into the practices of
War Communism, but meant the rigorous weeding out of
tu f)
overlapping trading agencies as well as /feimplifying of
the whole organisation of the supply of consumers'
goods and was the more important as the existing
scarcity of commodities?even in relation to the
decimated purchasing power of the population^exacted
the maximum of economy.^
Although the crying need for rationalisation
became apparent almost simultaneously with the growth
of socialised trade, no successful measures to improve
the situation could be undertaken before the State's
regulative influence on trade in general had assumed
the necessary proportions. This is the reason why we
have discussed planning attempts before the problems
of rationalisation.
It is impossible within the scope of a general
narrative to record in detail all those measures which
were passed by such bodies as the S.T.O. with a view
to rationalising the trade-network. It will be
sufficient to emphasise that the lines along which
rationalisation was supposed to proceed were mainly
these: (1) the extension of the system of general
/Strictest econoiry was also required in face of con¬
tinued industrial expansion-an additional impetus for
rationalising the commercial network. This rationalis
tion campaign,which naturally transgressed merely
the re- modell itig n of trade and included the demand
for lowering industrial costs by means of improvements
in organisation, wras begun in 1926 and intensified in
1927. The Joint Resolution of the Sovnarkom and the
S.T.O. of June 28, 1926, called upon the banks to make
the granting of credits to co-operatives conditional
on "actual achievements in the reduction of commercial
expenses and of retail prices." Thus .the campaign was
linked up with that of lowering prices. Centrosoyuz
and the V.S.N.Kh. received instructions from the S.T.O
to work out rationalisation schemes fo^ co-operative
and State trade. Rationalisation was declared to be
one of the five major economic tasks for 1927 and was
discussed at great length at the XV Party Congress.
(Cf. Dobb, Russian Economic Development, op.cit.,
pp. 331-32).
Icontracts as the form;:! link between the centres of
supply (Syndicates) end the' di stributive agencies
(co-operatives); (2) "transit" as the technical method
of supply, that is to say,"through-trade" which could
dispense with considerable wholesale stocks of goods
that were regarded as a luxury in those days;'(3) the
limitation of functions of industrial selling organis-
tions to what was described as "initial wholesale";
(4) the assignment to the Torgi of strictly local,
trading functions and of contacts with the non-co¬
operated demand.
So far we have been concerned with the question
of rationalisation as it was posed in relation to
wholesale trade. Somo of tho problomo confronting.
vti fcai, men! i or.GfcW.bs-for a (e.g. , ln-
oanoaca a'.a oiza). The most aicutely felt weakness was
the parallelism in State and co-operative retail. It
was decided to carry out the rational, isat ion of the
socialised sector's retailing along the lines of
strengthening the co-operatives and extending their
scope. It was hoped thereby to attain appreciable
iraJHL
economies in retail distribution. State retail/was
retained so as to prevent the co-operatives from
assuming the dangerous position of monopoly. Further¬
more, the model establishments of State retailing -were
an ideal experimenting ground for various ambitious
rationalisation schemes and could thus set the pace
If
/Cf., e.g. the orders' of the S.T.O. dated August 18,
1926, quoted by V. Zhitomirsky, The Problem of
Rationalisation of Trade Turnover (in The Internal
Trade of the U.S.S.R. during 10 Years, op.cit., p,27Q.
Although commodities were supposed to pass through the
minimum number of warehouses (two as a rule - hence
the "two links'*principle) their movements were in actu
(Cf- "Soylet Trade",192'?
al
for the lagging organisations.
But there were numerous other def/ieiencies in
retail trade which called for energetic and speedy
repair. At the beginning of its functioning socialise
retail trade worked much worse than private trade.
Later, certain improvements took place, especially in
the direction of an increase of the retail trading
unit. This process, of course, was bound to reduce
trading oncost: it affected, to a certain extent,
private retailing as well., but was, owing to the lack
of security on the part of the private merchant^mainly
restricted to the socialised sector. These structural
changes and the "degree of concentration" are brought
out in the following table (taken from Gromyko and
Riauzov, Soviet Trade during 15 Years, Moscow 1932,
(R), p. 18):
DYNAMICS OF THE STRUCTURE OF RETAIL TRADE
Years 23/24 24/25 25/26 26/27 27/28 1930
Types in % %
Large-scale 43.8 43.8 46.2 47.8 48.5 72.9
Small-scale 56.2 56.2 53.8 52.2 51.5 27.1
We see that^up to the commencement of Integral
Planning Soviet "retail trade remained predominantly7
small-scale in spite of all efforts at rationalisatior
This was partly due to the fact that the State (as
will be explained later on) in its struggle against
:the private sector was compelled to retain the small-
scale type of shop because of its popularity with the
I consumer. Apparently, the compromise between this
.
concession and the needs of concentration (which the
Bolsheviks in their cr.az.e - forfoutdoing Ameriean orec)
standards so adored)
was attempted by developing the system of branches of
retail undertakings. But efforts in this direction
remained by far to*? inadequate. The abrupt chaige
which occurred in 1930 in favour of large-scale retail'
Iom4.
trade was to a great extent rroohaniQ and artificial,
since Integral Planning entirely changed the whole
.
machinery of distribution.
Special tajiks of commercial rationalisation were
reserved for the agricultural market and here regulation
and rationalisation went hand in hand. As a general
rule it was ordained that not more than 3-4 agencies
should concern themselves with the collection of a
particular agricultural raw-material. The other
measures of rationalisation such as the assignment- of
districts to different organisations and the all-round,
reduction in the number of authorised collectors has
been dealt with elsewhere.' All this led to a greater
utilisation of the trading agencies and to a certain
reduction of their oncost.
All these reforms can be described as belonging
to the external rationalisation of State trade and,
in this sense, are hardly separable from the general
planning attempts. But the more thoughtful and far-
seeing among the U.S.S.R.'s economic captains realised
from the beginning that State commerce could entrench
itself firmly in its position and widen its sphere of
operation only if each of its component units could
compete economically with private enterprise. This,
/ As regards the division of functions between the
co-operatives and the State collectors, the eo-oper¬
atives had to look mainly after the interests of the
agricultural population.
however, was only to he achieved on the basis of sound
management. We know to what hopeless state of degener
ation and chaos internal management had been reduced
owing to the general finbroglio and the destruction of
economic calculation under War Communism. Thus the
needs of internal rationalisation were dually pressing
as those of external adjustment.
An important point in this connection was the
|question of the productivity of the sales-staff. The
|Authorities spared no efforts to increase the "out¬
put" of the State's and the co-operatives' commercial
employees. According to official statistics successes
in this direction appeared rather spectacular. It was
claimed, for instance, that during the years 1924 to
1927 the turnover per employee increased 63-fold in
the .network of the Syndicates/ Such a rapid rate of
(advance in the productivity of labour in the sphere|
of State trade is, of course, to a very considerable
*
extent to be explained by the fact that the revival
|
of Soviet commerce proceeded from an extremely low
| state of productivity. In any case, improvements in
I this regard were noticeable, not only in the system
•[of the Syndicate's, but also within the co-operatives
'
and local State retailing. In retelling the advance
I of productivity "was, however, not so imposing as in
| wholesale. This was to be attributed partly to the
greater technical limitations of turnover per employe^
in a retail undertaking as compared with wholesale,
but it also pointed to the probability that the
planning organs paid greater attention to the
/ Zhitomirsky, op.cat., p. 248.
Ifi"
rationalisation of the wholesale bases than to that of
the retail shops. Besides, it is fairly obvious that
the results of external rationalisation had more
immediate and more noticeable repercussions on the
productivity of labour in wholesale trade than in
retail shops which latter continued to offer a wide
scope for the improvement in the "human element".
The central question of internal rationalisation
was the reduction of distributive costs. This problem
is, especially under Soviet conditions, important
enough to merit a separate discussion. In this contexft
it will suffice to say that the Party had^on many
occasions during the NEP - e.g., at the XII Party
Congree (1923), the XV Party Conference (1926) and the
February Plenum of the Central Committee (1927)^ -
stressed the importance of the regulation and the
reduction of distributive costs.
The changes in distributive costs in the period •
under review may perhaps be best illustrated by a
few statistics. According to L. Zalkind, writing in
the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia/ these changes were
as follows:
GROSS RETAIL PRICEDADDITIONS
EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TURNOVER
Years Industrial goods Agric. goods Tot, goods TCji
1924/25 16.0 27.9 20.2
1925/26 15.2 25.6 18.6
1926/27 12.3 24.5 15.8
Figures /as these should be regarded with extreme
caution, for they differ considerably from inffrm&tion
/Vol. XI", p. 79?.
supplied by other sources. The reason for these dis¬
crepancies, adduced in official publications, is that
there were many different methods and bases of cal¬
culation, none of which was entirely accurate./
Th^problem of distributive costs touches on
[different aspects of Soviet trade. In so far as they
included the profits of the commercial enterprises and
[budgetary contributions, the question was really one
of price-regulation and commercial policy. Inasmuch
as these costs were inflated by extortionate earnings
jof private merchants and of some of the "autonomous"
commercial enterprises of the State, it became a
matter'which had to be settled by strong pressure
exerted on private trade and by rigorous control of ■
[the socialised sector. But?to a great extent costs
of distribution depend upon the degree of the
[rationalisation of trade. It was realised in those
days that much could be achieved by reducing transport
[costs and other oncost items by means of improving the
organisation of the transmission and handling of mer-
[
chandise. An analysis of the available statistical
[material suggests that the effects of external
rationalisation on the level of distributive costs
became noticeable in 1926/27, again more in wholesale
than in retail trade. In retail trade abuses of the
[management (pilfering, profiteering etc.) and the
/Larin lamented about the inadequacy and faultiness of
[the statistical services in those days. Every sta¬
tistician had entirely different bases of calculation,
isome counted in gold roubles, others in commodity-
roubles etc. ( Cf. Larin, The Lessons of the Crisis
and the New Economic Policy, Moscow 1924, (R), p. 60).
harmful influence of the private merchants demanded
greater attention than the needs of internal ration
alisation, but nobody denied that an energetic
improvement of the internal organisation could
(discover further reserves of economies. This task,
however, remained unsolved during the HEP.
CHAPTER II
SOCIALISED VERSUS PRIVATE TRADE
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SOCIALISED VERSUS PRIVATE TRADE
A Soviet economist (who subsequently fell into
disgrace^wrote in 1927: "There can be no doubt that
the histor^n, in describing the economy of the first
ten years of the Revolution and the struggle within
it between capitalist and socialist tendencies, will
focus his attention with great interest on the
manifestations of these tendencies in the sphere of
market-relationships, in the sphere of the exchange
of goods. The spectacle of the ousting of private
trade and its replacement by the dominating positions
of the so-called socialised sector...represent a
phenomenon unparalleled in economic history."^
..Indeed, the struggle of the two "compartments"
of the Soviet economy is most fascinating. The
idea of limiting private commerce to an extremely
narrow sphere of operation was present in the mids
of the leading Bolsheviks from the time of the very
inception of the NEP. Lenin at once posed t^he defiant
question: "Who will defeat Whom ?" and argued at
great length that the proletarian State, without
betraying its own nature, could allow the freedom
of trade and the development of capitalism, but
only within limits and only on condition of State
regulation over private trade and private capitalism.
In the course of 1923, however, (which is some¬
times described as the period of the"perversion of
the NEP") the private elements and tendencies
developed with such vehemence that the private sector
/ A.Fishgendler in Questions of Trade, October 1927^p;.47.
managed to capture strips of "forbidden territory".
Then came what we have described as the period of
"learning how- to trade". The Party took to heart the
bitter lesson which it had learnt end started to pre¬
pare itself for an onslought against the private
sector.
During the period of War Communism the relentless
struggle between the new regime and the bourgeoisie
i
was being fought by direct measures of brutal economic
coercion and political interdiction. During the NEP
the new arena of the fight between these two forces
| became the market and the battle was waged with more
"peaceful" weapons. The internal market was the only
sphere that was left to the remnants of an exhausted
and decimated bourgeoisie to consolidate what remained
of its influence and power. The occupation,by the
State, of all "commanding heights" of the national
economy had shattered for ever the hope of deriving
new strength from alien fellow-capitalists or of
resurrecting the lost economic and political status
by investing in the heavy industries.
The State misjudged, it seems, the inherent
capabilities and versatile pluckinooo of the"NEP-men".
Not only did they usurp almost the whole sphere of
.
goods-exchange, they also attempted to strengthen their
position by linking up with small-scale and medium
industry as well as with the well-to-do representatives
of the peasantry. The process of capitalist
accumulation was started again and the State, acutely
alive to this new and somewhat unexpected danger,
accepted the challenge.
Cajtamce_
From the point of view of the division- of power
"between the two "compartments", there could be no
doubt whatsoever that private enterprise was doomed
to lodse from the outset.
The struggle against the private merchant was
begun on the economic plane. Lenin insisted that the
economic forces under the command of the working class
were sufficient to assure the transition to communism.
Seemingly he conceived the possibility of driving out
the capitalist elements by purely economic weapons,
i.e., by the actual economic superiority of the new
order. Nevertheless, even during the initial stages
of the struggle of socialised against private trade
the idea of administrative duress was never lost sight
of. It will be recalled that simultaneously with the
re-admissiohion of private enterprise came its
limitation by the State: in his article on "The Im¬
portance of Gold", written in November 1921, Lenin
reassured his followers that the "proletarian state
can master trade, give it direction, put it v/ithin
certain limits." But indirect economic pressure
remained the main method of attack.
It is important to realise straightaway the
crux of the conflict between State trade and private
commerce. Why did the State permit the inordinate
growth of capitalist trading at all ? Why. did it
not apply, at once, adequate administrative restraints
that would have curbed the activities of the private
merchants aid middlemen ? The State^ had, no doubt,
the power to do so, but such a course of action would
have amounted to the blockipg of the only existing
effective distributive links between town and country
and would thus have defeated the whole purpose for
which the hew Economic Policy had been framed. It
follows, therefore, that economic restraints were
limited in their application by the capacity of the
State to replace the services of the ousted private
merchant.
1
Unfortunately, the Soviet Authorities, in their
persistent attempts to subdue and. exterminate private
commercial activity,were not always guided by sound
economic maxims. There were many occaions in the
history of trade under the NEP when the State applied
rigorous administrative and punitive measures against
the private merchants, although the economic condition
of its consumers1 goods-industry and of its trade-
organs did not make it possible to replaces what had
been destroyed. Such actions have to te viewed in a
political light. In so far as the Soviet Government
is a dictatorship and the machinations of the "ITEP-men"
constituted in fact grave political threats to the
regime, it had to act in a way which was not con¬
sonant with the elementary principles of a prudent
this
economic policy and/resulted in a lowering (if only
temporary) of the standard of living of the Soviet
/
citizen.
Let us now describe very briefly the various
stages through which the struggle between the two
/This is one of the disadvantages of any dictatorial
regime. From the economic point of view, the repressive
actions of the Soviet Government can only be excused
on the assumption that, after the distasteful job had
been accomplished, the Authorities would concentrate
all their energies on improving the material lives of
the common people. This, however, cannot be answered
at this juncture.
ZO/f-
"compartments" passed. The years of retreat of State !
and co-operative trade were what Beluz describes as
the "l'age d'or du commerce prive". It & in those
years of adaptation and cut-throat competition between
the different nationalised enterprises that private
speculation and enrichment were rampant and/the
foundations of private commercial capital were laid.
Besides, the development of private trade was beirg
favoured at times by the State itself, paradoxically
though it may sound. In a country of the size of
Russia we cannot expect uniform compliance with the
jorders of the Central Authorities by all local organs;
in addition, the uniformity of outlook within the
Communist Party is of a comparatively recent date:
especially in the beginning of the NEP there were many
v divergent trends and opinions current among both the
leadership and the rank and file of the C.P.S.U.
Furthermore, the economic staff in the Government was
composed of many "non-political " elements.
Arguments in favour of private trade were in
those days publicly discussed and filled the columns
of verbatim reports of conferences, of newspapers and
periodicals.^"
Dobb states that "until 1923 the question of
trade and of State policy towards it had received
little serious consideration. (For the time being)the
State with its preoccupation in the realm of production
/Deluz, Le Role du Capital Prive dans la Russie des
Soviets, Paris 1929, p. 129.
^Contemporary Soviet historians complain that "wreckers"
in the trade-apparatus rendered far-reachirg assistance
to the private merchant (chiefly by way of credit-ad¬
vances) and propagated the view that private trade had
to be maintained, since it was more elastic and also
%0S
was willing to let such trading bodies as existed, in-
I /
cludirg the private trader, work their own sweet will."
As early as March 1922, viz., at the XI Party
Congress;Lenin called a halt to the retreat and demanded
the re-grouping of forces so as to put a stop to further
concessions being granted to the private economy. But
the real offensive against private trade started
immediately after the XII Congress (April 1923).^ It
is significant that the focussing of attention td on,
problems of trade coincided with disturbances in the
market. At the XIII. Party Conference^which was held
in January 1924^the question of the market assumed a
central position. "The "scissors" crisis", observes
Dobb, "had transferred attention from industry to the
3
market." One of the resolutions passed at this
Conference pointed out (in the usual heavy Bolshevik
jargon) that the "question of the relation between
State and private capital in the sphere of the economy
represents at this juncture the most important question,
for it pre-determines the constellation of the class-
forces of the proletariat, which is based on the
i
'nationalised industry, and of the new bourgeoisie, which
in its turn is based on the elemental processes of the
free market. The growth of private capital must be
arrested by increasing the economic importance of the
co-operatives and of State trade and their adaptation
/Dobb, Russian Economic Development, p. 359.
^History of the C.P.S.U.(B), Moscow 1939,p. 262 and
yugoff, Economic Trends,op.cit.,p. 182. One of the
resolutions was to the effect that "the most important
task of the comipg year will be to regain a dominant
position on the trading front. Private capital must be
replaced by the cooperatives", (quoted by ^ugoff,ibid.)
ere wi^h the
planned-regional transmission oi goodss so as to prove
g^ficSifgglxgfentng- -Tt IS not eas-v
"bo the needs of the commercial turnover in the
villages."
As regards the economic crisis,the XIII Party
Conference emphasised that the difficulties had been
accentuated by the weaknesses of co-operative and
State trade. Their contacts with the market had been
defective and the co-operative retail shops failed
to inform the supplying organisations in good time
of the difficulties in marketing that had arisen.
The "selling out" tendencies of the Trusts and
Syndicates were 'also deprecated' in very strong terms,
jTwo practical conclusions were drawn from the dis¬
cussions of the Conference: the first was "positive",
viz., the strengthening of the co-operative and
State trade network (which we have described) and
the second was "negative", viz., the struggle against
the private merchant.
From Dobb's account of the discussions at the
Conference it appears that at first the policy of
the Opposition was adopted almost fully by the Party's
■
Central Committee. These proposals,which were form-
mulated by Larin, favoured the application of direct
administrative means to supplant the private trader
in favour of the co-operatives and State trading
organs. "Larin proposed to prohibit State bodies from
delivering goods to private middlemen, except to
village retailers who undertook to sell their goods
at an assigned price; to restrict the issue of bank
credits to private wholesalers; and to apply additional
differentiation by means of taxation to the private
-
/Quoted by Neiman, op.cit., p. 106. (source given).
^Russian Economic Development, pp. 360 et seq.
/
trader." And, although at the XIII Party Congress
(May 1924) it was emphasised that the basic method
in conquering the market should be not measures of
administrative pressure, but the raising of the
position of co-operative and State trade", the policy
of administrative interference was not abandoned.
X/
Professor Karlgren writes: "Some figures...from the
Leningrad gubemia show that 75% of the business men's
turnover was talei in taxes, the Government tax being
45%, the Commune tax 22%, and other taxes 8% of their
income. ... Great numbers of business men, big .and
little, were arrested and banished to the northern
gubernias. ... In the summer 1924 the campaign, aided
I
by the fiery zeal of the Press, reached its highest
point. ... Even at a very early stage of this campaign
the Bolsheviks succeeded in crushing the private
3
wholesale trade. ... The campaign against the widely-
spread net of retail trade was less easy to carry to
to a successful issue^ and^at the same time, more
hazardous as well. ... But, even in this direction
they.. .reduced the share of the markets that the
private trader had succeeded in gaining to about
The "hazardous" character of the campaign agains
the private retailer is corroborated by STugoff thus:
"To begin with, this policy was successful in
restricting the activity of the private traders. But
soon there waw a rally. Private enterprise accomodated
^Bolshevist Russia, London 192 7 , pp. 141 et seq.
I We know already why the first attack was directed
against wholesale trade. It was intensified when
Lenin declared wholesale trade as one of the "commanding
heights" in the sphere of commercial turnover.
f Dobb,p.360.
xoz
itself to the new atmosphere, wormed its way into
the nooks and crannies of an apparently solid wall,
adopted all the devices of protective coloration.
| Stubbornly it fought an behalf of the "right to profit".
The new generation of private traders had gathered
experience when winning their spurs and accumulating
their capital in the period of war communism and of
civil war. The wholesale dealers disintegrated their
apparatus. To outward seeming they became retailers,
they sold goods just as extensively as when they
called themselves wholsalers. ... to some extent
prevented from doing business in the towns...they
entered into close relationships with the "kulaks".
It was found possible to evade the official super- ■
vision, registration, and taxation to some extent
in the towns, and still more in the countryside. By
degrees, the private traders were again able to play
/
an important part in the cixulation of the comnodities."
It is interesting to observe that a substantial
part of public opinion took the side of private trade.
Consequently (and also because of the acute shortage
of cirulating funds in the nationalised economy) the
Central Authorities resolved to call off the campaign,
or, at any rate, to render it less rigorous until such
timesas socialised trade was strong enough and
sufficiently efficient to replace private trading.
Professor Karlgren goes so far as to say that the
/Yugoff, op.cit., pp. 182-3. The retreat of private
merchants to the villages and to Finance is stressed
by DelK, op.cit., pp. 145-46.
Government was even resolved "to make a show of
friendly invitation to those whom they had just been
persecuting." But unfortunately "the local ad¬
ministration, which has - as is so often the case
after the complete reversals of Soviet policy - not
kept pace with the new turn of events, still continues
I
its constant castigation of nepmen." Essentially,
however, the policy of the forcible elimination of
the private trader was temporarily checked. The
merchants and middlemen took a respite. But it was
not for long. Two years had passed since the XIII
Party Conference ana complaints about the profiteering
of the private merchants became louder and louder.
This time the situation was more favourable for the
State, for although there wfas a good deal of speculative
private enrichment, the relative share of the private
merchant in the country's trade had meanwhile
3
appreciably declined. And, while "resort to,the old
methods of administrative regression.. .were, not
U.
seriously proposed"/ there was "towards the close of
the year 1925...a second fierce campaign on the part
of the authorities against the private traders; there
was a third in the end of 1926; and ...a fourth in
the beginning of 1928, as a part of the general
/Op.cit., p. 1451 Comp. also Dobb, op.cit,, p. 367
and Deluz,op.cit., p. 137. Credit-policy became more
favourable to the private merchants.
ilCarlgren, op.cit., p. 145. Jin his Report to the
XV Party Conference Rykov pointed out that an absolute
improvement in the position of the pritfate trader was
not inconsistent with his relative decline. (Quoted
by Dobb, op.cit., p. 369).
-fDobb, ibid.
i
"swing to the left" ".
These new offensives, it is true, relied much
less on brute force, but there was no question of a
return to the principle of competition on equal terms.
The administrative machinery of the State continued
to function. But it no longer relied on the method of
police-raids on private shops; it preferred the
device of arbitrary refusal to grant fresh licences
for the establishment of new private shops or to renew
existing permits. In addition, the fiscal screw was
pitilessly applied.
The numerical results of these campaigns can be
gleaned from the following information:
As regards the changes of the retail trade net
3
the figures were these:
DYNAMICS OF RETAIL TRADE EXPRESSED AS A PERCENTAGE OF






1st h. 2nd h.
1924/25
1st h. 2nd h
1925/26
, 1st 2nd h.
Socialised 100
sector
115.0 143.0 167.0 203.0 252.0 396,0 420.0
Private 100
sector
103.0 104.8 104.6 109.0, 117.0 136.0
.
136.0
This table reveals quite clearly the impact of
the campaign against private trade launched in 1924
and the subsequent easing off of the restrictions; it
also shows that after 1924}the Authorities tried to
fill the gaps which had been created by the dis¬
appearance of the private merchants.
I Yugoff ,op.cit. , p. 183. <1 "En 1926-27, il a et6
delivre aux entreprises commerciales 456,600 patentes.
En 1927-28 ce nombre s'est abaiss£ a 315,500, soit
31.2% en moins." (Deluz,op.cit.,p. 143).
3 Soviet Trade after 15 Years, Moscow 1932, p. 15.
ZlO
The changes in the relative shares of the different
types of retail trade from 1922/23 until 1930, that is
to sa.y the "degree of socialisation" of Soviet trade^
/
are brought out in the following table: (in % %).
Sectors 1922/23 23/24 24/25 25/26 26/27 27/28 28/29 1930
State 14.4 15.4 19.9 16.2 1673 15.0 17.3 17".4
Co-op. 10.3 29.7 37.7 43.8 48.8 59.0 67.4 76.3
Private 75.3 54.9 42.4 40.0 35.5 25.4 15.3 5.3
The last onglougnt against private trade which
coincides with the launcning of the First Five-Year
Plan utilised once more the policy of administrative
rout. The "swing to the left" meant in effect that the
State felt strong enough to take the whole of the
economic life under its direction and to replace
the "commercial link" between town and country by the
a
"productive link". Private trade had to go, the
it was argued, that
more so as/it would have provided a refuge for
politically hostile elements in those critical days.■
But?even When it became abundantly clear that
the battle had been lost by the private trader, he
did not .surrender. Reminiscent of the "heroic" days
of War Communism het merely went underground. The
end of the NEP and the beginning of the planning era
is characterised, by the revival of illegal private
trade.
During the years 1928/29 and 1929/30 private
trade and small private trade which was duly
registered and taxed declined by 132,091 units (viz.,
from 170,476 units to 38,385 u. nits), or by 77.5 per
cent. During the special quarter 1930 ( which was
/Economics of Soviet Trade,op.cit., p. 83. Here the
growth of the co-operatives both at the expense of
State trade and private commerce is noteworthy.
&Cf. below, pj» 1
inserted for the purpose of making the financial
year coincide with the calendar year) this private
trade network was reduced by a further 52.9 per cent.
Nevertheless^the private trader managed to salvage
quite a considerable part of his capital and was
promptly putting it into illicit circulation.
The Soviet press in those days complained and
lamented bitterly about the impossibility of drawing
| a clear line of demarcation between legal and illegal
private trade. Behind small and seemingly harmless
| retailers the rich merchants hid, so that the
supposedly independent small traders were, in actual
j fact, mere agents of shady capitalists. This reduced
I greatly the efficacy of fiscal control. In view of
this fact it was suggested^not only to raise tax-
{ rates to be levied on private trade, but also to
exercise a stricter fiscal supervision and to give
the Revenue Authorities wide powers of search of those
who did not fulfil their financial commitments. These
suggestions were followed up and it was claimed that
they were successful in detecting "foul play". It
is hardly necessary to add that the militia and the
criminal police 'lent their full support and co¬
operation to the fiscal Authorities. Thus, in the
eyes of the Soviet Government^the semi-legal and the
the illegal private trade did not only present
economic and financial problems but constituted one
/Finance and Socialist Economy, 1931, No»6,pp. 7 et
seq. (I.Segal, Illegal Private Trade and the Struggle
against it).
of the worst forms of the "intensified class-struggle
/
of the dying bourgeoisie".
Analysing the struggle of socialised versus
private trade we find a great deal of truth in Deluz1
statement that "cette substitution du commerce d'Stat
au commerce prive ne se faisait pas en vertu des lois
ordinaires de la concurrence commerciale, mais par la
pression administrative, par des impots ecrasants, la
restriction ou I'annulation complete des credits con-
sentis, le refus de vendre les produits de 1'industries
d'Etat, en un mot par 1'elimination, en quelque sorte
X/ k,
mecanioue, du concurrent priv£." But it/also important
to bear in mind the following considerations: it was
the Russian Revolution which destroyed the ordinary
laws of competition. During the period of War Communism
they were almost entirely inoperative and when the NEP
was proclaimed they could only function within a
limited sphere. The struggle between State and private
commerce was above all a political struggle between
two warring camps, admittedly with a very unequal
command over political and economic power. . Its out¬
come as such can, of course, hot be described as
pointing to the superiority of the principle of
State regulation versus that of free competition. Under
;Soviet conditions there was and could be at no time a
normal functioning of free competition. The principle
of free competition was re-admitted in 1921 in a per¬
verted form and it continued to work in a perverted
/ Finance and Socialist Economy, op.cit., ibid.
^Op.cit., p. 136.Italics ours.
fashion. It is too simple to attribute this
development to the State's actions alone. It is
true that the State had forced private trade under¬
ground during the days of War Communism. It did so,
as we tried to show, not (or not entirely) by its
own volition, but under the force of superior internal
and external considerations and driven by the whole
uncontrollable momentum of the social upheaval. It
is almost a natural law that under such conditions
one of the contending parties tries to assume
political power and,once it has captured it,not to
let it slip out of its hands. When the Bolsheviks
had gained the power they coveted^all their subsequent
actions were coloured by their desire to preserve that
power.
Under such circumstances there could be no
question of a peaceful contest of the two sets of
economic principles. In actual fact an imperfect
and rather inefficient system of economic State
I r^filation was fighting against a corrupt and degenerate
system of free competition.
We wonder whether a fair contest between the
unmarred principles of State regulation and free com¬
petition is at all possible in real life. If this
were so its outeome would, from the point of view of
an impartial economic investigator, certainly furnish
conclusive evidence as to the economic superiority
of one of the two ooonornic principles. But such
ideal and fair contests are (we are afraid) mere
hypotheses and can only happen in Alice's happy
Wonderland. In real life the principles manifest
themselves in social forces and are influenced by-
political strife. But while the struggle between
socialised and private trade does not really throw
much light on the alleged superiority of a nationalised
commerce, it suggests a certain general economic
truth, viz., that while it is fearly easy to reduce
private trading activity to nil by adequate police
measures and the like, this displacement is limited
economically by the capacity of the socialised sector
to fill the gaps which have thus been created. This
is not a very startling observation, but apparently
Jb
the Bolsheviks did not appreciate it in good time.
/These considerations seem to us to be commonplaces
and we labour them for the sole reason that they
appear to be overlooked by many writers on Soviet
economic questions.
^However, even among the Soviet economists there were
voices which warned against the indiscriminate
destruction of private commerce in pursuance merely
of a political creed without paying the sLightest
regard to economic factors. Thus^a Soviet economist
wrote in 1927: "Finding ourselves at war with private
commercial capital we have still to measure the force
of the attack with its consequences. Our task is not
only to destroy the opponent, but to occupy the
liberated base by our own forces. ... We do not com¬
pete v/ith private capital, but we are also applying
non-economic pressure. Hence the position may well
arise that non-economic pressure (taxes etc.) go too
far ahead of the economic possibilities of socialised
trade. ... the desire to curtail the influence of the
priva-te merchant.. .demand of us the replacement of
the private trade network by a corresponding co¬
operative network. Otherwise the position of the
consumer will be damaged." (L. Sokolsky, Questions of
Private Commercial Capital, Soviet Trade, 1927,No. 49,
go.3 et seq.). The author of this article goes on to
prove (on the basis of ample statistical evidence)
that the State did not succeed in compensating for
the disappearnce of the private trader by a balancing
accretion of the co-operative trading system. (Corro¬
borative statements to that effect can be found in
Haensel, The Economic Policy of Soviet Russia, London
1930, pp. 143-5). He also pointaiout that since the
day-to-day -wants of the average consumer wrere to a
great extent served by smallish private shops (which,
as Del# shov/s (op.cit. ,p,137) incidentally, required
relatively less trading capital than similar units of
the socialised sector) it was essential not only to




Otherwise the struggle would not have been so erratic:
indeed, its vacillating nature suggests that ad¬
ministrative pressure was in most cases ahead of
economic possibilities of replacement, that the
campaigns were balled off because of the economic
difficulties that arose, but that after a while these
lessons were forgotten and political considerations
compelled the Authorities to apply fresh measures
of administrative duress#
It seems that a new civilisation can rarer be
born without economic waste and that during its
infantile period sound economic principles have to
i
give way to the exigencies of political warfare.
Indeed, a gloomy conclusion#
t/6
I continued from previous page): establish, at
least as a transxtional monsure, small trading
units (in the form, e.g., of branches of bigger
commercial undertakings), so as to take over_the
vital functions hitherto fulfilled by the private
trader.
CHAPTER III
PRICES AND COSTS UNDER THE NEP
PRICES AND COSTS UNDER THE
NEP
In our discussion of War Communism we noted that^
after the Revolution^prices disappeared both as an
economic category and as a lever of economic policy.
The introduction of an exchange-economy (if only in
a modified form) revived the phenomenon of price.
This revival was a most painful process. Until
the realisation of the Monetary Reforms in 1924
economic conditions continued to favour barter trans¬
actions based upon a reciprocal identity of wants.
Prices, at that stage of the Restoration Period, were
(like the prices ruling in the illicit markets of
War Communism) mere reflections of the varying degrees
in the scarcity of goods and were determined by the
surging monetary floods which spread all over the
country but affected some regions more than others0
Under these circumstances there could be no
natural connection between prices and costs. The
administrative and directive organs of the national
economy tried their best to achieve some kind of a
rudimentary calculation despite monetary instability
and the chaotic state of the market, for they realised
that the restoration of economic accounting was absolutely
essential for the raising of the productivity of
labour which latter.in the face of an all-round
'
economic deterioration and the absence of any
foreign help?was in effect the only reserve of the
Russian economy. Accordingly, a number of measures
were introduced by the Supreme Council of the National
Economy to expedite the transition of State enter-
prises to proper costing procedure/ But the first " 2~! ^
attempts of this striving after economic accounting
were rather helpless. Quite apart from the question
of relative monetary stability^economic calculation
requires financial discipline and simple bookkeeping
efficiency. All these elements were absent and could
not be created overnight. Rykov's description of the
situation is very much to the point: "According to
the judgement of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection
it is impossible to obtain exact or even approximate
data concerning the economic state of nationalised
industry because of the lack of adequate reprpts,
I accounts, figures and balance-sheets of any kind.
The investigations of Gosplan confirm this view. In
I the S.T.O. there were cases when prices were fixed
completely arbitrarily or administratively decreed
and the experts had no idea why they fixed these and
JL>
not other figures."
The ways of price-formation under these conditions
| were truly strange. We have seen that at the beginning
of the period under review there was the tendency to
take pre-war value-relations as guidance for price- j
fixation in the market. The desire, on the part of
the Authorities, to observe some kind of "normality"
in price-formation is, e.g., discernible in the
/Cf. the Decree concennipg the extension of rights of
State undertakings in the sphere of finance and of
the disposition over material resources. (Ekonomichesr
kaia Zhizn, July, 26, 1921). Cf. also Sigal as, np. c it. r
p. 13 and S.S. Katzenellenbaum, Russian Currency and
Banking 1914-24, pp. 88-9.
^Quoted by Pollock,op.cit.,p.139.-This state of affairs^
brought about partly by the notorious general inefficiency o/^-
and the mentality of War Communism (production regardf *
less of cost),was,without a doubt to some extent res¬
ponsible for the "selling-out" ("razbazarivanie") of
the products of Russian industry.
practice of the decreed equivalents. But the chaotic
working of the laws of supply and demand over-ruled
these regulative criteria. Prices fluctuated violently
according to district and commodity-group.
Very soon^a number of Soviet economists began
to realise the futility of their worship of pre-war
prices. It began to dawn on them that the War and
the first years after the Revolution had wrought
such tremendous and unevenly distributed transfor¬
mations of productive activity that it was both non¬
sensical and dangerous to regard the pre-war price
indices as the manifestation of some kind of "ideal" |
or "normal" exchange-relationships. In August 1922
the economist Smilga gave vent to these criticisms in
an article^in which he wrote: "We must put an end-
to the method which we applied in the preceding
year, viz., to fix prices in accordance with pre-war
business trends. ... there are no such things as
pre-war prices and pre-war roubles. The world
economic conditions and our own have undergone such
a profound transformation that it would be a great
mistake to work with pre-war standards."'
But if pre-war criteria were of no avail, what
principles were there to guide the State in its
endeavours to establish a fairly smoothly working
price-mechanism in pursuance of the general aim of
restoring economic activity on the basis of a
modified market-economy ?
The first end obvious step was to make allowance
for the transformations of economic activity. This
J / Quoted by Pollock, ap.cit., ibid.
task was not simple. Fdr it was^merely the changes in
output end their incidence on the various branches of
productive activity that had to be taken into account,
but also changes in the volume of commercial output
(i.e., of those flows of goods which were available
and destined for market-exchange) that had to be
gauged as correctly as possible. Industrial production
offered comparatively little difficulty, since it was
closely controlled by the State. As ^ards agriculture,
after a rough estimate of total production, it was
necessary to find out the proportion of agricultural
output that reached the market. This depended, how¬
ever, on the prices of the relevant manufactured
goods and the fluctuations of the harvest. The degree
of the actual changes between industry and agriculture
Was
established by first expressing the two commercial
outputs in terms of pre-war evaluation and then
ascertaining the degree of disequilibrium or dis¬
cord (as compared with pre-war days) between industry
and agriculture in general and between the different
products in particular. Thereafter^ the Authorities
could ponder over the correcting measures to be
.
introduced. These had, of course, to aim at an
equilibrium between industry and agriculture, but
not in the sense of reverting to pre-war conditions
but in the sense of establishing a new balance in
conformity with the changed circumstances. ThuSj,
"normal" pre-war prices were taken just as a starting-
point and served as a basis of comparison an d
orientation.I
/Still, some industries like metallurgy, silicate and
partly textiles continued to base their calculations
Only in this sense were they "normal". But then the
new value-proportions which crystallised in the course
of the NEP were by no means considered as "ideal" or j
"eternal" either. The changes that had occurred in
the economic structure after the Revolution had been
?
to a great extent^elemental processes. When the
NEP was inaugurated the market began to exert anew
a very strong if not decisive influence on price-
formation. But the State had retained the power to
intervene in the economic sphere. The new equilibrium,
a manifestation of the altered structure of Russian
economic life, was therefore a composite equilibrium:
i.e., brought about, in the main, by market-forces,
>
but corrected by State fiat in a manner which the
Bolshevik leaders deemed expedient and beneficial,
the regulative influence of the Central Economic Ad-
minis tration growing with the passage of years.
What were the actual transformations that had
occurred in agricultural and industrial production ?
At the outset of the NEP^market conditions favoured
the peasants. There was a keen demand for grain
(which was, more than ever, the prime necessity of
the masses) arid various other agricultural raw-materials.
Industrial prices were relatively low because of
the "selling out" practices of the Trusts. The poor
harvest of 1922 intensified the demand for grain
XXX
(continued from previous page): on pre-war pricelists
This shows that the new value-proportions were being
worked out by touchstone methods without much
centralised guidance. But, as Turestky mentions (Pla-
novoie Khoziastvo, 1936 ? NoZ. 3, p. 124), the short¬
comings of these old price-lists became noticeable
at the beginning of the Reconstructive Era, when,
e.g.j the prices for metal goods were revised and
unified.
still more. But in the spring of 1923 the situation
9
changed entirely and resulted in the "scissors"-crisis
to which we have referred on ms$fci occasions. One of
its causes was excessive industrial costs and another
the discontinuation of the "razbazarivanie". But
the chief factor which precipitated the crisis was,
of course, the uneven recovery of industry and ag¬
riculture. While agricultural cultivation advanced
owing to the stimulus of the favourable terms of
trade, industrial progress slackened./ In the year
1922/23, however, the rising tendency of agricultural
prices found its definite limit in the decimated
purchasing power of the towns. Very soon the agricult¬
ural index fell from 103 per cent of the pre-war
level to 72 per cent, while the industrial index
recovered from 97 per cent to 137 per cent. It
appeared that while industry had reached only 35 per
If
| cent of its pre-war value in 1922/23/agriculture had
5~
gained roughly 75 per cent of its pre-war yield, although
its marketable ("commercial") surplus did not keep
pace with the improvement. "It is possible", says
Dobb/ "that this fact (viz., industry's lag behind
agriculture) warranted as much as a 2:1 change in the
iterms of trade between town and village." Professor
/Actually there seems to have occurred.a slight rise
of the agricultural price-index at that time. (Cf.
Planovoie Khoziastvo, 1925,//o^.l, p. 97). - The in¬
fluential Soviet economist Groman (who subsequently
ifell into disgrace) aptly referred to the financial
year 1921/22 as the "dictatorship of bread".
3/lt would be wrong to regard the "scissors" phenomenon
as a typically Russian,rfor actually,"scissors" movements
bould be observed in many other countries after the War.
(E.g., Germany and U.S.A.). But nowhere was the opening
of the "scissors" so pronounced as in Russia. (Comp*
Molchanov,op.cit., p. 8). 3 cf. Dobb,op.cit.,p.221.
^Ibid. ,p.223./"Liashchenko, op.cit. , p. 310 £"0p.cit. ,p.224.
/
Liashchenko corroborates this view. Similarly, Larin |
and Strumilin came to the conclusion that a rise of
industrial prices by 1.5 or 2 times would be "natural":,
while Gosplan estimated the "natural" price-increase
at tw^thirds of pre-war prices.^ Such price-relation-
ships would have corresponded to the"normal" value-
proportions relative to changed circumstances. In
actual fact, however, the alterations which occurred
in the terms of interchange between industry and
agriculture came to something like 4:1 in favour of
|
industry. This truly "abnormal" price-disparity
baffled the economists of those days. One group of
observers emphasised the influence of monetary dis¬
turbances as a factor accentuating the rise of in¬
dustrial prices, others attributed it to the decline
in goods turnover (which intensified the depreciation
3
of the currency).
From their close discussion and analysis of the
"scissors" crisis it became absolutely clear to the
Soviet economists that the point was being quickly
reached where the countryside was no longer able to
-
absdrb the industrial wares. Had the economic
development been left to an "automatic drift", the
"free" functioning of the market would, no doubt,
have forced the establishment of the "normal" exchange-
relationships of 2:1 between industry and agriculture.
This adjustment would have taken the shape of a
/Op.cit., p. 310. Jt-Cf. Larin, The Lessons of the
Crisis and the Economic Policy, Moscow 1924,(R), p. 10.
3For details of the various interpretations cf. Dobb,
op.cit., pp. 225 et seq. The close attention which the
"scissors" phenomenon evoked in Party circles is shown_
by the fact that it figured prominently in the discussions
which preceded the XIII Party Conference. (Dobb,op.cit.,
p. 245).
catastrophic fall of industrial prices and an acute
sales-crisis. The "normal" proportions would, to be
sure, have worked themselves out in the end, but at
what a cost and with what far-reaching social
repercussions ! The 'teutomatic adjustment" of the
"free" market would have ruined many an industrial
undertaking, would have led to a considerable drop
in production (particularly detrimental in view of
the slow end painful rise of Russian industry) and
would have caused severe unemployment.
The State tried to devise the appropriate
measures which, while avoiding, as much as possible,
the detrimental consequences of "automatic adjustments"
would in the end lead to a "normalisation" of the
price-relationships nbetween town and countryside,
not necessarily on the basis of 2:1 in favour of the
towns, but if possible at a proportion more favourably
to the peasantry and also more consonant with the
industrialisation programme of the Communist Party.
Soviet price-policy in those days cannot be
separated from the general economic interventioi/and
regulation of the State. It is inseparably linked
up, for instance, with the campaign for rationalising
industrial production, since it was evident that all
price-lowering decrees would remain a dead letter,
so long as cost of production remained high.
Pressure was brought to bear, accordingly, upon
the heads of the Trusts and Syndicates with a view to
bringing about a reduction of industrial prices. On
the "agricultural front" the Government tried to
effect a rise of agricultural prices, "partly by
altered price-policy in grain purchase, and more
liberal creeits to grain-purchasing organs and partly
by a development ox the export of grain." ^
The measures to enforce the lowering of industrial
prices were of a varied character. Mechanically in¬
discriminate price-lowering was consider! dangerous.
It is true that many autonomous industries, captivated
i
by the "NEP-spirit"? had. unduly inflated their profits.
But an indiscriminate narrowing-down of the profit-
margin by order of the State would have turned many
of the profits of backward industries (and most of
them were backward in those days) into losses. The
problem resolved itself again into that of limiting
excessive industrial costs. According to Dobb's
analysis (based on Soviet statistics^ the main
elements which made up the high cost-structure were
the cost for credit-facilities (which with the
introduction of monetary stabilisation was turned
into a very "real" item) and the exorbitant railway
tariffs exceeding those of pre-war days by about
20 to 25 per cent. Labour costs had increased
appreciably, but varied widely in different branches
of industry. The greatest rise, however, had occurred
in the expenses for fuel and in general administrative
oncost. We have already discussed the problem of
overheads in relation to trading costs and the efforts
i
to lower these by commercial rationalisation. As
regards industrial overheads the State pursued a
policy of industrial "concentration" with the object oi
/ Bobb, op.cit., p. 246, .tEkonomicheskaia Zhizn
(2.9.23 and 11.9. 23) gives instances of this kind
of profiteering. (Quoted by Dobb,op.cit.,p.240).
3Ibid., pp. 247 et seq.
closing down, temporarily at least, those enterprises
which were working at a loss and thus reducing the
burden of overheads/
Another device to force down industrial prices
and thus make the closing of the scissors-blhdes
possible was the policy of the so-called "commodity
intervention'.* This scheme was put forward in 1923
and provoked much discussion in the Soviet press; it
was actually adopted in certan special cases & The
crux of the scheme consisted in the importation of
foreign products at the lower world prices which were
then put on the market so as to force the Trusts and
-
Syndicates to revise their pice-schedules and to
reduce their trading oncost. In effect the scheme
represented a serious challenge to the monopoly
position of the autonomous State enterprises. Such
was the most radical form of the scheme. A modified
form was proposed by Larin who criticised the crude
conception of competition between imported and home
products and drew attention to the dangerous effects
which an unfavourable balance of trade would exert on
the currency. What he had in mind came to this: one
should allow the various Trusts to import foreign
goods, to "mix" these with their own produce and to
/ By the spring of 1924 the policy of "concentration"




sell the total at an average or "combined" price. As
an example Larin referred to the sale of boats and
maintained that it was possible to sell ten million
pairs of boots which included five million pairs of
imported articles at a lower average price than the
h&rrW. 2,
five million domeotioally produced pairs. If this
were the case the Soviet workers and consumers stood
to gain. But Larin and his followers emphasised that
this policy, when adopted, should not, on the whole,
conflict with either the principle of the state
-to
Monopoly of Foreign Trade - the right or import being
reserved to selected State organisations only - or
ithe principle of a favourable balance of trade.
I
A third modification of the scheme consisted in
the proposal that the permit to import the cheaper
foreign merchandise should only be granted on con¬
dition that the organisation in question undertook to
buy a certain proportion of home-manufactured goods
as well.
The common cofiome-"of all these schemes was the
idea of deriving certain real advantages from the
i
lower world prices and at the same time to create a
/Cf. B. Ischboldin, Die russische Handelspolitik der
Gegenwart. Ein kritischer Beitrag zum bolschewistischen
Wirtschaftssystem, Jena 1930, p. 150 and A.G. Mikhailovsky,
A Note on Combined Prices, Planovoie Khoziastvo, 1925,
N6X. 12, p. 81 et seq. The latter suggested that in¬
stead of charginjan "average price", the Russian factories
should charge the usual domestic price, pocket the
idifference and place it at the disposal of the State
(Mikhailovsky's remarks, however, were made when the blades
of the price-"scissors" had closed almost completely and
referred therefore not so much to the elimination of the
value disparities between industry and agriculture but to
the problem of internal industrial accumulation which
became acute at that time .J
J&schboldin, op.cit., p. 151.
3We have already drawn attention to the fact that even
before the War wo®ld prices were much lower than prices
in Russia. After the War prices rose all over the world
stimulus for the lowering of internal industrial
prices• In the last two modifications of the original-
scheme we discern quite clearly the fear£ of harming
home industry and creating a conflict between the
interests of the Russian producers and the Russian
consumers.
The,.scheme as a whole found many critics. The
main attack was of course that, owing to the difference
in quality of foreign and domestic goods people would
purchase only the better class articles. Conceivably
this "trick" of the consumers could have been countered
by a similar "trick" of the sales-organisations. The
ingenious Larin might have proposed that the Leather
Twist should sell a left boot imported from abroad
together with a right boot manufactured at home. But
that
the main objection was,'as the actual practice showed,
the policy of "commodity intervention" could be applied
only in very special cases.'
Nevertheless, as a result of all these measures,
(continued from previous page): but their advance in
Russia (although it cannot be accurately established),
was much more pronounced than elsewhere (inherited high
cost-structure and the added dislocation of the Civil
War !) Because of a rigid Foreign Trade'Monopoly,prices
abroad ceased to exert any "automatic" influence on
internal price-trends. In 192.7, the Sbftfcboi of world
industrial pri'ces {grouped.by countries'); to analogous
prices in the U.S.S.R. (taken as 100) w0jjfe as follows:
Britain: 45; Germany: 34; France: 42, U.S.A.: 31.
(Cf. Molchanov,op.cit.,p.l3). Thus to the many price-
"scissors" the "scissors" between world and home prices
can be added.
/I.e., in relation to those goods which fulfilled the
following conditions: (1) the difference between world
and Russian prices must be very marked; (2) the imports
must be of a magnitude substantial enough to exert a
downward pressure upon domestic prices,and (3) in so far
as the aims of "commodity-intervention" went beyond the
immediate t^cs of mitigating the "scissors"-crisis and
were orientated towards the general directives of
economic policy, the scheme should be applied, in
particular, in relation to those commodity-groups where
price-reduction was considered essential (e.g., machinery,
agricultural implements etc.) __
the Soviet Government succeeded in liquidating the
"scissors"-crisis/The price-policy of the Soviet
Government as applied to the "scissors" phenomenon is
not only important as a proof a successful attempt
at intervention injxS the processes of the free market,
but is also a manifestation of the heatedly disputed
economic
official/policy of the Communist Party, whose main
principle consisted in preserving the alliance between
the towns and the countryside and. in not allowing the
dictatorship of either industry or agriculture; it
also contains an indication of the almost blindfold
striving of the Bolshevik leaders after a new economic
balance within a new social framework.
The passing of the most acute stage of the
"scissors"-crisis coincided with the successful ter¬
mination of the Monetary Reforms. The stabilisation
of the Soviet currency which helped so much in curbing
the speculative machine*feations of private traders,
laid the foundations for centralised price-planning.
the prices of
Mow it became possible to fix/a number of important
commodities.
ber
/According to the Gosplan-calculations the dispaity
between industrial and agricultural prices was, on
October 1, 1923, 90 per cent above"norm" and on Decern!
21, 1923, only"25 per cent above "norm". Industrial
ex-factory prices were lowered by 30 per cent, betweei
November 1,1923 and November 1, 1924. In 1924, in¬
dustrial costs were reduced by nearly 20 per cent.
(Cf. Turetsky, Methods of Price Planning,op.cit.,p.119).
According to official information, quoted by Dobb
(op.cit.,pp. 270/71) "the overvaluation of industrial
goods against agricultural, as compared with pre-war,
which on October (1923) had reached a ratio of more
than 3:1 on the wholesale market, (had) by the end of
the year fallen to 2:1 and by October 1924 to less than
L5:l." That the closing of the "scissors" continued
in subsequent years is clearly reflected in the changes
of the wholesale index of Gosplan quoted by Molchanov
(op.cit.,p.6): in 1925/26 the disparity between the J
industrial and agricultural indices amounted tb 1*7. and nd
in 1926/27 to 1,25.
We know that wholesale trade operations were
fairly soon taken over by State trading agencies and
the Syndicates as well as the various dommodity Ex¬
changes played an important role in the regulation
of wholesale prices. Especially the latter, by
means of their supervising functions and the limitation
of speculative interferences,contributed a great deal
to a more ordered and conscious price-formation.
"Collecting prices" in the agriculturajtoarket
«
could be influenced by the methods of contractation.
This was most essential, for only thus could, from
the price-side, industrial costs be reduced and
retail prices controlled.
As ^gards the retail price-sphere standard price
for tea,salt, kerosene,sugar, makhorka, cigarettes
and goloshes were being introduced from 1924 onwardsi
.
Otherwise^the regulation of retail prices of socialised
trade (which, as a rule, were lower than those of
private trade) was, in the beginning of the NEP effec
by fixing retail price-additions as a percentage of
the cost of the commodity to the retailer. This left
the period between the time when the commodity left
the factory until the time when it reached the socialised
shop free from state-regulation. Because of the
growing strength of socialised retail trade the
more effective system of norms and additions expressed
as a percentage of the delivery (ex-factory) price
could be introduced subsequently.^Side by side with
ted
/Of. Neiman, op.cit.,,p. 138 and Turetsky,op.cit.,p.l26,
&These norms and additions were fixed by so-called
"Parity Commissions" consisting of representatives
pf trade and industry. (Cf. Turetsky,op.cit.,p. 128)
the application of this system such indirect measures
as credit-policy and organised competition with private
trade with a view to lowering prices were employed. But,
on the whole, price-regulation remained feeble (although
it proved strong enough, to do away not only with the
"scissors" phenomenon as between industrial and agricul¬
tural prices but also as between wholesale and retail
prices.)
Towards the end of the 1TEP, however, price-fixing
policy was tightened. The decisions of the February
(1927) Plenum of the Communist Party proved to be a
milestone in the history of Saiet price-planning.
Apart from calling for a 10 per cent, decrease of
retail prices and the publication of retail price-lists,
the Plenum passed a (lengthy and clumsily worded)
Resolution on Prices which ram as follows: "tn the
'
price problem all basic economic and,consequently,
political problems of the Soviet State intersect.
Questions of establishing adequate relationships
between the peasantry ana the working class, of
guaranteeing the inter-connected developments of
agriculture and. industry, of the distribution of the
national income, of the industrialisation of the
|
U.S.S.R. and the strengthening of the workipg class
both economically and politically, of insuring adequate
Ireal wages, of the stability of the chervonetsj lastly,
of the planned increase of socialist elements in our
|economy and the further limitation of the private-
capitalist elements therein, - all this is contained
in the problem of prices. All this renders the price-
policy the central economic and political problem of
"
-2.33
Soviet economic policy for many years to come. The
[political and economic necessity j&?^lov/eri hg delivery
prices forces us to direct, from this anglg, the whole!
of the industrial life of the coming period." ^
In connection with this declaration the change in
the 1923-constitution of the Tiros ts is noteworthy.
According to the new statute (passed in 1927) "the
[Trust must be supervised by a Government body, named
in its constitution, and conduct its operations on the
basis of commercial accounting in accordance with
planned tasks as confirmed by the Government body
mentioned above. One of the tasks of this body was
the fixing of delivery prices which were to be binding;
upon the Trust. The XV Party Congress (which met from
December 2-19, 192^ and declared that the Restoration
Era of the national, economy of the U.S.S.R. had been
terminated and the Reconstructive Period begun) pro¬
claimed the policy of lowering delivery (ex-factory)
prices on the basis of a reduction of industrial costs.
From the beginning of 1927/28 delivery prices became
less and less commercial prices in the sense of being
determined by the autonomous decisions of the factory
managers and their profit-seeking adaptation to the
forces of the market, and assumed more and more the
nature of fiat prices, i.e.,decreed by the Government
on the basis of manifold considerations and integrated
3
with the growth of the economy as a whole. This new
departure was only possible by virtue of the increased
'Quoted by Prof. Prokopovitch's Bulletin, No. 131,
October 1936, p.103.,p. 103. Other parts of the
Resolution quoted in Gorelik and Malkis, Soviet Trade,
op.oit., p. 152.
^Bulletin, ibid.
$Cf. ch. discussing price-formation during the First
Five-Year Plan.
hold of the State on economic processes. The system
of inter-industrial relations was strengthened by
widening the scope of general contracts between the
Syndicates and the trading organisations and by the
development of the system of preliminary orders. These
two devices paved the way towards an integral system
of price-planning,!.e., one which comprised, all stages
of price-formation.
In 1928 the so-called "double price lists" were
introduced. Since price-regulation had become a con¬
stituent part of economic policy it had^by necessity^
to adapt itself to the solution of the complex economic
and social tasks of the Reconstructive Period. The
more the State freed itself from the uncontrollable
forces of the market and the more output and assortment
of commodities was extended, the greater became the
need to stimulate the production of certain lines of
goods with the object of reconciling the interests of
industrialisation with the demands of the working
consumers for the prime necessities of life. It
became, in effect, imperative to subsidise certain
branches of the heavy industries and to sell some
goods of common demand below cost. The/ system of
the "double price lists" was designed to meet and to
reconcile the interests of industry and trade. Its
conception was fairly simple and amounted briefly to
this: a differentiated price list was constructed for
settlements between the Syndicates and their in¬
dustrial suppliers, while a unified price-list^ was
issued for dealings between the Syndicates and the
trading agencies. The differentiated price list took
Z35"
into account the specific conditions of production
for the various goods in different districts and
factories; it was based on the actual cost of
production of the different enterprises plus a
"normal" rate of profits. The commercial or trading
price list, on the other hand, worked with average
prices and thus Ensured unified prices for the same
products within fairly wide zones. The average,
however, was not an arithmetical but a "socially-
weighted" one, the"weighting" being determined by
the interests of the broad masses of consumers and
the tasks of industrialisation.
In those days the Government tried to induce the
factories to experiment with various substitutes for
raw-materials. With the help of the "double price
lists" the price-raising effect of the introduction
of the costly substitutes could be "spread" and thus
rendered more populai^h with the consumers. The
"social wfghting" of the commercial price list was
accomplished in such a way as to offer goods of prime
necessity below cost if required and correspondingly
to increase the prices for luxuries and semi-luxuries
( handled, by the same Syndicate) which were demanded
by the more well-to-do classes of consumers. On the
side of industry this system prevented the managers
from concentrating on the more profitable lines of
production to the detriment of the less profitable
out economically more important goods, since all
lines of production could artificially be made equally
profitable. In this manner the system added to greater
discipline in the fulfilment by the Trusts of their
X5(?
productive programmes*
Thus the "double price lists" fulfilled the
following functions: (1) they protected certain back¬
ward industries and subsidised new lines of production
by means of gathering in real values from the consumer,
but at the same time they protected the interests of
the poorer consumers by means of "socially" weighting I
the unified prices for consumers' goods; (2) they
shaped demand in certain directions and helped to
plan the assortment of goods; and (3) they established
a close link between the wholeslae and the retail
| |
■prices*
In 1929/30 the system of'double price-lists"
operated in the metal, textile, silicate, timber and
some other industries. With the introduction of the







The principles of economic and commercial
policy evolved gradually and by way of a bitter
contest of various and often divergent opinions. Many
of the leading Communists held the view that the main
trohble and the chief danger of the NEP lay in the
adaptation of industry to the whim of the peasant
market. This entailed, so the critics held, the im¬
possibility of a rapid industrialisation. Now, the
essence of the market and of private trade certainly
presented grave dangers of social stratification;
besides the forces of private capitalism infected the
nationalised industry with their acquisitive spirit.
But what was to be the alternative to the policy that
had been inaugurated ? We have analysed the various
methods by which the State tried to subject the market
to its regulative influence and how it tried gradually
to solve the salient contradictions of the NEP period
by holding the capitalist forces in leash and at the
same time by transforming the productive relationships
between town and country. But while the stimulus for
'
this transformation emanated from industrial production,
the medium by which it could be transmitted to the
.
countryside was the market which likewise fed industry
.
with precious raw materials.4 This situation reveals
the difficulties of State economic manoevring. In
fact, market- problems overshadowed at times all other
"weak spots" of the Soviet economy.
Thus^a commercial policy was evolved as a
separate branch of economic policy. We have dealt.
I with some of its more important manifestations, like
the regulation of the agricultural and industrial
markets and^rice-policy. It remains to touch very
hriefly on the question of how all these various
measures were co-ordinated and subjected to the
"leading link" of economic policy, viz., the ad¬
vancement of industry.
One important task of the Soviet Government's
commercial policy was the re-distribution of
commercial profits with a view to (1) tapping an
additiohal source of financing industry and (2)
preventing the emergence of a new social class of
commercial capitalists.
As regards the former task it was essential to
ascertain the total commercial profits in the country.
Such estimates were attempted in the difficult years
of 1922/23. Larin, after a very careful investigation,
arrived at the figure of 2,600 million gold roubles
for the gross profits of trade as a whole/ This
would have amounted te a retail price-addition of
40 per cent on the average (!), a much higher figure
1
1
than that quoted by Zalkind for the following year,*-'
After making various adjustments and due allowances
for the private merchants' own consumption, Larin
calculated the net' profit of the private commercial
secfot in 1922/23 at 300 million gold roubles (a
figure which, in his opinion, was a very conservative
estimate). Larin claimed that this net accumulation
of the "NEP-men" could be conveniently taken away by
/Larin, The Lessons of the Crisis and Economic Policy,
Mosow 1924, (R), pp. 17 et seq.
jLCf. statistics on p.
the State without causing any harm to trade and
economic activity in general. This transfer would
not diminish the consuming power of the new "bourgeoisie,
"but simply curtail such harmful financial operations
as usury, speculation with foreign exchange, purchase
of smuggled luxuries and arrestments in valuable ob¬
jects. The appropriation of these funds (the
"peaceful" expropriation of the expropriators, as it
were) should, according to Larin, bemused for the
purpose of raising industrial wages which at that
time were at the subsistence level. In this way,
by increasing not only the intensity of demand but
also by creating a new demand for industrial crops
(cotton, sugar beet) and for better foodstuffs like
dairy products (that would induce agriculture to
change its so unfortunate cereal-producing character)^
the most salutary results on the country's
industrialisation could indirectly be achieved. . Larin
was at great pains to show that the policy he ad¬
vocated did not impair the "smytchka", but that on
the contrary it strengthened the alliance between
workers and peasants by raising rural purchasing
power. The main point of Larin's proposals was, of
course, the contention that it would have been
particularly detrimental to achieve the reduction
of delivery-prices of industrial products by wage-
stabilisation or even by wage-cuts. He maintained
that price-reduction and wage-increases could go
hand in hand^provided energetic steps w^ere taken to
lower industrial costs. Now, there was certainly a
constant increase of money-wages during the NEP since
the passing of the Monetary Reforms. But the policy
of simultaneous cost-reduction and wage-increases
proved very difficult indeed because labour was the
main cost-item in many industries.
A further task of commercial policy was the
reduction of the share of trade in the whole of the
national economy. Apart from doctrinaire reasons
- Marxism regards trade as such as an essentially
/
unproductive (though necessary ) economic activity -
all economic researchers arrived at the same con¬
clusion, viz., that trading profits of the socialised
sector were obviously excessive. The attitude
towards profits seems to have been that in so far as
profits were realisable in a particular branch of
economic activity without damaging'the interests of
the economy as a whole, they should materialise in
industry and that it was sufficient for trade to
cover its costs.^
A few words now about the attitude of the State
towards external trade and the reconciliation of
interests and requirements of foreign and domestic
commerce.
The first period of the 1TEP was characterised by
the absence of any marked degree of co-ordination
between the internal and foreign markets, as exemplified
/Comp. Book III. — J I
Jk"The dividend paid by the State internal trade into
the Treasury was surprisingly small, being only 23,800,000
rubles in the budget of 1928-9: the explanation being
that the remuneration left to the State trade apparatus
has been reduced intentionally with a viewr to allowing
the maximum share of profit to the State industry. For
this reason the State revenue derived from this source
diminished in comparison with preceding years (26.5
mill.r in 1927-8 and 28.1 mill. r. in 1926-7)" (Paul
Iiaensel, The Economic Policy of Soviet Russia, London
1930, p.141).
iby "the non-existence of a centralised Commissariat,
One explanation of this attitude is, of course, the
new "laissez-faire" policy which the NEP ushered in.
Besides,it was "being maintained in the first years of
the period under review (1921/22-1923/24) that the
holding capacity of the urban market for agricultural
produce was so limited that the exportation of
[agricultural produce could proceed without much, harm¬
ful effect^.^An additional factor in the situation
was the exceedingly lucrative character of the export
of agricultural products at the low "scissors"-prices
and the importation of industrial goods at the low
world-prices.. Thus the main conflict as between the
interests of foreign trade and the needs of internal
economic re-adjustment arose in the sphere of agriculture.
Whereas a speedy liquidation of the "scissors"-crisis
demanded the. raising of the agricultural price-level,
high agricultural prices hampered the operationgbf the;
Soviet export agencies. Although export-policy vacillated
from time to time according to internal economic
conditions (e.g., scarcity of consumers' goods
necessitating the temporary importation of foodstuffs;
volume of harvests etc^ its main tendency since
1922/23 seems to have been to achieve a favourable
/That may have been so, but the fact remains that thex-
was a great unsatisfied demand for bread in the cities.
The recrudescence of the category of "effective demand"
vras one part of the price which the Bolshevik planners'
had to pay for their re-orientation of 1921.
^The poor harvest of 1924/25 forced the Authorities to
prohibit temporarily all export of grain and even led
to grain inports. At the same time manufactured goods)
were imported in considerable quantities, so as to
stimulate agricultural production and increase the
marketable stocks of the''countryside. All this
undermined the "productive" structure of Soviet import
.balance of trade by forcing exports, so as to be able
to purchase machinery and equipment requisite for the
industrialisation of the country. Ana since in the
first years of Soviet Russia's contacts with the
outer world her main exportable commodity was grain,
the stabilisation of agricultural prices at home had
often to be sacrificed in the interests of the so-called
"productive" imports (i.e., the importation of means
of production etc.) Such a policy, of course, did
not fail to hit the peasantry, to spread discontent
in the countryside and to slow up the evening-out
of the major disproportions in the Russian economy.
When agricultural prices at home began to recover,
while world prices for Soviet exports fell and the
tness
lucratively of grain exports declined in consequence,
there were even attempts at lowering internal
collecting prices of. grain so as to keep up exports !
This produced very harmful economic effects. Marketable
stocks of grain fell sharply, export operations
declined and an unfavourable trade balance was the
outcome.
This unsatisfactory development was rendered more
acute and more difficult of solution by the lack of
co-ordination between the two Commissariats of Trade,
on which we have already had th£ occasion to make
some comment. The Narkomvnutorg was divorced from
the Narkomvneshtorg and there was a pronounced lack
of unity in the regulative measures of the two
Conmissariats. Thi^r fusion, in 1925, had its good
effects, especially in connection with price-policy
which came to be decided upon in the light of the
exigencies of both external and internal trade. In¬
discriminate dumping of agricultural., produce was
discontinued. The more the supply of the population
was subjected to Government regulation and the
more agricultural production recovered, the easier
it became to maintain a satisfactory level of exports
and the "productive" nature of imports without unduly
restricting consumption at home. Thus?the Authorities
| succeeded in striking some kind of compromise between
the interests of a foreign trade that would stimulate
the development of the heavy industries, the interests
of the peasants who clamoured for higher agricultural
prices and the needs of market-"normalisation" which




Concluding our survey of trade under the
New Economic Policy^certain features of the
development stand out clearly and are worthy of
re-emphasis• The NEP was a policy of compromise
and implied a tacit recognition of the creative
forces of market-exchange. It was a risky policy^
for the rescuseitation of exchange in a socially
heterogeneous economy held acute social and political
dangers in store. Discussions within the Communist
Party about the essence of the NEP were caused by
the realisation of this fact, and accoi$ to a great
extent .for the va/c illations in policy* But gradually
Stalin's conception of the NSP gained ground, based,
as it was, on limitation of capitalist elements and,
at the same time, utilisation, as much as possible,
.
of their services; on regulation of exchange and,
simultaneously, on the gradual technical ana
productive transformation- of the countryside.
A new economy was being created. While economic
activity had been recovering on the basis of an
exchange-economy, sufficiently strong contacts were
being established between industry and agriculture
in the form of newly devised organisational bonds
(general contracts, delivery plans etc.) with the
result that the services of the private middlemen
could, after a while, be dispensed with almost
entirely. One of the underlying ideas of the NEP
was to get agriculture going again by means of the
ordinary inducements of the market, but simultaneously
with that recovery to introduce new trading organisations
(State owned or controlled) and to make agricultural
production dependent not on the supply of privately
managed handicraft production, but on the output
of the nationalised industries. This necessitated
intense industrialisation and utmost economy of all
resources. In an impoverished country like Soviet
/" ■
Russia and in the absence of foreign financial help
in the form which would have been compatible with
the political regime, industrialisation and all
the various subsidiary measures were bound to curb
other branches of the State's economic activity
(like trade) and re~act unfavourably on the standard
of living of the people.
The economic reasons advanced for Stalin's
industrialisation programme are family obvious, if
one proceeds from the final goal of the Bolshevik
Party, viz., the building up of a socialist and^
thereafter^ of a communist society, based on the most
advanced mechanisation of all productive processes.
The development of consumption goods' industries
could not, in the long run, have insured a steady
growth in the volume of production. Furthermore, a
complex and varied demand structure required a solid
material basis and "roundabout" methods of manufacture.
In ouLd-ition,
Furthermore it must not be forgotten that the
twin purpose of economic self-sufficiency and defenc
(on which the economic policy was to rest in the
subsequent years of Integral Planning) influenced
the actions of the Soviet Government all along. 1
I
/Cf. discussion of market problems^ and price trends
under the First Five-Year Plan. \f .— ^
A particularly potent reason for industrialisation
under the conditions of the NEP.,however, was contained
in the emphasis that the one-sided growth of consumption
goods' industries would have implied the preponderance
of trading capital over industrial capital. E^en if
this new trading capital would have belonged to the
nationalised industries it would have much more easily
have al^igne'd itself with the forces of capitalism, on
whose services it would have depended. The State would
gradually have lost its regulative control over
economic life. Conversely, it is "beyond dispute that
industrial capital could (under the then prevailing
conditions) be formed by State action alone and was'
in consequence much more op^ to .supervision and
planned direction.
Naturally, consumption could not be neglected
altogether, for on its growth depended the recovery
in productivity. But since the Soviet Government had
to a certain extent restored capitalism, it thought
that it would be just as well to strike a bargain
with its most bitter foe. And while it concentrated
on the restoration of fixed capital, it left the
growth of agricultural production to private initiative.
But after a while the State stepp d in with its
|
own trading apparatus not only with a view to
preventing the social and political consolidation of
a new merchant and kulak class, but also with the
object of stopping the economic abuses of, private
enterprise, viz., speculation and crises. Thus, while
the Soviet Government admitted the superiority of
private capitalism as regards the s'peedy restoration
of agriculture and. the consumers' goods industries,
it was resolved to combat capitalist abuses and
ultimately to displace private commerce altogether.
As we have seen, the growth of socialised trade
was beset with numerous problems which can be grouped
under three main headings: economic, organisational and
human.
The chief economic aim of the Authorities was at
all times the development of productive forces and
this determined their attitude towards the market.
The problem was, at any given moment, thus to regulate
So.
the market /as to achieve the maximum volume of output
in a manner that would not in any way prejudice the
interests of the working class. It is clear that
such a policy was very difficult to achieve so long
as private enterprise dominated commerce. Therefore
the Russian Communists had to become traders them¬
selves.
The organisational problem consisted in
establishing an efficiently run socialised trading
system able not only to compete with private commerce>
but also to replace its functions^and to devise a
rational socialised trading unit. This problem was
closely connected with the human aspect of the matter.
The perusal of relevant documents reveals a whole
mire of inefficiency and corruption among the employees
of socialised trading.
Tangible results of all attempts at solving the
last two problems remained rather meagre and^while
the State, endowed with superior political power, had
managed to subdue the elements of capitalism and
to restore fairly quickly the productive forces of
the country, exchange and distribution continued to
be "weak spots" in.the Soviet economy.
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THE TRANSITION TO INTEGRAL PLANNING
THE TRANSITION TO INTEGRAL PLANNING
The task of restoring Soviet industry was more
than accomplished Ly 1928/ The volume of industrial
production of 1927/28 exceeded that of 1913 by the
considerable figure of 26 per cent. The Soviet
Government continued boldly with its industrialisation
programme and had since about 1926,commenced the re-
cons timetion of Soviet industry, i.e. the creation of
new heavy industries with fresh plant and equipment.
But the heterogeneous nature of the NEP threatened to
jeopardise their efforts in this direction. The
lagging behind of agriculture constituted the major
problem of economic disequilibrium. On. the other
hand, the intensification of the programme of
industrialisation meant in effect (1) a diversion of
manpower from agriculture to industry and (2) an
increase in the demand for foodstuffs and agricultural
raw-materials. Thus^the Russian countryside became
not only the seat of a disquieting growth of unreliabl
(if not hostile) social classes, able to paralyse
Soviet industrial, activity simply by withholding their
grain from the urban settlements, but' it also proved
to be unable to serve the requirements of Russian in¬
dustry. Needless to say,both political and technical
factors were closely inter-related and conditioned
each other mutually. The problem of the Soviet village
/W.P. and Z.C. Coates, From Tsardom to the Stalin
Constitution, London 1938, p. 92. Cornp. History of
the Communist Party etc., op.cit., p. 286. Pollock,
op.cit., p. 170, says that the restoration of Soviet
economy to the pre-war level was completed at the end
of the financial year 1925/26, but admits that at that
time many important branches of industry had not reach
that level. It is therefore safer to take the ;end'
3.92.7 as the beginning of the Reconstructive Period.
ed
had therefore to he solved in its entirety. The
so-called "grain difficulties" of 1927-28 convinced
&L lN<f
the Authorities of the necessity tb extend/their re¬
constructive programme to the countryside.
Stalin, in an interview given in summer 1928,
summarised the situation thus:
"The output of industry is increasing, the number
of workers is increasing: the towns are growing, the
districts in which industrial plants (such as cotton,
flax, beet, etc.) are cultivated are also extending.
All these make increasing demands on grain - for
marketable grain - but the yield of our marketable
grain is o^nly growing frightfully slowly. The only
solution of the difficulty, is to transform the small
individual backward farms into collective farms proper
ly equipped with modern machinery and working on
/
scientific principles."
It would lead too far to describe the various
phases of the collectivisation campaign and the inter-
Party discussions on this issue. We shall confine
ourselves to the role which trade played in the
changing nature of the countryside.
The essence of the Second. Agrarian Revolution was
Of course, not re-organisation of exchange but that
of production; its outward feature was political
struggle. The importance, of commerce in facilitating
■the collectivisation of agriculture should not be
act
minimised, however. First attempts %£ linking up
agriculture with industry on the basis of contractual
deliveries and exchange of produce, had been under-
! ■ ■
l
/Quoted by W.P. and Z.K. Goates, op.cit., pp. 97-98,
taken during the HEP. This system was being extended
in the period immediately preceding actual collectiv¬
isation. It was a most important preparatory step in I
the direction of changing the productive relationships
of the village and, although it is doubtful whether
the middle peasants showed an increasing disposition
to dispense with the services of the private middlemen
and to deal directly with the nationalised industry
(as was being made out on the official side),it
certainly enhanced the State's grip on agriculture/
Stalin was at pains to emphasise that the system
of contracts was not inconsistent with the NEP, that
it had originated in the HEP and that it represented
merely large-scaLe buying operations under close
supervision of the Government. For Stalin^the system
of contracts was a bridge to the road of collectiv¬
isation. He regarded it not merely as an effort to
increase the supply of marketable grain, but as a
new form of Smytchka between the working; class and
the main mass of the peasantry.^ That system had
thriveft in the case of 'industrial crops, but now the
i
Party was intent on making it the universal form of
the acquisition of grain.
Such a task remained impracticable, however, so
long as the kulaks, the "bloodsuckers and sworn
enKemies of Socialism" (as one called them then),
retained their leading positions. As in War Communisji,
the law of the preservation of power compelled the
Bolsheviks to extirpate a social class whose existence
/"For details ofthe economic significance of the
contract system cf., e.g., S£alin, Leninism, op.cit.,
Vol. II, pp. 90 et seq.
jg^Ibid. , pp. 166-67.
threatened to undermine the regime. The decision to
proceed with large-scale collectivisation was
announced by Stalin in his well-known speech delivered
at the Conference of Marxist-Agrarians on December 27
1929. This far-reaching decision taken after bitter
Party struggles, accompanied by failures, partial
retreats, violent opposition of the kulaks and in¬
flicting boundless human tra^egty,ushered in the end
of the NEP and the beginning of Integral Planning. ^
The rather rapid transition to a new era began with
the launching; of what the Russian planners called the
"offensive along the whole front", i.e. the widening
of State-supervision to the countryside with a view
to ousting what was considered an obsolete economic
system and a rapacious social class and replacing it
by a system of communal cultivation. The Second
Agrarian Revolution, in so far as it concentrated
the mass of the peasantry into compact producers'
co-operatives and thus destroyed the old market-
links between town and village, had probably greater
rep^rp cuss ions on the evolution of Soviet trade than
the renewed attack against the private trader
immediately before the beginning of the First Five-
Year Plan. It was by means of both methods that
/ Cf. Stalin,aVo£. II, p. 357. The period which we
have termed "Transition to Integral Planning" refers
tb the years 1927-29. In the official terminology
it seems to have several designations. Apparently
the official classification is based on a double
evaluation of the period, viz., according to (l)pro-
ductive changes ("Transition to Reconstruction") and
(2)the politico-social framework of productive relati
ships ("End of the KEP", "The Beginning of Socialism"
etc.) We have preferred to give the period our
composite name. (Gf. our remarks on the classificatic
of the NEP-period, p.8&).
on-
n
Stalin was intent on sending the New Economic Policy
/
"to the devil".
, Briefly speaking, the sphere of exchange under
the period of transition to Intergal Planning was
characterised (apart from the already mentioned
jgeneral inculcation of the system of contracts as
"the basic method of the new form of goods-exchange
between town and country" (Stalin) ) by a further
j socialisation of the commercial turnover and a marked
growth of co-operative trade. This new commercial
link between industry and agriculture facilitated
the extension of planning beyond industry to the
multitude of collective peasants' farms and the
remainder of individual husbandries. The beginnings
of Soviet trade proper^were being laid, i.e., of a
large-scale regulated interchange of commodities
without capitalist middlemen and based on the reciproc
growth of productive forces in town and country.
s.l
/"Asked what he meant when he said that the New
Economic Policy should be "sent to the devil", Stalin
answered vaguely: "We shall have sent it to the devil
when we have no need to tolerate even a limited amount
of free trade, when we have organised an economic
union between town and village by an interchange of
commodities." (L.Lawton, op.cit., Vpl. II, p. 523).
£By linking up agriculture with industry the State
was in a position to develop agriculture according
to plan (supply of seed end fertilisers, determination
of the volume of production, price-regulation etc.).
3 Cf. Book III.
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The First Five-Year Plan was begun on October 1,
1928, and was completed by December 31, 1932, i.e.,
in four and a quarter years. Much has been written
on its aims, character and execution and there is thud
no need to engage in repetition/ The bold venture
found severe critics, especially outside Russia,but
in retrospect there is no doubt that the Plan was, on
the whole, successful in building an up-to-date and
powerful heavy industry (although at an enormous cost,
both human and material) and in setting up a novel
type of economic organisation.
/Of the official publications on the First Five-Year
Plan, the Summary of the Fulfilment of the First
Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National
Economy of the U.S.S.R., Moscow 1933, is probably the
most useful.
Xl% is impossible to appreciate the changes brought
about by the Second Five-Year Plan without taking
into account the international badgpound against which
it was carried out. The Japanese aggression aga.inst
Manchuria in 1931-32 marked the beginning of a steady
deterioration in international relations. The Soviet
Government thought its external security threatened
and considered it necessary to hurry through the Plan
and to pay particular attention to the needs of defence.
The latter tagc# became one of the major objectives of'
the Plan and the determined industrialisation must in
part be regarded as a means of making Soviet Russia
strong and independent. As Stalin declared at the
Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central
Control Commission of the C.P.S.U. on January 7, 1933
"the fundamental tefc# of the Five-Year Plan was to 1
transform the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak
country, dependent upon the caprices of the capitalis
countries, into an industrial and pov/erful country
quite independent of the caprices of world capitalism
(From the First to the Second Five Year Plan, Moscow
1933, p. 14). The needs of defence required very con
siderable allocations of economic resources and in¬
tensified the strain imposed on the population. The
failure to fulfil the programme of general industrial
output to the full - it was only accomplished to the
extent of 93.7 per cent. - "is to be explained by the
fact that in view of the camplications that arose in
the Far East, we were obliged hastily, in order to
improve the defences of the country, to transfer a
number of factories to the production of modern weapons
of defence. ... the transfer resulted in these factories
zioO
It was evident from the outset that the envisaged!
.
capital construction would by necessity create
'
difficulties in supplying the population with necessities.
But before proceeding to analyse the various "market-
problems" which were created by the First Five-Year
Plan, we propose to delineate the outstanding trends
of trade during this period.
The most striking development was the division of
State-controlled commercial activity'into a regulated
(contractual) goods-exchange between town and country
on the one hand ana into a system of rationed supply,
rather reminiscent of the days of War Commuhism^on the
other
The new system of distribution did not grow over¬
night. The transformations which we have indicated
above took some three years (from 1929 to the middle
of 1932) to assume a definite shape. During these
years sBmii-compulsory "contractation" gradually
came to comprise the preponderating share of the
flow of goods from the country to the towns and in
the towns the system of "closed" supply^differentiated
according to the social and eoonomic status of the
recipient^was being elaborated. At the end of this
period the trade network as well as the turnover
of the co-operatives and of State commercial organis-
(continued from previous page): ceasing to turn out
goods for a period of four months, and this could
not but affect the fulfilment of the general programme
of output of the Five-Year Plan during 1932." (Ibid.,
p. 23).
/By that time trade was already purged, to a great
extent, from private elements .
JtBoth aspects of the change will be discussed later.
ations underwent a marked extension. From the
beginning of 1932 there was a further campaign against
[the remnants of private commerce. At the conclusion
of the First Five-Year Plan it could really be main¬
tained that private commercial activity had been
eradicated for good and all.^ At the same time began
/The following principal results in this respect can
be gleaned from, the offical Summary of the First
Five-Year Plan (op.cit., pp. 208 et seq.): the number
of trading units of the socialised trading system (co¬
operative and State) increased during the period under
[review by 155 , 700 ( 91,300 in the villages and 64,400
jin the towns). On January 1, 1933, the retail system
of co-operative and State trade, including the trading
system of the collective farms, had 312,400 trading
units. Trading units were enlarged and specialised,
land, department stores created. A large number of trade
enterprises was shifted from the cmtre of cities to the
working; class suburbs. The number of members of con¬
sumers' co-operatives rose from 24.7 million on January
1, 1929, to 73.1 million on January 1, 1933, i.e., to
about three-fourths of the adult population of the
U.S.S.R. The number of co-operative trading units more
than doubled. The State trading system which comprised
14,700 trading units on January 1, 1931, grew to
70,700 trading units at the conclusion of the Plan,
i.e., it increased almost five times in five years.
This development took the form both of opening of retail
stores by Syndicates of the State Light and Food in¬
dustries for the direct sale of commodities produced b^
[these industries and. also of the opening of large
department and specialised stores.
#'In 1928, th^rivate trader controlled 20 per cent of
[the total circulation; in 1930 this figure fell to 5.6
per cent; while by 1931 the percentage of private trade
fell still lower and the turnover of the private trade
had become a negligible quantity. The process of re¬
placing private trade by socialized trade ... has been
a highly intensive one."... The following are the num¬





















disappeared. The function of
middleman has thus been elirn-
this class degenerated into
speculation which is prohibited by law. ... The abol¬
ition of private trade represents a tremendous victory
©¥* socialism. It signifies the elimination of private
capitalist trading profit; it frees the working popul¬
ation from the necessity of buying consumers 1 goods at
exorbitant prices for the benefit of parasites and en¬
sures the trade connection between the working class
and the peasantry being strengthened and raised to a
higher level." (Summary etc., op.cit., pp. 207-2o8).
the development of Kolkhoz trade and of decentralised
collections (although centralised collections of ag¬
ricultural produce retained their dominant importance).
An outstanding achievement of the Plan was the creatioh
of an extensive network of public catering establish-
ments.
The far-reaching changes in the national economy
as a whole and in trade in particular received divergent
interpretations by the different sections of the
Communist Party. In the domain of trade those who
sympathised with the views of the Right Opposition
(which advocated the retention of the essentials of
'
the HEP) tried to evade the new Government regulations
as regards differentiated supply, neglected the decree^
concerning the lowering of prices and sold out, with¬
out authority, stocks of goods which had been ear-
Mi
'"'According to the estimates of the purveying organ¬
izations, in 1932 the co-operatives and State organ¬
izations alone procured 120,000 tons of meat, 130,000
tons of milk and dairy products, 360,000 tons of pot¬
atoes, etc., on the collective farms and at collective
farm markets." (Summary etc., op.cit., p. 217).
£/The Soviet Government paid great attention to the
development of public catering which it regards as an
important method for the transformation of the mode of
living of the masses. During the first quinquennium
the number of establishments of the public catering
service in the towns in the system of the Centrosoyuz
and the Peopfe's Commissariat of Supply hact increased
from 1,500 to 13,982, including factory-kitchens,whose
number increased from 3 to 106. The number of workers
served by these public catering establishments has
increased in the urban sector from 750,000 at the
end of 1928 to 14.8 pillion at the end of 1932, i.e.,
twenty times. The total, turnover of the public cat¬
ering system, in both the urban and rural sectors,
increased from 102 million roubles in 1928 to 4,385
million roubles in 1932^ (Ibid., pp.214 et seq.)
marked for specific purposes. The adherents of the
Left Opposition (which identified the existence of
goods-exchange aid money with capitalism) availed
themselves of the new economic orientation to tarn,
as quickly as possible, the trading organisations
under their charge into rigid and "mechanical" dis¬
tributing centres and to treat the temporary measure
of rationing as an example of an ideal socialist
distributioni Both these tendencies were criticised
iL*
by the Government on many occasions. But it is doubt
ful whether they were caused merely be doctrinaire
allegiances. It seems that in many cases they could
simply be explained by the utter perplexity of the
trading managers end co-operative officials brought
about by the abrupt changes of policy. After a great
deal of trouble the members of a revolutionary move¬
ment held grasped the rudiments of business , they had
(to a certain extent) "learned how to trade"; now
they had to re-adapt themselves to new forms of dis¬
tribution. The proper appreciation of the new policy
spread but gradually.
/Cf. infra^our discussionton selective supply under
the First Five-Year Plan.
&See e.g. , the Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the
"Central Committee and the Central Control Commission
of the C.P.S.U. (B.), December 1930, concerning the
work of consumers' co-operatives, which criticised
the NEP-spirit of some societies; the Circular and
Appeal of the Sovnarkom and the Centrosoyuz, dated
May 12, 1931 scourged the Utopian attempts to proceed
at once to direct commodity-distribution. In its
"opinion the objective conditions for this drastic
change were not then present and the co-operators
were therefore warned not to interpret the elimination
of private trade as the elimination of trade as a
whole.(Both documents quoted in Economics of Soviet
Trade, op.cit., p.104 and p. 105).
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/
/Mn,Hubbard has rondorod ■ a remarkably lucid account
of the framework of Soviet trade under the First 'and
Second Five-Year Plans and we shall refer to it when¬
ever it becomes necessary to supplement the official
Soviet material.
Retail Trade.
At the beginning of the first quinquennium the
co-operative system played quite clearly the dominati
role in the socialised sector. In 1927/28 all types
of co-operative enterp/lse accounted for 60.3 per cent,
of the total commercial turnover. In 1928/29 the per¬
centage came to 66.5. The corresponding figures for
State trade were 14.9 and 17.4 per cent. In the years
1929/30 and 1931 the relative share of the co-operativ
continued to rise, reaching 70.6 and 73.3 per cent, of
the total socialised trade turnover, while State trade
grew from 23.4 per cent, in 1929/30 to 26.7 per cent,
in 1931. In 1932 there was a marked reversal in the
trend. State trade jumped up to 36.6 per cent., while
co-operative trade dropped to 63.4 per cent, of the
socialised turnover. The rapid development of State
trade was especially noticeable in the villages, which
used to be the stronghold of the co-operatives. Here
State trade increased its hold from 18.6 per cent of
es
the socialised turnover in 1931 to 33.1 per cent, in
I
The almost complete elimination of private commer
1932.^
2,All figures taken from Economics of Soviet/trade,
op.cit., p. 112 /Soviet Trade and Distribution,op.c: t.
cial activity and the consequent need to fill in the
I
gaps offers "but a partial explanation of the extension
i
of State trade in the last years of the First Five-Yeap
Plan, The chief impetus came from the introduction of
rationing which (as will be shown later) brought mani¬
fold and difficult distributive problems in its wake.
These the co-operative system was unable to tackle un¬
aided.
The co-operatives were, of course, ideally
adapted to rationed distribution by reason of their
membership-basis and the valuable experience which
they had collected in the days of War Communism. The
State shops, on the other hand, "had been accustomed
/
to sell to all ana sundry." After the introduction of
rationing one group of State shops continued to deal
in so-called "free" (i.e., non-rationed) goods, such
as cultural articles, luxury goods, haberdadi ery,
whereas another group that had specialised in wares
which had been put on rations (textiles, clothing,
boots etc.) was converted into what was described as
"closed" shops, selling to a fixed clientele on pro¬
duction of the appropriate ration books. According
to Hubbard most "State shops in the towns were under
the State Department for P.etiil Trade from whose
initial letters G.O.R.T. the shops took their name.
As a general rule G.O.R.T. shops were organised for
the upper classes, Government officials, administrative
officials in the industrial Trusts, banks, etc., the
higher technical personnel such as engineers,
scientific workers, university and high-school teachers
/ Soviet Trade"and~Distribution, op.cit,, p. 38.
and so on./ Each category, at least in the big centres,
had their own special G.O.R.T. shops in which both the
quality and quantity of the rations varied, the best
being those supplying members of the Government, People
Commissars and the leading members of the Communist
Party. Another form of G.O.R.T. was the "Insnab" for
supplying the needs of foreign experts employed in
State enterprises."' About 1830 the Commissariat of
External Trade opened the so-called "Torgsin" shops
which sold goods without limitation exclusively
against valuta, precious stones and jewellery .^Towards
the end of the First Five-Year Plan "commercial" shops
began to make their appearance. Here goods of daily
demand could be obtained without ration-cards, but at
very high prices. The total turnover of these shops
remained small, however, but showed a pronounced growtl
towards the close of the period under review.
In the towns the influence of the co-operative
shops was considerable. They were divided into two
classes, viz., "general town shops for the lower ranks
of Government officials, clerical staffs, municipal
workers, etc., and the special factory shops for the
exclusive supply of the workers in a single enterprise
The noticeable contraction in the number of urban co¬
operatives from 69.9 per cent, of the socialised turn¬
over in 1931 to 61.6 per cent, in 1932 with a simul¬
taneous expansion of the urban State trade network
/Hubbard," Soviet Trade etc., op.cit. , pp. 38-39.
^Torgsin prices were calculated on a gold-basis.
jHubtoard, Soviet Trade,etc., op.cit.,p. 39
from 30.4 per cent, to 38.4 per cent was due to the
setting up? in 1932, of a new State organisation called
"Department for Workers' Supplies"(0.R.S.) to whew'a
great number of factory co-operatives (Z.R.K.) was
transferred. This decision was taken at the end of
the period, viz., in December 1932. The meaning and
purpose of this re-organisation will be discussed
later. This step had certainly more than mere formal
significance,
"The O.R.S. shops were put under the management
of one of the factory directors, generally the Senior
Deputy Manager, who was responsible for obtaining
supplies, issuing ration books and the general ad¬
ministration of the shop. In most cases the factory
O.R.S. also included dining-rooms for the factory
staff and workers. Meals taken in any communal
feeding establishment were in addition to the worker'$
3
i-ation and did not form part of it."
It should" not be imagined, however, that this
reconstruction of workers' supply proceeded more or
less instantaneously. In point of fact the Z.R.K. and
the O.R.S. continued to co-exist for cm ato a con¬
siderable time. When the two decrees of the Central
Committee of the C.P.S.U. and of the Sovnarkom, dated
December 4 and 19, 193g were passed^ 1,243 Z.R.K.
functioned within the system of consumers' co-oper¬
atives. Of these^346 (i.e., 28 per cent.) belonging
chiefly to the more important industrial enterprises
/Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 112. ,,
/,W. Nodel, Supply and Trade in the u.&.S.E*, p. 85.(AjUacx.t'Bty,
jHubbard, Soviet Trade etc., op.cit., p. 39.
^Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 253. These
are the two decrees by which the re-organisation was
carried out.
|were soon abolished. Where the Z.R.K. refined their
internal administration was altered, so as to make
them subordinate both to the factory manager and to
their respective co-operative centres.
This organisational dualism was prompted by the
I following considerations: in enterprises of major
national importance the supply of workers was deemed
to be the exclusive concern of the factories them-
selves, whereas in lesser economic units, while
supply was linked up with production 'the right of
members to elect their own management - subject to
approval from the higher co-operative organisation -
was preserved. In the middle of 1933 new Z.R.K. were
established in a number of Government offices and
i
seats of learning. There is no doubt that in the
sphere of workers1 supply as in every other sphere of
?
I
economic life, the Soviet Government consciously
adopted the attitude of an experimentalist. It was
intent on discovering empirically under what cir¬
cumstances either of the two forms of workers1 supply
within, and attached to, the various centres of
production, was the moat appropriate to existing
conditions. The Authorities realised, of course, that
the different schemes of re-organisation which belong
to the period under review were bound to be of an
extremely transitory nature due to the swiftness with
which productive forces developed and also because of
/The factory managers were given the right to influenc
decisively the distribution of the goods-funds in
question.
i/Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 254.
sundry miscalculations and unforeseen factors which ma.de
constant organisational and administrative adjustments
imperative.
Extremely interesting are the efforts to induce
the organisations of Workers' Supply to utilise local
tK(/s
resources;(wteefe will be discussed later in greater
detail). This tendency towards local self-sufficiency
and decentralisation was originally one of the many
attempts and designs to mitigate the acute''deficit" of:
consumers' goods which made itself felt under the
First Five-Year Plan. But every negative measure
seems, after a time, to be turned into a positive
element by virtue of the "Soviet dialectic". Nowadays,
when goods are relatively plentiful, local and regional
self-sufficiency is an important feature of economic
planning in Soviet Russia.'
r-
In the villages the bulk of retail trading was
handle el by the rural co-operative organisations, al¬
though at the end'of the First Five-Year Plan there
was (as we have noted) a rapid advance of State trade
in rural settlements.
Co-operative retail trade was carried on by ag¬
ricultural producers' and consumers' societies. The
most important were, of course, the consumers' so¬
cieties, but the other types of co-operation were
directly responsible for quite a considerable share of
commercial activity in the villages. "The producers'
co-operatives maintain a few stores for the sale of
the kustarni products manufactured by the peasant
artisans. These products are mostly linen and em¬
broidery and carved wooden objects, such as toys. But
the producers' co-operatives sometimes sell their
products directly to the consumers. For example, a
small artel of takers will maintain both a bakery and
a retail bakery shop. It is interesting to observe
that prices at such bakeries are generally somewhat
higher than th^prices of similar baked goods sold at
the consumers' co-operative shops. Agricultural co-
|
operatives are responsible for a part of the retail
marketing of directly consumable agricultural products,
particularly of dairy products.
The attempts at rationalising retail trade (begun
at the end of the NEP) were resumed during the First
Five-Year Plan and with better partial results, it
seems. The size and turnover of the average trading
that of
unit grew markedly, at least in comparison with/private;
shops. Besides the "releasing; capacity" of retail
trade was enhanced by such measures as the introductio
of a "non-stop week", the lengthening of business
hours, preliminary weighing and packing and the setting
up of house shops which aimed at organising the supply
of food products to tenants. A great part of these
rationalising efforts was, however, "neutralised" by
the weaknesses of rationed supply which will be re¬
viewed below. The trade network remained inadequate;
only in the second half of 1931 was there a noticeable
improvement in this respect. The tendency towards
a more even distribution of the network in the cities
and a more rapid growth of trade organisations in
backward and distant areas continued to exert itself.
7c .B. Hoover, The Economic Life of Soviet Russia,
Hew York, 1831, pp. 131-32.
tQ.f. Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 112 and
Nodel, op.cit., p. 51.
Uho 1 essie Trade.
The organisation of wholesale trade during the
First Five-Year Plan was particularly susceptible to
"Leftist" tendencies which became very pronounced in
!
the years 1930-31. Their influence went so far as to
frustrate one of the main objects of the 1929-reform
of industrial administration. By virtue of a decree
dated December 5, 1929, the system of Syndicates and
chief administrative boards of industry, including
their ramified wholesale machinery, were abolished
and new organis. tions, the so-called Industrial Branch
Combinations', were created in their stead. They were
charged not only with the technical re-organisation
of production but also with the functions of supply,
i.e. ,purchase and marketing'. But owing to the "Leftist"
moods of some of the responsible tradOfficials, the
supply functions of the new organisations wrere artif¬
icially curtailed on many occasions. A similar
process could be observed in the co-operative movementj,
The liquidation of the Provincial Unions and the
creation of big regional societies took place in
1930,
operative wholesale depots, "the individual consumers
A73
/
This meant^in effect., the suspension of co¬
co-operatives obtaining their stocks direct from the
su
industrial Sbyty." This arrangement proved, as Hubbard
3
shows, to be very harmful to the development of trade
in- general and was particularly detrimental to the
interests of the consumer.
/For types of~combinations cf. Arnold, op.cit., p.350
n. The new organisations were based on the principles
of Business Management or Ithozraschet (cf. below),i.e.
had independent balances and accounts. X Hubbard, op.
cit., p. 41. A "Sbyt" was a commercial department of
an industial Trust (its££f.the component part of a Coii
Qinationj . ,31 bid., p. 41.
- 1
7
The taeks of a properly organised Soviet wholesale
-.referred to in ,trade will he 3?a/another context. Here we
may confine ourselves to a brief enumeration of the
measures which Party and Government adopted with a
view to counteracting "Leftist" practices.
The stagnation-period of wholesale trade under
the First Five-Year Plan came to an end in the second
half of 1931. This was to a great extent due to the
"May Appeal" (quoted above).
The revival of wholesale trade assumed three
main forms:
(1) The organisation of specialised wholesale
supply bases under the various "productive" Commissariu
These bases were attached to the various industrial
/
combinations.
(2) The organisation of wholesale centres for the
express purpose of facilitating the sale of the "non-
deficit goods", i.e., of goods whose supply was con¬
sidered as assured.
(3) The organisation of inter-regional universal
wholesale bases of the co-operative and State trade
systems/^
The Authoritiessalso tried to bring about a more
even distribution of the wholesale network, so as to
avoid the concentration of wholesale trade in big
cities or in regions where the various commodities were
actually produced. But it is jJlain that such a
/Special wholesale depots (Prpmbazy) were establishedunder trie Commissariats for light Industry and the
Commissariat for food industry. Hubbard (op.cit.,p.
43) enumerates them in detail.
^Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 121.
thoroughgoing re-modelling of trade in an enormous,
"both culturally and geographically "uneven" country ad
Russia is such a gigantic task that it cannot be
accomplished over-night, as it were. Failures in
organisation continued, the assortment of goods re¬
mained unsatisfactory, the principles of economic
accounting were not complied with; especially the
system of transmitting commodities ran counter to the
jprinciples of a rational and economical flow of goods.
It happened that goods travelled happily all over the
Union in order to arrive at their ultimate destination
not very far from the place whence they had been
originally dispatched. -It is admitted that many of
these defects of wholesale trade have not been over¬
come to this day.
Regulative Organs. ——
At the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan the
country's internal trade was under the supervision
of the Nsrkomtorg. Subordinate Republican Commissariat^
controlled trade activity in the seven constituent
republics of the U.S.S.R. and under these there were
i
regulative bodies for the smaller territorial sub-
/
divisions. In February 1930 the Commissariat was re¬
organised "so as to conform as much as possible with
that of the Supreme Economic Council." This was done
in order to increase the regulative grip of the Far-
komtorg on trade and to integrate the general economic
organisation of the country under a central planning
scheme. "It is rather significant that this re-
%1S
/hoover, op.cit., p. 123.
I^Ibid.
o
organization followed upon the reorganization of in¬
dustry and was contemporaneous with that of the hanking
i
i
system of the Union." It was only too natural that the
inauguration of Integral Planning should have been
followed by organisational adjustments.
The mas t important task of the reconstructed Nar-
komtorg was to be the supervision of the food industry
and the interchange of products between town and
countryside. Public feeding was likewise placed with¬
in its purview. Besides, manifold technical tasks
came within the Narkomprod's scope. Tfte, reconstructed
Commissariat continued to supervise foreign trade
I
operations.
But things moved faster than all administrative
enactments. New problems of distribution arose which
the Narkornprod, even in its reorganised form was un¬
able to tackle. The appearing shortage of goods
forced the Commissariat to devote all its energies
to the complicated tasks of food supply. This was
not easy so long as the attention of the Narkomprod
had to be divided between Home and Foreign Trade. The
Government decided therefore to effect yet another
step of reorganisation. It thought it advisable to
revert to an organisational set-up similar to that
which existed before 1925, i.e.,to create two
Commissariats charged with the direction of externa],
and domestic trade respectively. This was accomplished
only nine months after the first reorganisation decree
viz., on November 22, 1930. By virtue of the latter
/Hoo/er, op.cit., p. 124.
X>Ibid., p. 125.
(decree the whole of internal trade was placed in the
jhands of the People's Commissariat of the U.S.S.R.;
jits name was reminiscent of that given to the supply
centre during the period of far Communism.^ Many
Communists thought that this was indicative of a
return to the "good, old times". Simultaneously, a
speci2.IL Commissariat for the control of Foreign Trade
was created.
2j
The teics of the new Narkomsnab were not essentially
different from those of the reorganised Narkomtorg,
hut the distributive functions were strengthened,
Iwhile market and price-regulation receded into the
background. Briefly speaking, the Commissariat for
jSupplies had to organise the supply of agricultural
products, to pass them over to the food industries
jfor finishing and to supply the population, especially
the urban working classes, with consumption goods. The
corameric\l^ operations of the co-operatives were also
in the hands of the newr Commissariat.
Material and Technical
Reconstruction, of the Trade NdWork.
The reconstruction and re-modelling of an entire
trade machinery cannot be solved by organisational
dispositions alone. It is obvious that a widening
of turnover and of the network itself could only be
achieved by the actual construction of new trading
units, the building of warehouses, the erection of
depots, etc. The Soviet planners realised, of course
that the reconstruction of the obsolete commercial
'"The Commissariat under War Communism was one of
Food Supply^ the new Commissariat was one of Supply.
^Abbreviation for Narodny Kommissariat Snabzhenia.
I
equipment itself with the help of the most up-to-date I
methods of Western Capitalism (chiefly American)j was
necessary in order to effect economies in the sphere
of exchange, e.g., to increase the velocity of commodity
circulation and to cut clown losses, waste, etc. These
talcs were entrusted to the Narkomtorg and then to the
Narkomsnab. But the pre-occupation with the unexpected-
ly excessive demands and appetites of industrialisation
made it impossible to put aside sufficient funds for
the purpose of reconstructing the material and tech¬
nical base of Soviet commerce. Taken absolutely, the
sums expended seem quite impressive,' but it is note¬
worthy that the actu/al expenditure fell far short of
the planned allocations.
Nevertheless, noticeable progress was achieved
during the First Five-Year Plan in this domain, but
again it must not be forgotten that the material
state of the Russian distributive apparatus with whic
the SovieVblanners were confronted^ was extremely-
poor. Therefore the results obtained meant an immense
improvement as compared with the conditions prevailing
before and during the NEP, but^measured by the
standards and progress of distributive technique in
a country like the U.S.A.^they come to very little.
This point can perhaps be illustrated with reference
to the development of cold storage. In pre-war Russiq
cold storage was extremely backward. In 1917 there
were altogether 46 cold storage enterprises with a.
total holding-capacity of 63,300 tons. At the end
of 1932 the two indices increased to 261 and to
/Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 114
JfcZbid., p. 115.
, ?7226,000 tons respectively. / /
But it was admitted that warehousing; incgeneral
and cold storage in particular remained both backward and
inadequate during the First Five-Year Plan. Mot only
(it was said) was their holding-capacity far too small!
and their technical equipment poor, but their geographj-
ical distribution did not correspond to the new dis¬
tribution of productive forces and, hence, did not
facilitate the movement of goods along the newly formed
trade-routes. The socialist reorganisation of agri¬
culture, particularly, demanded the erection of ware¬
houses and places of cold, storage near collective and
4/
State farms.^
Another aspect of material reconstruction of supply
during: the First Five-Year Plain should be mentioned,
viz., the revolution in bread baking.
Bread baking in pre-war Russia was carried on in
the most archaic forms and Gorky's descriptions of
3
Czsrist bakeries are unforgettable. Their employees
were exploited to the utmost and, because of that,
often lost all traces of human dignity. Model is of
the opinion than conditions under Czardom were even
worse that those in London in the 'sixties (as
described in a Royal Commission Report).
During the War external emergency and internal
needs compelled the Czarist Government to set up a I
few semi-mechanised bakeries. At the time of the
assumption of State power, the Bolsheviks inherited
/ Ibid. jZlhid.
3Cf. Model, op.cit., p. 147 and Webbs, Soviet
Communism, p. 319.
only one fully mechanised bakery, hastily constructed
in Petrograd during the War.
Mechanisation of bread baking was commenced
in the course of the Restoration Period by the
co-operatives. During the First Five-Year Plan the
building of bread factories was greatly accelerated.
By this means the Soviet planners hoped to achieve a
substantial economy in the time required for pro¬
ducing this most vital of all foodstuffs and to ease
the burden of the Russian housewifes, many of whom
were employed in the factories. At the end of the
First Plan there were 330 mechanised bread baking
units, including 11 automatic bakeries. This means
that the number of mechanised bakeries was doubled
during the period under review. The output of
"mechanised bread" increased even more quickly than
the number of mechanised bakeries. The "specific
weight" of mechanised bread baking grew from 21 per
cent.in 1929 to 68 per cent, in 1933, a percentage
which is almost certainly higher than anywhere else
in the world. The "specific weight" of automatic
bakeries increased from 3.6 per cent, in 1924 to
about 34 per cent, in the first years of the Second
Five-Year Plan.^ But the success in this field was
ckteJ>&;
manifest mainly in the towns, and fororriobt in capital-
cities. Much remained to be done in the country-side.
The Bolsheviks realised that by the end of the
First Plan, while a good deal had been achieved, the
task of technical reconstruction of the distributive
/ Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 116.
^Webbs, op.cit., p. 318.
apparatus remained incomplete. Therefore one
jof the most influential leaders of the Communist Party!,
the late. Kuiybychev, re-emphasised at the Seventeenth j
Party Conference (which took place early in 1932), the
great importance of the task of reconstructing the
technical and material base of Soviet trade from the
point of view of improving the services to the consumer.
He exhorted his audience to continue with this task
/
;during the Second Five-Year Plan.
Compare Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 116.
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t/ru
The material and formal changes pf Soviet trade
! under the First Five-Year Plan which we have surveyed!
do not by themselves reflect the causes for the goocjsf
I
famine and rationing, which are the salient features
! of distribution during the period under consideration!
; For this purpose wre have to analyse very carefully all
those factors which were responsible for the scarcity
of consumers' goods in those years.
The problem of market-equilibrium was not for-
Hz
gotten by those responsible for the drawing up of the
/
First Plan. Itws solution was one of the most diffic
theoretically and it appeared, later that it was in
this province that the Soviet planners had erred most
seriously. The main technical aspect of the problem
consisted in fixing such prices for commodities as
would insure a balance between demand and the planned
volume of coratrners1 goods. The obvious complications
in bringing both sides to balance, even "on paper",
were due to the heavy capital construction envisaged
by the First Five-Year Plan, which while diverting
the labour force to the production of means of pro¬
duction, provided at the same time for a considerable
increase in the total wage-receipts of the workers
in the heavy industries. How were these difficulties
"overcome"at the desks of the State Planning
Commission ? It was thought possible to achieve
a balance between production and consumption by
2
"skilfully 'fertilising' the labour of the people",
/Brutzkus, Economic Planning in Soviet Russia,p.131.
£lbid., p. 129.
ilt
i.e., raising the productivity of labour in a planned !
/
way and on an unprecedented scale. "It ( was ) here,
in the opinion of the Gosplan, that the miracle of
planning (would) appearBy means of this "miracle"
it was hoped not only to finance the gigantic con-
strycpttive task out of current income, but likewise so j
to increase the output of the light and food industrie
as to feed the workers engaged in the heavy industries
and, in addition, even to raise the standard of life
of the population as a whole. Minor corrections in
the balance of demand and supply in the Soviet "markeu
were to be achieved by taxation of individual incomes,
loans and the judicious utilisation of savings.
It Is interesting to note that one of the ablest
Soviet economists and statisticians'", Professor Strum-
ilin expressed his grave doubts as to the possibility
of raising the productivity of labour to the extent
desired. In his book "Social Problems of the Five-
Year Plan 1928/29-1932/33", published in 1929, he
dealt with the particular difficulties whtfxh he an¬
ticipated would arise in connection with the main¬
tenance of market-equilibrium under the First Five-
Year Plan. He made the observation that owing to
the socio-political idedLogy of the new Russian State
there was a tendency to raise wages with the result
that a gap between available purchasing power and the:
volume of consumers' goods would be created and a
so-called "goods-famine" would arise in consequence.
/Arnold, op.cit., p. 405.
I Ibid.
Furthermore, Strumilin admitted that the additional
demand, for everyday articles by workers employed in
the constructive trades was by 110 means offset by ail
additional production of the commodities in question.
Still? he advised very stongly against the easy
solution of the matter, viz., the concentration on
light instead of on the heavy industries. Such a
course would admittedly facilitate the striking of a
balance between demand and supply in the short run,
but would, in the long run, decrease the influence
and strength of the Soviet system.' Once the decision
of the Authorities to build a powerful and independent
heavy industry was accepted as sound "both politically
and in a wider sense economically, the appropriate
solution of the market-problem under such conditions
would (he said) necessitate the artificial restriction
of demand down to the level of available supply of
consumable goods. Therefore Strumilin recommended
to hold wage increases in check and to affect such
balancing measures si.-?3a as the re-distribution of the
national income, taxation and price-adjustments. Stilj.1,
he thought it possible to increase the norms of con¬
sumption of the working class as a whole.
While the forecasts with regard to the possibil¬
ities of capital construction proved to be even some-
/ Similar reasons were given by Stalin in Ms, report
on the results of the First Five-Year Plan*admitted
thatWfewer articles of general use have been produced
than was required and that the Government could quite
easily have rectified this. But what would have been
the practical consequences of such a change in econ¬
omic policy?" '.'.of course, out of the one and a half
billion rubles in foreign currency that we spent on
purchaang equipment for our heavy industry, we could
have set apart a half for the purpose of importing ra^
cotton, hides, wool, rubber, etc. We would then have'
had more calico, boots and clothes. But then, we
what timid, those relating to demand, were, to say the
least, over-optimistic. The projected volume of final
igoods to "be placed on the market at fixed prices was
not attained, while wages which were intended roughly
to equal the value of those final goods proceeded
"according to plan".'' Furthermore, the Plan envisaged,
■ftx -
ik—<^A, the lowering of agricultural retail prices by
As6
I12-20 per cent.; wholesale industrial prices were
Xj
jplanned to fall by some 20-23 per cent., while the
|reduction in the cost of;production was to be about
i 3
35 per cent.! The gains thus obtained were to be
|applied to accumulation in industry.
In actual fact, however, the hopes of thpSoviet
planners for a unique surge of labour productivity
as the main foundation of the drastic reduction in
I
the cost of production, did not materialise. At the
end of the first quinquennium, "in spite of every
itrick of accountancy, no amount of calculation could
|discover the looked for reduction (in the cost of
I
production)"Besides,the very impressive quantitativ
results of the Plan were by no means indicative of
the accretion in use-value; the quality of products
was poor. And,,instead of the planned strengthening
of the rouble's purchasing power, the printing press
used to fill the gaps of the Finance Plan, casued by
a costly industrialisation, while the spread of non-
(continued from previous page): would not have had a
tractor and at/automobile industry, .. .we would not hav|e
had metal for the production of machinery - and we
would have been unarmed in the midst of a capitalist
environment which is armed with modern technique."
(From the First to the Second Five Year Plan, op.cit.,
pp.24-25).
/Paul Winterton, Soviet Economic Development since
1928, Economic Journal, S*pl-, 1933, p.tSo.
^Strmmilin, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
JBrutzkus, op.cit., p.129. Ibid,p. 140. The rise m
,2-8"
cash settlements amounted to an acute credit inflation
There is very little reliable information on
price-trends during the First Five-Year Plan, for aftej:
January 1, 1931, the publication of price indices was
discontinued. Arnold thinks that this measure was
justified, for the indices "were not very meaningful!,
particularly so beginning with 1929, when prices of
the socialized sector alone were being included in the
k
index." With this verict we are inclined to agree,,
since rationing destroyed the category of a unified
price. A long series of price-levels was set up as a i
direct consequence of normed distribution and supply.
We shall attempt to analyse this complicated price-
structure in conjunction with our discussion of
rationing itself. Here we shall confine ourselves to
the broad price movements during the period under
review.
7
(continued from previous page"} :the cost of production
is admitted by Iieiman, op.cit., p. 170.
/Minute details on the currency circulation under the
First Five-Year Plan are to be found in Arnold's book,
op.cit., pp. 404-449."Inasmuch...as (the Plan's)...
expectations did not materialise, and the various
enterprises required more fuel, more raw materials,
more workers, and so forth, than was anticipated by
the Plan, additional credit and additional currency ha,|5
to be issued." (p.405). It is quite clear, even from
official information, that there was inflation in the
U.S.S.R. during that period, if inflation is defined
as a "condition that is caused by an increase in the
volume of purchasing power that is not accompanied by
ai. corresponding/increase in the volume of goods and
services available for distribution." (Ibid., p.429).
There was a "wide disparity between the official, index!
of circulation during these years and the index based
on retail sales (as measured" in rubles). ... It may be
presumed...that between October 1, 1928, and January 1
1933, the increase in currency amounted to from 193"to
246 percent; on the other hand, the increase in retail
sales between 1927-28 and 1932 amounted to 141 percent.
(Ibid., p. 428). . .
.Jlbid., p. 423. Cf. also p. 432. Similarly Turetsky,
Concerning the synthetic indices of the plan of the
national economy at the present period, Planovoie
Khoziastvo, 1935, /Vol. 2, p. 152. -Continued on next Jpge.-
From what has been said above about the expansion
II
"(SQntinued fi a pr
numbers would have




punchr sine; uo\; ar
'•
ious pac e): 7 n those
n'of no avail, even
mays inaex-
ii civc. i o oii xx they
e i;
_ '1.t a d ', si i: e e the sine of
ieposel of at the different price-j
This underlines the
any attempt to calculate the "actual]"
,0 of the rouble under rationing. Many!
of the economic observers of the Soviet Ynion have
tried to tackle t" is mysterious question. By attaching
different "weights" to different price-indices they
arrived at quite divergent conclusions. Incidentally,
in spite of the cessation in the publication of
regular and systematic .price-indices, average price-
indices for both town and country (expressed as a
percentage of prices ruling in 1926': were released
from time to time. These were ouite unreliable ahd
became patently mi siending the more the operation of j
rationing was extended and the less the relative
share of the countryside in the consumption of
manufactured goods became; in the course of the
averaging process considerable advances in prices
for the relatively dear manufactured goods allotted to
the countryside were more than offset by smallish
reductions of urban retail-prices. In the first
quarter of 1231 we find the indices of average priced
charged by the consumers' co-operatives already
divided into town and country prices, which, of
course, reflected the wide disparity of the two
price-levels. In the later phase of the First Five-
Year Plan the scant official information on the price-
situation confined itself to such qualitative state¬
ments as the observation that the increase in prices j
towards the end of the first quinquennium was due to i
the extension of the high-priced "commercial" funds
and that only a quarter of the total price-advance
affected rationed supply. (Cf. Eeiman, op.cit., pp.
169-70). Information of this kind is certainly
defective, but it must be realised that full price-
information would have necessitated the enumeration
of a long list of items (various shares, of goods-
funds, prices appertaining to each of them, incidence!
of price-changes on each of them, on individaul
commodity-groups etc.) which the State Planning
Authorities probably withheld both for reasons of
preserving simplicity of information and for political
reasons of their own (e.g., unwillingness to disclose:
the magnitude of inflation). In any case the price-
statistics of the period under review are not very
illuminating.
i
of currency during the critical stages of the First
| Five-Year Plan, it is obvious that under "normal"
| market-conditions prices should have risen by leaps
and bounds. But the system of price-regulation kept them
in check, although it could not altogether prevent
their advance. According to Arnold the price indices
failed to reflect the rise at all accurately. "For
example, the official wholesale price index (1913«100j
on October,!, 1928,1929, and 1930, stood ait 176.1,
181.7, and 186.5, respectively. On "January "1," 1031,
it droppoel-farthor to IP2 .•*+•* There is certainly no
reason to doubt, that this price index was a fairly
accurate indication of the price-movements in "closed"
shops, which distributed their goods at artificially
low prices, but under conditions of commodity-famine
even the privileged sections of the working class had
to supplement their rations in the "free" market, which
the Authorities had to tolerate. According to official
Soviet information, quoted by Arnold, the "free" market
(volny rynok) furnished^in 1928/29, 33 to 36 per cent,
and in 1929/30, 25 to 27 percent, of consumers' goods-
The "specific weight" of purchases by workers in the
volny rynok in 1931 varied in the different districts^
in accordance with the conditions of normed distribution
by the State^from 3 to 16 per cent, expressed in
natura and sometimes reached as much as 50 per cent.
2
of the total value of purchases
/Arnold, op.cit., p. 423.
Ibid., p. 424.
3Turetsky,Planovoie Khoziastvo,1936, vol.3, p. 130.
At the first glance these figures do not quite
match with the official assertion that the influence
|of the private trader was completely liquidated in the
course of the First Five-Year Plan. But it must not he
forgotten that, first of all, the final elimination
of legal private trade did not occur until fairly late
jin the Plan's execution, ( In 1930 the private sector I
|still amounted to some 6 per cent, of the retail turn-:
over, which, however, did not include bazaar trade).
| MS
jit xs not legal private trade, but the volny rynok to
which the population had resort during the "lean years'
of the first quinquennium and where prices, because of
jthe superfluity of cash and the penury of consumers'
goods, were excessively high. This tolerated market
was extremely primitive. "Peasants stood on the strea"
kerbs with baskets of fruit, eggs, etc., which they
sold under constant threat of being "moved on" by the
police, and even of having their stock-in-trade con¬
fiscated. " * The attitude of the police seemed to have
depended on whether there was an adequate co-operative
and State trade network in the districts in question.
It should, therefore, not ba deduced from the figures
relating to the importance of the volny rynok in the
satisfaction of everyday needs of the population, that
this form of supplementary supply was evenly spread
out all over the Union. "In 1930 the inhabitants of
Moscow and Leningrad were able to procure practically
the whole of their absolute necessities from the or¬
ganised State and co-operative shops, while in Siberia
/Hubbard, op.cit., p. 141. An even more depressing
description of the volny ryriok is given by W.H. Cham-
b.erlin, .RussiaIs -Iron Age, Londqn 1935,.u. 109. FurtherInteresting details: Qtoo Scniiler, ProTxLeme aes Kolas
handels, Ostenropa, 1933, Ho. 8,pp.273 et seq.
and other outlying regions - the ordinary industrial
its
proletariat had to buy 30 per cent or more of la&g need
in the free 'market.11 ' It was only on May 6, 1932, that
the Government decided to reorganise this type of
trade end turn it into properly supervised and regulat
bazaars.
The price-levelj obtaining in the veiny rynok was.
of course, not simply a "mechanical resultant" of the
monetary inflation. Owing to the revival of specul¬
ation it stood much higher than the expansion of cash-
circulation warranted. Conditions for speculative ac¬
tivity were ideal in those days. It was in the "free1
market that the ousted Fepman took his refuge, it was
here that the bagman reappeared. Scarce goods changed
hands innumerable times and attained fantastic
prices. According to official data, collected by
Arnold, "the price index of the "free" market rose in
1928-29 (as compared with 1927-28) by 26 percent, and
in the first half of 1929-30, by another 32 percent.
On the whole retail prices in the "private" sector
exceeded those in the "socialized" sector by about
25 percent in 1927-28, by 50 per cent in 1928-29, and
by more than 200 percent in 1929-30. But already by
1930 the prices of a number of commodities in the
private sector exceeded those in the socialized sector
from 12 to 15 times." According to Turetsky the
disparity between the price-level of private specul¬
ative trade and the prices of the co-operative, sector
/ Hubb ard, op.cit., pp.141-42.
XOp.cit., p. 424.
JPlanovoie Khoziastvo, 1936, NoX. 3, p. 130.
If2-
for some foodstuffs amounted to 1,500 per cent, at the
end of 1932 ! "Commercial trade" carried on by the
State (i.e. trade without rations at higher prices)
began to be organised at the end of 1931, but it took
some time until it could exert any influence on the
speculative prices.
In the "closed" shops prices were kept artificially
;low for reasons which will be discussed later. But even
in the sphere of "closed" commodity-distribution the
price-fixing of the Government did not remain omni¬
potent. Although remaining unaltered for longish
periods?"closed" prices used to rise by jerks from
time to time. According to Malcolm Campbell / there
was a particularly sharp rise in the last days of
January 1932, when foodstuffs went up by 25 to 75
per cent., cotton goods by 209 per cent., footwear by
40 to 45 per cent, and articles of clothing by 30 to
|
p5 per cent.; but he admits that owing to the almost
Complete absence of information on prices, he cannot
corroborate his statement. It is relatively easy to
find in the Soviet publications of that period referen¬
ces to price increases in "closed" shops. But they
are invariably interpreted by the official commen¬
tators as deviations from the official regulations.
From the reports of the Committee of Workers' and Peasants'
Control it appears that the grip of price-regulation
on the co-operatives was not so strong after all, for
the "deviations" occurred very often. It is a fact that
the "UEP-spirit" of the co-operatives to which we have
already drawn attention in another context, fostered
tIT'Soviet Economics, London 1933, pp. 166-67. Cf. alsoeiman, op.cit. , p. 168.
speculative tendencies in the "closed" distributive
In addition
centres. On tho other hand there was excessive
bureaucratisation, lack of elasticity and absence of
icost accounting which led to increased commercial on-
icost and, in the last resort, to unauthorised increases'
of prices for rationed goods. But it is hardly proper
to explain this price-raising tendency in "closed"
shops merely by organisational shortcomipgs, however
blatant they may have been. There can be no doubt that
under conditions of a superfluity of cash and limited
supplies of goods, it was extremely difficult to keep
even "closed" prices in check. It was certainly not
only the "NEP-spirit" or the speculative appetites
of the co-operative shop personnel alone which com¬
pelled It to disregard the officially fixed prices.
The economic forces were at least equally strong. If i
a manager of a "closed" shop'obtained supplies in¬
sufficient to satisfy his anticipated ratiohed demand,'
what was he to do ? Reduce the rations or raise
prices ? Some of the managers, no doubt good and
honest people, thought that the latter solution was
a better expedient for striking a temporary balance
between demand and supply. But if they were to adopt
this course they would be denounced as Nepmen. Their
position was indeed not very enviable.
Information on the price-level obtaining in
"commercial"shops is very sparse and all that can be
said about it is that it was much higher than that
ruling in the "closed" shops and lower than the priced
in the "free1 market. According to Pietro Sessa,
Moscow Correspondent of the Tribuna and Stampa,
prices in the "commercial11 shops and on the open
market were at least three to four times higher than
in the closed shops, in some cases ten times higher/
From information supplied by Hubbard, it appears
that in the case of food the differenc^cetween "closed"
and "commercial" prices was much greater than in the
case of clothing, but even within these two broad
commodity-groups the ratio was by no means uniform.
In the last quarter of 1931 a certain reduction of
3
"commercial" prices took place. It is of course
impossible to arrive at any exact measurement of
the "commercial" price-level on the basis of such
defective official data. The only generalisation
which can be hazarded with certitude about the price-
| movements during the First Five-Year Plan is that
i there was, because of the severe shortage of goods
as well as because of monetary and credit inflation,
a substantial rise in prices in those spheres of
commodity-circulation which were not affected by
] rationing measures and that even the "closed" shops
could not easily withstand the pressure of the
i purchasing power which was continually being piled
up behind the rationing system.
/Soviet Economics, op.cit., p.2
i ^Soviet Money and Finance, p. 332; Soviet Trade and
| Distribution, pp. 273-74.
! 3'Turetsky, Planovoie Khoziastvo, 1936, vol. 6, p. 130.
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CHANGES IN THE STANDARD OF LIVING
DURING THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN
Even our first and. very superficial investigation
into the Soviet price-system during the period
under review reveals that prices do not provide any
clue to the important question of the stendad of life
of the Soviet people in those years. Neither is
the nominal level of wages (which had been rising
continuously during the first quinquennium) a reliable
indication of the population's real well-being.
There can be no doubt that, measured in absolute
terms, the output of consumers' goods industries
controlled bv the State increased during the First
Five-Year Plan. The statistical evidence in this
respect is very convincing.' In 1932, according to
official figures, the commodities produced by the
textile industries amounted to 143.7 per cent, of the
1928 output, leather footwear came to 259.3 per cent.,
rubber footwear to 209.4 per cent., kerosene to 204.5
per cent., canned goods to 459.6 per cent. At the
same time, again according to official information,
there was also a considerable increase in the commodity
supplies of agricultural products in the hands of
the socialised sector and an increase in the retail
commodity circulation. How can we reconcile these
official data with the eloquent descriptions, coming
from hostile, friendly and "objective" sources alike,
all of them testifying to the very severe shortage pf
of consumers' goods under the First Five-Year Plan ?
%e?uelfAihntexim6a 8A9R
number of small private and co-operative enterprises
especially in the making-up trades. ... In view
9
f'Z
First of all, there was an increase in population,
i.e.? in the number of mouths that had to be fed, from
154.2 million in 1928 to 165.7 million in 1932. ^
The second and perhaps the most important factor
in the situation was the change in agricultural pro¬
duction. Three main points have to be emphasised in
|
this connection: (1) the wholesale (and apparently in j
X)
most cases wilful) destruction of live stock. (2) Parj-
3
tial harvest failures in 1931 and 1932, partly owing j
to natural causes but certainly accentuated by organised
opposition on the part of the peasants themselves,
especially in the Ukraine, (3) The growth of new
crops. In order to make possible and to further
industrialisation the Soviet Government did all in
its power to foster the cultivation of industrial
and "technical" crops (e.g. , cotton, flax, sugar-
beet, etc.) The area, under these crops was increased
by 6.26 million hectares or by 72.7 per cent, as
compared with the technical crop area before the
First Five-Year Plan period, while the area under
i"
gram increased only by 8e2 per cent.
/Summary etc., op.cit,, table on p. 269.
%Irx one year (1929-30) more than sixty million animals
were slaugthered, being one-quarter of the whole; and
in the course of the next three years (1931-33) over
eighty million more. In 1933, the total live stock
was less than four-ninths of the total in 1929. (Cf.
Febbs., Soviet Communism, op.cit., p. 246.)
3 Cf". statistics of grain production in the Soviet
Handbook, London 1936, p. 174.
^Cf. Webbs, op.cit., p. 247 and p. 283. "The
opposition of the Ukranian population caused, the
failure of the grain-storing plan of 1931, and.still
more so, that of 1932." (Ibid.)
5*Summary etc., op.cit., pp. 159-60.
(continued from previous page): of the lack of statis¬
tical information regarding the contribution of small-scale
and private enterprise to the total flow of consumers1
goods, it is impossible to say whether the total supply
?feg'W8PRa%8ist#aB1fe<.m@aaaigvgg gfn£g-p.s.s.R. ,p.7)!
The third5 factor in the situation was the charge
in the structure of population. The building of
factories, blast-furnaces, and electrical plant
called for additional numbers of workpeople, tie more!
so as the expectations as regards a spectacular rise j
in labour-productivity did not materialise. There
was an exodus from the countryside to the towns and
an absorbtion of the urban unemployed and the youth
by the newly erected industries. According to officia
figures total agricultural population declined from
119v8 million in 1928 to 117.2 million in 1932,
while non-agricultural population, in the seme period.,
increased from 32.4 million to 47.4 million.
What were the effects of these transformations
on the standard of living of the Soviet citizen
duriig the First Five-Year Plan ?
The changes in agricultural production had,
without any doubt whatsoever, the most adverse con¬
sequences on the food-situation of the country. The
truly staggering daugther of live stock was bound to
create a serious shortage of meat and meat products.
Crop failures and the artificial stimulation of
technical crops must have been responsible for the
inadequacy in the supply of grain. Official statemenfl
to the effect that there was a considerable increase
in commodity supplies of agricultural products in
the hands of the socialised sector are highly mis¬
leading, in so far as at a cursory glance they might
suggest an improvement, on the whole , of the food-
supply during the period under review. The mere fact
that the quantity of foodstuffs in the hands of the
ft ate incres.; a"": in tho.'-e years is a natural corollary
of the changes in the distributive system, the elimin¬
ation of legal private trade and the collectivisation
of the countryside, hut without additional information
(which, so far as we are aware, is lacking) it certainl
does not imply that the total supply of food "•tuffs,
increased.
An unqualified answer to the question regarding
the standard of living is made difficult by the
following considerationsj the system of rationing
hakes the attempt to calculate the changes in the
average per capita consumption rather futile. Although
it is probable that the quantity of foodstuffs in
relation to the total population warrants the con¬
clusion that the standard of living in this respect
deteriorated in the paiod under review, it is equally
probable that the preferential treatment of the..
working cjglAss, particularly of those engaged in
constructional tasks insured a tolerably satisfactory
provisioning*^ of this decisive cjalss of Soviet consum¬
ers.' If this is so, it is equally plain that the
real sacrifice was borne by the remaining part of the
a/raC
inhabitants, particularly by the professional^ "non¬
productive1^ as well as by politically and socially
hostile or unreliable groups. Many observers (notably
jV.K. Chamberlin) even go so far as to assert that there
pas a terrible famine in 1932-33 causing some four or
five million deaths beyond normal mortality. Whether
/Cf.~Webbs, op.cit., p. 654.
Quoted by Webbs, op.cit., p. 282.
this statement is an accurate description of actual
i 9
I conditions - and the Webbs have reason to believe
that it is not it seems likely that a. good deal of
the suffering of the peasantry was self-inflicted,^
This introduces another complication. How far, it
may be asked, was the shortage of foodstuffs during
the First Five-Year Plan due to purely economic causes
(i.e. , the transfer of a substantial number of actual
or potential producers of food to industrial con¬
struction, the decreecLstimulation of technical crops
etc.) and how far to socio-political factors (e.g.,
obstruction by the peasantry of the Government's
collectivisation measures). Contributory causes can
also be sought in the inefficiency of the distributive
system and in ordinary harvest-failures. And is it
not also correct to maintain that the increase in
heavy constructional and buildirg activity meant that
the people concerned had to eat more in order (at
least) to keep their efficiency ? ~ in which case
there was also a physiological reason for the relative
shortage of foodstuffs. Furthermore it must not be
forgotten that because of the planned opening-up and
the productive development of outlying regions as well
a.s the setting up of numerous constructional centres
within the country, there was marked unevenness in
distribution of the available stock of consumers'
goods^ with the result that there was comparative
plenty in some parts of the country, and acute penury
in others. Yet another consideration is that the
degree of the shortage of foodstuffs under the First
/Ibid., pp. 282-83.
%/L. Fischer quoted by Webbs, op.cit., p. 283.
: Five-Year Plan varied in different years. It was,
e.g., more serious in 1932, when thg£>olitical oppos¬
ition of the peasantry reached its climax and the
sowing campaign failed than, say, in 1930 where there
was a particularly and exceptionally good harvest.
The above reasoning is in part applicable also
to the question of the supply of the population with
consumers' goods other than food. Still, there are
special causes for the shortage in manufactured
goods of daily use, which was undoubtedly the common
experience, in varying degrees, of the Soviet citizen
in the course of executing the"self-Denial Plan"' The
population-shift from the countryside to the towns
meant a decisive break with past traditions and
fht,
habits. It is a well-known fact that g family of an
Tt,-
industrial worker spends more on clothing tha# that
of s. peasant. This was particularly true of Russia
where, prior to the beginning of industrialisation,
the requirements of the peasantry in matters of
clothing and footwear w£» most primitive. In summer
the muzhik wore trousers and a shirt made of cheap
fabric and went about bare-footed. In winter, all
he needed in addition was, perhaps, a heavy overcoat
(lined, maybe, with sheepskin), a cap and felt boots
(or even plaited grass shoes). The demands of the
urban workers, on the other hand, were always slightljg
more pretentious than this and it is therefore not
surprising that the increase in the number of the
proletariat caused a severe shortage in such things
/Comp. Webbs, op.cit., p. 655
as clothing and footwear, despite the absolute
increase in the production of these articles. And
!there was, of course, concurrently, a cultured advance
jail along which increased and altered the demands of
|the Soviet population as a whole. Fore will'be said
about this as well as about the importance of the
increased supply of social and cultural services,
amenities, amusements etc
In conclusion it may be summarised that the
First Five-Year Plan implied very real sacrifices for
the people. There was acute shortage of foodstuffs,
still relative shortage of manufactured of'monufaoturodl
goods and a dearth of consumers' goods which was
uneoually felt by various classes of the copulation<J C. .L.
and. in different parts.of the Union. Any attempt to
calculate the changes in average per capita consumption
1
lis futile. Lastly, the whole basis of comparison
I of the standards of living underwent a radical
transformation in the course of the First Five-Year
Plan.
/Webbs, op.cit., p.656.
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SKE/'~;CTIV:] DISTRIBUTION
UNDER RlE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN'
Beginnings of'Closed" Supply.
V/e have now reached a stage when we can review
the history, the purpose and the consequences of
rationing.
The original reason which compelled, the Soviet
Government to introduce rationing wai/the dearth of
agricultural products, mainly of foodstuffs, which
made itself felt in the years 1927-1929. We know
that the productive capacity of the small-scale
peasant husbandry lagged behind the requirements of
industry. According to Hubbard^ the position was
aggravated by the campaign against the kulaks which
was a frequent reason for the subdivision of the
3/
larger peasant farms. This development soon led to
a
a rise in prices for agricultural products which was
particularly pronounced in the private sector where
the index (1913=100) jumped up from 207 in 1926/27 to
247 in 1927/28 and to 367 in 1928, the corresponding
A
figures for industrial produce being 242, 242, 269/
As can be seen, it was this time an industrial
scissors'-crisis that could be observed since 1927/28
in the retail-price-sphere. The officially fixed
buying-prices paid by the State agencies to the
peasants remained relatively low, however, although
there were certain increases in the prices paid for
grain and flax.^" Amidst growing scarcity the volume
of private purchases of grain grew during* the years
3af
/Soviet Trade and Distribution, op.cit.,p.25.
Jtlbid. Comp. Hoover,op.cit. , p. 83.3 Hubbard,ibid.
4/La Monnaie et le Systeme des Prix en U.R.S.S. ,op.cit^ ,pe21,
^"Hubbard, op.cit., p. 25.
/) W$
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1828 and 1929, despite the most stringent restrictions
which were imposed upon them.
The advance in prices for foodstuffs was thus
accentuated by private speculation and was particular!
marked in private shops. But there is sufficient
evidence to show that in the socialised sector prices
advanced as well. As could be expected, the price-
boom was particularly acute in the consuming regions
and in the big towns and cities.
The launching of the First Five-Year Plan with
its high rate of industrialisation introduced manifold
complicated problems of distribution,. which^in the
opinion of the Soviet planners, could never have been
solved satisfactorily by the free play of market for¬
ces. The greater number of workers employed in in¬
dustry necessitated an increase in the allocation of
wage-funds. Total money income of the working
population rose by leaps and bounds while the supply
of the vital foodstuffs declined. There arose the
phenomenon of unused purchasing power. People had
to be turned away from the shops, after a few for¬
tunate buyers who happened to have come early had
used up the very scant supplies. The co-operatives, j
naturally, tended to close their doors to non-members,
This state of affairs# soon resulted in gross social
injustices, since only the relatively well-to-do were
out
in a position to satisfy their requirements wn the
dwindling number of private stalls etc. at very high
prices, utterly out of reach for the average Soviet
worker.
Under these circumstances the Authorities were
compelled to introduce, or rather re-introduce, a
system of' rationed supply. According to Molotov
(speech made on November 25, 1934, published in the
Pravda of hovem^Jpr 30, 1934) special measures (viz.,
the introduction of food-cards etc.) had to be taken
with a view to preventing industry from breaking
down because of the inadequacy of agriculture and
to supplying the inhabitants of the towns and
especially the major industrial centres as well as
certain classes of workers with bread and other
foodstuff's at prices fixed by the State.
It is important to realise that,in contradis¬
tinction to the rationing of the days of War Communistn
which functioned under the conditions of stagnating
production and organisational chaos with the object
of serving the needs of the war economy and of
among the workers I
gratifying the crude equalitarian principle/, rationing
under the First Five-Year Plan had as one of its main
objects the additional stimulation of an expanding
production by means of granting social and. geographi¬
cal privileges under the conditions of a. temporary
shortage of foodstuffs and of certain manufactured
consumers' goods. Besides, and again in contrast
to rationing under War Communism, the new system of
supply, although it weakened the importance of money,;
did not destroy the monetary system altogether. On
-
the contrary, the Government tried, as hard as it
could , to keep it intact so as to give some real
|
meaning to wage-differentiation and to preserve the
skeleton of economic calculation. Under the First
fcr
Five-Year Plan all rations had to be paid/in money,
[while under War Communism rations were distributed fre|<
of charge.
Entirely new features were introduced by the
growth of production. From the point of view of suppljy
and distribution the geographical distribution of
productive resources under the First Five-Year Plan
meant that preferential treatment had to be accorded
to certain regions. "To distribute the State resource!;
on the basis of -equality would have been tantamount
to refusing to supply the important new regions, to
withholding privileges from the most important
constitution jobs. A change had to be made in the old
system of planning; the role of the State in the dis-
/
tribution of goods had to be strengthened."
Another noteworthy principle of the new system
of selective distribution was to link supply with
Si
production. Under the conditions of goods-famine
it was thought not only socially just but also pol¬
itically expedient to give preferential treatment to
those sections of the toiling masses who were deemed
to be the most important in fulfilling the difficult
teaks of the Plan and who had, it was claimed, to ob¬
tain compensation for the hardships and for the
purely physical strain which the heavy constructional
jobs called forth.
/Yodel, op.cit., pp. 55-56.
^During the period of War Communism there had been
sporadic attempts (chiefly at Lenin's instigation) to
link supply with productive results,but on the whole |Lt
can be said that in those days the decisive criterion
of privileged supply was the socio-political status o
i the recipient. Under the First Five-Year Plan all thjis
changed or, at least, was supposed to change, for the
new system did not end with rationed distribution pur
and simple but was supplemented by the so-called "clo
supply in the factories. (Cf. text below). Thus, a




Nodel summarises the principles of the new
system of supply which was re-organised with the
adoption of the First Five-Year Plan thus:
"There were three principles: (1) To single opt
particularly the main industrial regions, the new
construction jobs and the most important factories,
creating a number of privileges for them through the
system of supply; (2) in the factories themselves to
single out the skilled workers and to offer them
better conditions as regards supply, compared with
other workers; (3) to send large quantities of in¬
dustrial goods destined for the village to those
regions where the peasants had larger stocks to sell
to the state and co-operative organisations, where
they had more money earned honestly rather than by
speculation." ^
is
From Eubbardfe account it appears that the in¬
troduction of normed supply was not effected by
virtue of a single Government enactment, but proceeded
rather slowly, locally and piece-meal. To our mind
this suggests a certain hesitancy and unwillingness
on the part of the Authorities to adopt these
measures and an indication that they had to be put
into force by the pressure of circumstances.
In the course of its existence rationing seems
to have undergone several modifications and according
3
to Chamberlin there was never any hard and fast proe
/Nodel, op.clt., pp. 56-157.
2/0p.cit. (viz., Soviet Trade and Distribution),pp.28 e
3Russia's Iron Age, pp. 109 et seq.
(continued from previous page): been, was not entitl
to a special ration. On the contrary, the factory
ijianagement had the powers to penalise him by reducing




hibition to purchase foodstuffs from other sources,
andjin the measure that other forms of supply like
"commercial" shops and bazaars developed, rationing
became less stringent.^
The first commodity to be rationed was (as could
be expected) bread, and the first measure of rationing
this vital foodstuff was introduced (again naturally)
in one of the bigger cities, viz., in Leningrad. Here
the City Soviet adopted a resolution to this effect
in Novermber 1928, but apparently it took a long time
until the requisite organisational preparations were
completed, for rat longed distribution of bread in
Us
Leningrad started only in March 1929.
The resolution of the Moscow City Soviet to
introduce rationing, passed on February 19, 1929,
contained certain noteworthy provisions: bread was to
be supplied to the working population against ration
books,and at increased prices to non-workers: as
regards other deficit goods the practice of preferen-
jtial treatment of members of co-operative organisatior
was to be continued. (This implies that semi-
rationing measures of this nature had been in
operation before). In accordance with the above
resolution the Moscow District Union of Consumers'
Co-operatives established ration books for four
categories of consumers.
Ration^jfed distribution of goods soon spread to
/This diouki . hot be confused with de-rationing which
|will be discussed below.
2/Hubbard,Soviet Trade and Distribution, p. 30.
J Ibid., p. 31 where further details may be found.
other big cities like Kharkov and Kiev and, before
.one; affected the whole country. After a while it
'-y
was found necessary to extend the measures to other
important foodstuffs, like sugar, tea, groats, vegetal
oil, butter, herring, meat, potatoes, eggs, macaroni,
preserves, pastry and sweets, and subsequently also
to non-foodstuffs (textile and soap being the first
articles of this category to be subjected to rationing
in Moscow). Thus, towards the latter half of the
First Five-year Plan (1831) the system of rationed
distribution was almost universal in the towns.' As
time went on, its organisation became more and more
ambitious and the geographical and productive
refinements of selective supply received increasing
attention.
In essence rationing meant the distribution at
le
/Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution, op.cit. ,p.31.
"The supply of industrial goods set aside for rural
consumption was distributed by districts according
to the results of the grain collections, preference
in distribution to individuals being given to poor
peasants, members of co-operative societies and
peasants who were earliest to sell their grain to the
State and co-operative collecting organs. In order
to stimulate the cultivation of cotton, grain was
supplied to the peasants of the cotton-growing regions
of Central Asia in proportion to the amount of cotton
they produced. Cereal foodstuffs were also supplied
to peasants engaged in fishing, fur-trapping, timber-
felling end so on in order to relieve them of the
necessity of growing their own food supply. The dis¬
tribution of foodstuffs to this class of consumer was
not organised on a basis of individual ration cards as
in the case of the industrial workers, but supplies were
made available to the collective body or co-operative
in proportion to the quantity of produce, goods, or
services supplied or rendered to the Government by the
peasants collectively. It is therefore impossible to
say accurately how many persons received food from the
Government at ration rates under this system; but it i
estimated that, in all, some 25 million peasants and
dependents may have been thus entitled to Government
food rations." (Ibid., pp. 31-32). This system of
distributing manufactured goods to the peasants at
ration prices was called "Otovarivanie"( Cf. Hubbard,
op.cit. , p. 170 and p. 374).
|fixed and particularly low prices of normed amounts
of the principal foodstuffs and of certain manufactured
articles to the wage-earning tend salaried inhabitants
of the towns, but also to certain other categories of
urban consumers such.as students, State pensioners,
members of handic^ft artels etc. Altogether there
were four categories of recipients and the rations
varied in each of the categories, the manual workers
representing the most favoured class.^
The scope of rationing may be gleaned from figures
supplied by Molotov: in 1930 the number of the
beneficiaries, including the dependents, amounted to
26 million and in 1934 (the last year of rationing)
it rose to some 50 million, being approximately a
third of the toted, population.^
The physical content of the ration was constantly
changing, but the following table is illustrative of
the approximate quantities:
FOOD RATION FOR THE MONTH OF APRIL 1930^'
| Bread













400 grams per day
2,200 " "
1,200 " " month
25 " " "
300 " " "
800 " " 11
On the whole, there was a considerable latitude
in the actual carryipg out of rationing by the variou,^
distributive centres. Sometimes it happened that
there was a plentiful supply of vegetables and fruit
/"in Moscow in 1930 the worker-class formed 34 per ce
of the whole population, but it consumed the following
percentages of the total amount of the commodities di
| tributed under the ration system: Bread 47 per cent
Groats 56 per cent . Macaroni 56 per cent . Meat'47 p
Herrings 55 " " nn+.+.p-r 4-3 n n
Vegetable oils 45 per cent." (Hubbard, op.cit.,p.34)
2/Pravda, 25.11.34. 3 38 million at the height of
I War Communism. ^Hoover, op.cit., p. 253.
"it
sr cent y
which could then "be obtained without any formalities.
At other times informal rations were introduced/ In
|times of special stringency the rations were often
jcurtailed. The Authorities tried to keep the "bread
Iration constant, but even this had to be reduced in
£
certain provincial centres when supplies ran short.
Members of co-operative societies enjoyed certain
additional, privileges, e.g., in the case of tea and
[butter. Milk was supplied to children only, and even
this was most irregular.^ "So far as foodstuffs were
concerned the worker's ration-book was on the same
principle with which the citizens of the belligerent
countries became familiar during the war. But...the
right to buy, say, a shirt or a pair of boots was
normally a matter of obtaining a certificate or permit
frorn some authority." ^
As 'can be seen from the above statistics the
rations were extremely scant and it is therefore not
surprising that they had to be supplemented in private
shops, after their suppression on the "free" market
and subsequently to an increasing degree also in
"commercial1 shops. Sometimes it is difficult to
understand why the Government aimed at the complete
extermination of legal- private commerce just at a
timer when the private dealer could, more than ever,
perform a Useful economic function and tide the Soviet
citizen over a very hard time. Or were political con¬
siderations all-powerful. ?
3(x
d-Ioover, op.cit., p. 254. -Zchamberl in, op.cit. ,p.llQ.
,JHoover, op.cit., p. 254. ^The End of Rationing and
the Standard of Living in the Soviet Union, Monograph-
No. 9 of the School of Slavonic Studies,London 1935,p.13.
Comparison with average food-consumption of British
workers to be found ibid.,pp.14-15.
Still, it would be a mistake to assume that
rations alone exhausted, the system of normed food-
supply. The Authorities tried, with a not incon¬
siderable success,to make up the paucity of actual
food rations by the development of public catering to
whose numeriehi:.achievements under the First "Piati-
lethal attention has already been drawn. The cheap
meals which the population received were in addition
to the food on their ration cards/ The factory
canteens and dining halls were of a "closed" type,
i.e., restricted to the employees.of a particular
factory a.nd charging especially low prices, while
open restaurants and refreshment rooms (charging
higher prices) were accessible to the general public.
To a certain extent the system of public catering;
was without the framework of rationed and centralised
supply. It is true that most of the food served by
the communal feeding establishments was supplied by
1
the State, but the more communal feeding grew, the
more difficult it became for the Authorities to allot
sufficient stocks of foodstuffs for this purpose. It
was chiefly In order to replenish the very limited
supplies earmarked for publico catering that the
Government tried to induce the various Z.E.K. and
O.P..S. to develop their own autonomous food bases.
Before discussing the details of this very
interesting aspect of Soviet distribution under
Integral Planning, it might be useful, to analyse the
/Hoover, op.cit., p. 255i Hubbard, op.cit., p. 39.
XHodel, op.cit., p. 144.
•considerations which prompted. the Authorities to
jlay so much stress on the importance of autonomous
land, local food supply.
The Sac our ay; eme nt o f L o c al
Food Supply under Rationing , "
It was clear to the Soviet Government that
nfttimately the solution of the scarcity-problem in
foodstuffs could only be attained by the re-organisation
|aiid the increase of agricultural production, particu¬
larly that of grain, and cattle-breeding, since the
I most palpable dearth, could be experienced in bread,
meat and such essential animal products like butter
land milk. On the other hand the leaders of the Soviet
State realised that such a process (especially in
reference to cattle-breeding) had by necessity to be
of a father protracted duration. Thus, while the
Government embarked, with the utmost energy and ruth-
lessness, upon this long-term programme, it decided
to encourage at the same time the setting up of a
secondary or subsidiary food-base, which could be
built up in a relatively short space of time. This
food-base was intended to consist of such items as
I fowl, rabbits, poultry, eggs and all kinds of vegetables,
| The cultivation of this produce did not require much
| capital expenditure, mechanisation or technical
skill; besides, its "turnover" was much more rapid
than that of other agricultural produce.
At first people did not appreciate the important
of these plans and even went so far as to ridicule
i
them. This can be explained as a kind of nsvcholomica
^Furthermore it was suggested to commence with a small
scale breeding of horned cattle and pigs.
inhibition, the course of the First Piatiletka thp
Soviet citizens had. become so accustomed to think in
gigantic terms that it appeared rather anting to
some of them to apply their- energies to the collection •
of a few himdred eggs, to breed rabbits or to plant
cabbages.*
The Authorities pleaded indefatigably for the
vital importance of local supplies in the system of
centralised distribution under the conditions of the
inadequacy of the main food-base.
Their efforts were not in vain. According to
3
Model the independent activities m obtaining
supplies enabled the factory-kitchens and dining-
rooms to increase their staple supplies by 15 to 25
per cent.
The organisation of local or autonomous supply
was accomplished by means of purchases of food from
collective farms within the scheme of decentralised
collections and also through the development by the
supply establishments of their own farms, vegetable
gardens and the like.
First, the organisation of vegetable gardens
was entrusted to the consumers' co-operatives. Later
on this tsfc.st was taken over by the O.E.S. and the
Communal Feeding Department of the Narkomsnab, viz.,
the Glavnarpit.^But the extent of the letter's
activities was rather- insignificant ( 2 per cent
of the total sown area of autonomous vegetable gar-
dens), the remainder being pretty equally divided
ABolotin, Questions of Supply, Moscow 1934, (R),p. 54.
IFor Party Resolutions on this subject cf. Economics
of Soviet Trade,op.cit., p. 262* .3 Op.cit., p. 144,
i/Xbid. , p. 264. 5" (Y . ,,
5/6
I between the consumers' co-operatives and the O.P.S. ^
*
The importance of local sup lies can be gauged
| bv the fact that the bulk of the demand of urban
centres for vegetables and potatoes was satisfied in
this way.^The sown area uiider vegetables and potatoes
! belonging to the co-operative farms was greater than j.
| that under the supervision of any other State
organisation concerned with the cultivation of these
crops.
At the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan
the number of milk-cows and pigs in possession of
the co-operatives took the second place in the system;
of State farms, despite the fact that a considerable
I number of co-operative farms had, by that time, been j
transferred to the 0.7 .3* In 1S34 there were 2514
I O.R.S. farms with a total area, of nearly 6.5 million
j acres, owning about 250,000 cattle and about 370,000
I pigs.7
i
It was Stalin who had demanded the creation
round each industrial and urban settlement of a belt
of food-supply. Of course, it had never been the
j intention of the Soviet Government to make these
entirely j
| industrial centres /self-sufficient. Under the con-
| ditions of the First Five-Year plan these bases
j became additional sources of supply. But even then
■
/Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit. , pp. 264 et seq.
ZThese supplies were being; distributed both through
the dining halls and the shops of the O.R.S. and the
| Z.R.K. JSconomics of Soviet Trade, np.cit. ,
i p. 265. From these figures it should novgimagined,
however, that yields per hectare and other qualitative
indices of these local-supply-farms were high. The
contrary is the case.
| ^Hubbard, Soviet Trade and Distribution, op.cit,.,p.39.
i For further details cf. Questioris of Supply, Moscow
| 1934, (R).
it was stressed that they would remain permanent
features of co-operative activity in the U.S.S.R.
Later, when the food-situation became less acute, the
| ' j
iGovernment continued to sponsor the development of
local supply, which is generally useful for the con¬
sumption by the urban population of early or perishable
i
vegetables, fruit and the like, and is doubly valuable
in a country where the recovery in transportation has,
!so far, lagged behind the rhythm of the general economic
I advance. It is gratifying to note that the Soviet
jplanners realised the limits of centralised planning
j end made a virtue of necessity.
Privileged Supply of Workers.
To return to our survey of rationing, we must
now dwell more fully on the principle of the privileged
supply of workers. Lenin's plan of linking up pro¬
ductive results with supply, which remained to all
intents and purposes a dead letter under War Comnunism,
..
came again to the forefront in the course of the First
Five-Year Plan. Although many people entertained the
belief that^ after the liquidation of the NEP and of
private speculation-Soviet Russia was proceeding along
the road of equal itaxianism in matters of remuneration
and food, their illusions and hopes were dispelled by
the Government. The first Piatiletka was to become
a period when remuneration depended on the performance
of the individual worker and of specific industrial
units. We know already that the successful fulfil¬
ment of the First Five-Year Plan was based on the
supposition that productivity of labour would go up
jby leaps and bounds. The Soviet planners were, of
course, not so naive as to think that efficiency
would increase on the strength only of socialist
enthusiasm. It is true that "socialist competition"
between several, factories for the' best results (which
made its appearance in 1929) relied to a great extent
on the altruistic motives of the workers concerned,
jbut especially later when the expected phenomenal
increases in the productivity of labour failed to
materialise, the Soviet•planners came to recognise
|the great practical value of payment by results.
The.wage-policy of the First Five-Year Plan
|amounted to a complete renunciation of all tendencies
it » /
of uravnilovka m the remuneration of labour. Wages
!differed according to the various classes of workers
(unskilled and skilled, lower grade and high-grade
|specialists, employees etc.) and within these broad
I groups there were several categories (as many as
five in the case of skilled workers). At the same
time it was sought to extend the system of piece -
!work to as many factories as possible.
Many foreign observers interpreted this change
in Soviet wage-policy as an endorsement, pure and
simple, of capitalist principles of remuneration.
! Apparently they had expected an increasing equali'ty
| and communal sharing, but instead they had to register
the emergence, within the working class, of fairly
/Cf., e.g., Wages-Policy in Soviet Russia by S.
Lawford Childs and A.A. Crottet, Economic History,
January 1932, pp. 442-60.
This re-orientation was not easy and the "official
line" of the Party had to fight very hard to secure
its adoption. The strongest opponents of wage-
differentiation belonged to the Left Opposition.
well-defined income-strata. It is true that the in¬
troduction of vage-dif 'erentiation meant the recog¬
nition of the value of monetae stimuli with regard
to people who (it appeared) could not so easily
jettison the powerful 'influence of the profit-motive
and^Tndividual enrichment from their mental make-up.
Cur interest in the wage-system of the first
quinquennium is cue to its interdependence with the
Plan's machinery of selective supply. Under condition
of a goods-shortage the policy of expanding mo^ptary [
payments had its obvious dangers. Prices would kavttb
skyrocket, the purchasing power of the rouble would
fall and the worker would find tkt what appeared to
him a high nominal wage did not come to much in real
terms. Furthermore, it is likely that under such
conditions the better paid workers, salaried employees
and officials would try to buy up, as quickly as
possible, all available supplies, so that the lower
pad toilers would have found it difficult to procure
the necessaries of life and might have revolted
against such a state of affairs.
Therefore the system of differentiated scales
of wages eiccording to the quantity and quality of
work performed had to be linked up with rationing anc.
selective distribution.
Originally^there seems to have been a reluctance
to introduce wide differences in money wages and to
rely on selective distribution alone as a stimulus
in production. But as time went on, a combination,
a-judicious mixing of both incentives was found to
be more efficacious. By this means a certain
320
minimum standard of living was ensured to the un~
! skilled, worker (the more so as he in particular, felt
deductions
the various wage-.instruotione which were made to help
the financing of industry), while supplementary
iS * |
I privileges in supply the skilled grades accentuated
o{ ii/dS fl+o-tn&Jkj
I the monetary differences yijssg-e range, ^ga^much narrower
than in capitalist countries. Besides, rationing
: assured that&mong the relatively well-to-do only
those benefited by way of sundry preferences, amenities
,and superior service, who earned their money by what
the Soviet State considered to be honest work and by
I work of a type deemed important for the country's
industrialisation. "Parasitic" elements, speculators
iand even the professional and intellectual groups
were forced to avail themselves of the "free" market
and the "commercial" shops to a much greater degree
than the working class. Thus, by directing the flow
of supplies^rationing effected a certain re-distribution
of the national income so as.on the one hand to
?
mitigate the inequalities for the lower-paid sections ;
of the Soviet working; class, and on the other hand to
make such monetary additions to the wage in the higher
income-groups of the proletariat as would transform
preferential supply into a direct incentive to labour-*
|productivity. The more the rouble depreciated in value ,
the less attractive becaiyve the monetary reward to
j thr skilled worker. Thus he judged his standard of
j
living not by whether or not he had "plenty of money",
but by the extent and forms of the various privileges
jwhich he received in his facotry in addition; to his
normal ration.
37,! ■
What forms did these privileges etc. take in
; actual practice ?
Generally .speaking, the closed factory co¬
operatives and then the O.R.S. received preferential
treatment. According to Paul they had priority in
the supply of rare commodities and, on the whole, of
the best class of goods. The members were entitled i
to place orders in advance for certain na nufactured
I articles which saved waiting. Payment was not by cash!
: but by chit, the amount of the bill being deducted
from the worker's pay-roll.
But there were also differences within the
factory itself. As a rule the supplementary supplies
of the O.R.S. and the Z.R.K. were primarily destined
for distribution among the workers belonging to the
leading departments and notably among the shock-
brigaders, the"udarniki". These obtained additional
| supplies, premiums, superior meals (sometimes at
j reduced prices) , better and quicker service/ By this!
I means it was hoped to raise the worker's"material !
interestedness" in his work, make him feel that the
State was directly concerned about his welfare and
/"Rationing usually implies leveling. Since 1931,
however, the Soviet policy has been to discourage very
strongly any leveling tendencies in wage and salary
payments, on the ground that productivity of labour-
depends on payment according ito merit. So, when j
rationing destroyed to some extent the effectiveness j
of differential Me&e and salary scales, new forms
of inequality were created in the form of the "closed
store" and the "closed dining room". -Alien I visited
Magnitogorsk I found a whole hierarchy of dining roomfe
in operation. There were eating places of at lead,
five different grades, with perhaps others of which
I did not learn. The distinction between them was
not one of price so much as of the class of diners
who were qualified to eat in each one." (W.H. Chamber^
lin, Russia's Iron Age, p. 112; cf. also ±>id., p.271).
Details of different menus for ordinary workers and
"udarniki" may be found in Bolotin, Questions of
Suraplv.op.cit.,pp.33 et seq.
thus (perhaps) slowly change his attitude towards labojur
by making him realise the ethical significance of
work, in a factory that was neither owned by privateV U i.
capitalists nor run for private profit.
The link between productivity of labour aid
supply was also achieved in a negative way. For, in
case of breeches of labour-discipline the culprits ver<
penalised by the forfeiture of their right to centralized
supply, to the use of factory dining halls etc. The
factory administration was invested with fairly wide
powers of thus dealing with such offences. One of the)
most common offences of this type during the period
under review was the so-called fluidity of labour,
i.e.,the tendency for workers to change from one job
to another, thus upsetting productive activity in
the factory which they decided to leave and loosing
f considerable time in finding and adapting themselves
|to their new occupations.^ It was extremely difficult
to combat this sort of thing, because labour, es-
|
peciallv skilled labour, was very scarce in those
days. Among the government's various methods to
stop these breaches of discipline, differentiation
of supply (which affected the worker's most sensitive ;





In some sections of popular opinion Socialism is j
/It is, .of course, not true to say that the excessive!
fluidity of labour was entirely due to the irrespon¬
sible attitude of the workers. Bad working conditions
and the unevenness in supply in different regions were
to a great extent responsible for the worker's care¬
lessness and nonchalance.
I associated with the restriction of choice .for
the consumer. One of the causes of what we think to
l
he an erroneous view is a misunderstanding of early
} socialist literature.f Another^and perhaps more
; weighty reason is the state of rationing in the
; U.S.3.P.. during the First Piatiletka. After all, the
! Soviet Union claims to he the only country in the
| world which is building up socialism and the public
! mind, helped by misinformed or biased reports, often
I regards some of the transient features of the Soviet j
economy as essentials of any socialist regime.
.
Our discussion of the system of selective supply
I during the first quinquennium tried to bring out the j
j reasons which prompted the Soviet planners to
introduce that system. It is true that there were
j groups in the Communist Party (commonly described
as the Left Opposition) which regarded rationing as
a bridge ac^ross to direct communist distribution
and it was by reference to these views that many of
the foreign observers tried to corroborate their
verdict that rationing of the Soviet type was a
constituent part of Communist society.
The truth with regard to rationing seems to be
that it was (as we have seem from our brief his¬
torical outline) adopted with the greatest of un-
3X5
^The. question as to whether a socialist economy is
compatible with the freedom of the consumer is reserved) for
later discussion.
&The forces of the Left Opposition in Soviet Russia
had at times been certainly very powerful (cf.,e.g.,
p.Sft) but since the defeat of Trotsky and the decisicjn
of the Party to continue with, and accelerate, the
process of industrialisation they have never represen¬
ted a strong political force. The official Stalinist:
group is partly to blame for the exaggeration of the !
importance of the Left Opposition. (Cornp. our remarks
on p. ).
willingness. Moreover, responsible Soviet' economists j
admitted from the outset that they were far from
willing
| vaulting to retain rationing when the reasons that had j
prompted its adoption had disappeared. They emphasised
j again and again that the measure was only a. temporary j
! one.
Indeed it would be a gloomy reflection to imagine
a socialist society afflicted with rationing, especially
j
j with Soviet rationing; of the first arid yf part of
|the Second five-Year Plan.
Every kind of rationing is a most cumbersome
r*"
and costly procedure distributing consumers' goods.
Not only does its compulsory assortment destroy the
freedom of the consumer to pick and choose, but it
makes the procedure of satisfying one's needs exceedingly
dreary. It necessitates the utmost centralisation
of supply^which is not always easy to achieve because
of the perishable nature of the commodities and calls
for an immense amount of administrative and clerical
work. All these points could be amply illustrated
by examples drawn from the experience of European
war-economy. Rationing is a direct outcome of en
actual or expected shortage of goods and it is only
resorted to in case of utter need. As commonly
understood,rationing is really a.military measure
and has nothing whatsoever to do with socialism,
unless we admit that socialism could exist under
conditions of a permanent shortage of goods, an
admission which'runs counter to the accepted definition
of the concept.
However detailed and careful the plans are which
govern the execution of a rationing scheme, its main
difficulties ere perhaps to he ascribed to the human :
element. Rationing, by its very nature, puts a
premium on red tape, inefficiency and excessive
bureaucratisation. Elements of corruption are often
present and become stronger the more acute the
scarcity
ponury of goods. Abusesnas these occur even in
countries where the standards of efficiency and
honesty of public officials and sales-staffs are
high.
From our knowledge of the- past history of trade |
and distribution in Russia before and after the
Revolution.and taking into consideration the re-
level of
latively low/efficiency prevailing in the U.S.S.R.^
it is not difficult to imagine that all these in¬
herent weaknesses and abuses of rationing became most
pronounced under the First Five-year Plan J
The Soviet planners did not deny that these
undesirable phenomena existed; their publications
dealing with the subject of trade and distribution
of that period discuss them openly and in great
detail.
Some of the weaknesses of rationed supply which
made themselves felt almost as soon as the system was
introduced can be said to have been structural, in
the sense, that is, that they could not have been
avoided under any circumstances. To begin with,
there was a retardation in goods-circulation, its
/This despite the fact that Soviet rationing was in
an important sense more favourably placed than war¬
time rationing of a capitalist State, since in the
U.S.S.R. there were no private middlemen and rationirig
was not grafted on to private trade.
3>r
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"freezing", as it was described, and a decrease in
the "productivity" of the sales-staffs. In 1931 an
¥examination :uJc{5 the running of Leningrad bakeries
revealed that 'the checkirg of the various chits,
orders and ration-books took about the same time as
the actual delivery of bread to the customer/ This
meant that the productivity of labour- had been reduced
by half !
Rationing thus causerfa considerable increase in
distributive costs. Not only had the distributive
centres to employ a permanent staff of officials
attending only to the routine clerical side of
rationing, but temporary staffs had to be engaged as
well in times of the handing out of the monthly ratidns.
Printing costs of co-operative and State establish¬
ments went up because of the many notices, ration-
cards and entry-books which had to be prepared, so
as to be able to register the Requirements of scores
of millions. Additional premises had to be obtained
for purposes of housing the extra staffs.
From the point of view of the customers the
introduction of normed distribution meant an enormous
iJtfjdL
waste of timely energy and imposed a very heavy ner¬
vous strain indbed. As Chamberlin justly remarks,
"as against the legal shortening of the working day,
by comparison with pre-war conditions, one must set ;
X/
the dreary hours which are wasted m queues..."
"Along with rationing, queues have come to play a Z
large part in the life of the man, or still more of j
the woman, in the streets in Moscow. It would be
ZC4orelit(, and Malkis, Soviet Trade, 1933, (R),p.89.
^Russia's Iron Age, op.cit. ,p. 279. .'Ibid. , p. III.
difficult to think of anything for which queues have j
<rve /
• not been formed at time or another.,,"
All this resulted in a large-sc£^.e waste of
Social labour in the distributive sphere, accentuated!
by the extraordinary and typically Russian slowness
£
of the sales-personnel. According to the Webbs,
the queues were not only due to the inadequacy of
supplies, but to inadequacy in the number of shops,
the length of selling counters and in the standing
room for the customers. It is plain that if an
inefficient and lazy personnel is called upon to
carry out a most complicated system of rationing
within primitive shops, the resets are bound to be
catastrophic. Moreover, rationing had seemingly
the most demoralising effects on salesmen. Since
! fchxy were assured of constant danand, which was
likely to exceed the avail^le supply, they tended
to lof/se all interest in, and reject for, the
wellbeing and the individual wishes of the consumers j
The whole act of distribution became "depersonalised'*
end if the customer timidly complained, the salesman
quoted the favourite motto of those days "Take it
or leave it". Thus, while the Soviet rulers claimedl
to have abolished the exploitation of the working
class, they had certainly intensified the ex¬
ploitation of the consumer.
The weaknesses and abuses of rationing became
particularly pronounced in the years 1930 and 1931.
T&e Left Opposition then certainly attempted to make.
.
_ I
a virtu/e out of the necessity for rationing. Almost!
7lbid., p7 113.
^Op.cit., pp. 324-25.
jail import-nt goods destined for the supply of town and .
,country came on the "reserved list". Stocks of goods j
iearmarked as an exchange-equivalent foi* agricultural
collections (by way of "Otovarivanie") lay idle in
[the rural warehouses so long as the obligations of
ispecific agricultural suppliers (e.g.. of wool) were I
not fulfilled, in spite of the fact that there was a
:shortage in manufactured goods to pay other agricul¬
tural suppliers (e.g., of wheat) who had prom/ffcly
complied with their stipulated obligations.
A system of centralised distribution where all
|movements of goods are accounted for exclusively by
| specific orders, could wotk fairly simply and success-]
]fully (in theory, at least) on the supposition of
[strict fulfilment of planned deliveries at both ends.
Under the then existing conditions there was, of course,
jnothing like'dovetailing of the two sides of supply.
! Even under the most ideal conditions it is difficult ]
to expect agriculture to conform exactly to planned S
expectations and generally^it can be reasonably argued
that.even under the most perfect circumstances„mal-9 J
I
adjustments the mechanism of planning will by ne¬
cessity occur. If this is so, the distributive
| machinery must possess a sufficient degree of elasti-
M-v
city and initiative of its component parts to meet
possible cases of congestion.
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union recognised
this necessity ch^ifly by empirical experimentation.
It is, of course, easy to put the whole blame on to
the shoulders of political opponents and "wreckers".
But we suggest that the tendency towards over-
central isat ion and "freezing" of the supply-mechanism
|was a general trend in those years. It was a con-
I sequence of a relatively abrupt re-oreintation of po~
I licy and/khe element of ineifea inherent in the new
| development5 it was also a result of the experimenting
! streak of the Bolsheviks. We do not deny that the
political element (the difference,that is,between
the views of the General Lane and those of the Left
i Opposition) entered into the picture later on, when
I the dominating Stalinist group had recognised its
! mistakes and had sounded a rather hasty retreat, whil^
the Left Opposition persisted in its attempts to
base supply and distribution on orders and counter-
i orders. At the same time the Right Opposition voiced
| anew the demand for "free trade" and a relaxation of
central price-planning. The Stalinist groups tried
to steer a middle course^retaining rationing as an
economic, necessity, but at the same time trying to
develop the elastic aptitudes of the Soviet dis¬
tributive apparatus.
The effects of an ultra-centralisation of.supplyi
j were not confined, to the "freezing" of stocks alone.'
{ Generally speaking, rationing became an ideal
breeding place for all sorts of abuses such as the
! dispatch of goods irrespective of the season or the
I specific demand-structure of the region in question.
| The abuses sometimes assumed a truly comic character,
! such as when lumber camps were supplied with children's
footwear. Apparently.the supply organisations
/ The natur al coneomitant of "freezing" of supplies in
some directions was, of course, goods-deficit in
others. Thus, instead of easing the general shortage[
of goods in the country by a system of just distribution,
normed sunolv made the deficit of goods even more acute at time
automatically followed a certain pattern of an average
assortment for the "average" demands of an "abstract"
human being and never considered the very special
and exceptional requirements of a lumber camp. These
truly ludicrous occurences could never have happened
in a system imbued with a greater measure of res¬
ponsibility and with less automatism.
In those days demand was relegated to a most
servile position in Soviet economy. There was no
question of demand guiding production,/if only to
some extent. At the same time the "levelling" ten¬
dencies ("uravnilovka") revived and the Authorities
had the greatest difficulty in combating them. There
was hardly any attempt at a realistic planning of
consumption, of developing and shaping certain tastes,
likes etc. The"planning"of consumption seemed to
resolve itself into an arithmetical manipulation of
norms and contingents which had been decreed by
bureaucrats who were not familiar with the living
consumer and unappreciative of the positive role
which the interplay of supply and demand could play
in stimulating production.
Owing to this attitude very little was done
to-replace the liquidated private trading units by
additional co-operative shops. In 1930 the number
of trading units had diminished by 181,299 as
compared with the total number in 1928, the incidence
of contraction fallirg most heavily on the townsi
I Cf. Malkis", Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 92. The total
in 1927-28 was 481,435. (Cf. U.S.S.R. Handbook,London,
1936,p. 240).
We know that the diminution in the number of trade
units was partly made up, ~y en increase in their
size, but on the whole .(as was officially admitted)^
the services to the consumers deteriorated.
At the same time there was a certain retardation
in the growth of the market-funds earmarked for dis¬
tribution by co-operative and State trade. The reasop
for this was that the various productive Commissariats
required large stocks of consumers' goods for direct
distribution in tha r factories and also in.schools,
hospitals etc. In those days, for instance, the
Sworkers were invariably supplied with their working
clothes by the factories.
Incidentally, the organisation of factory • supply •
suffered from several abuses as well. People tried
to derive advantages (to which they were not entitled)
from the system of communal feeding. In practice,
the principle "He who does not work neither shall
he eat" was not always enforced, for many"loafers"
and "drifters" managed to obtain preferential supplies.
I Similarly, relatives and acquantances of influential.
Government officials fed on supplies which were
supposed to be distributed to deserving workers only.!
When at the end of 1932 the organisation of workers'
supply in the factories was tigt/fened up and the
O.R.S. established, it was discovered, for; instance,
that of the 2 million people^belonging to 74 enter¬
prises of the heavy industries.who were catered for
/"Since prices in the closed shops are much lower
than those in the opfih. shops, there is a natural ten¬
dency among people who have no connection with the
factory to try to attach themselves to the factory
shop in order to secure products at low prices." (No-
del, op.cit., p. 88).
jby centralised supplies before the organisation of the!
/
jO.R.S. 273,000 were so-called "dead souls" and "pa.ra~
I sites" who were maintained on false pretences.
The Government and the Party certainly cannot be j
accused of having wathed the obvious weaknesses and
abuses of rationing with equanimity. Time end again
jvarious resolutions stigmatised existing def/iciencies
which were bound to arise from an excessive application
of normed supply, Gut the Authorities had to proceed j
warily, trying to steer a middle course between
"over-rationing" and "free trade". Here we detect
| again that touchstone-method with which Soviet economic
policy operates, a method which consists in radical
|trial and radical error and a synthetic compromise
dictated by political expediency and common sense.
The measures which were adopted to deal with
I the disadvantages of the system of rat oning were
essentially twofold: organisational - devised to
: I
I
|put a stop to existing abuses; and economic - intended
i to widen the basis of supply and gradually to pre¬
pare the ground for de-rationing.
aJL
As regards organisation/reforms, control cornmis-
I sions tried to eradicate from distribution the. non-
| observance of official prices and the very con-
I siderable elements of corruption. At the same time
j
attempts were being made to increase the number of
JU
j retail units, to reorganise the retail network in
| such a way as to bring it closer to the seats of
production - fJjA^actories in the urban areas and the
j
_
I / Economics of Soviet Trade, op.cit., p. 253.
JUJ.S.S.R. Handbook, op.cit., table 1 on p. 241.
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farms in the countryside, and. to economise the existing
! supplies of consumers' good's by accelerating the
„ M 1ke^r
velocity ox o^fer- circulation and enriclya^rs assortment
I(especially that of foodstuffs) within the range of
jpossibilities. The concrete results of these efforts\
however, left ample room fox1 further improvement. The!
| surmounting of the backwardness of Soviet trade is
I a slow historical process.
The inadequacy in the quality of service was
I noticeable not only in the "closed" shops, but also
as regards the system of communal feeding. Workers
complained about the carelessness in the preparation
of food and the way in which it was served: the
personnel was, as often as not, extremely insolent,
the dining-halls were noisy and badly organised, so
that the lunch-hour was by no means'a period of quiet
tie,
and relaxation, which is so essential to/twelfare and.
efficiency of the worker. Another drawback was the
lack of attention paid to the feeding of children in j
: schools and in special childerns1 restaurants which
i points to the tendency, not surprising in a system
.selective rationing, to put the supply of certain
: sections of the population before the consideration
of its general vital interests and well-being.
The economic^ mea.sures to mitigate the hard¬
ships caused, by the shortage of goods were based on !
the belief that.although the paucity of consumables I
in relation to the soarirg demands of the population
was unavoidable under the First Five-Year Plan, the
output of consumers' goods could be increased by
methods of enhancipg the utilisation of the existing!
resources. In addition to the development of local
supplies (which we have described), the Government
concentrated its attention on the building up of
I Kolkhoz and bazaar trade and the augmentation of
decentralised collections and the centralised
/
collection by the co-operatives, the expansion of
'handicraft co-operatives in local centres of raw-
materials, the fostering of small-scale fishery and
jthe production of consumers' goods out of waste of
I the heavy industries.
Efforts .ere also being pursued in the direction
of diminishing intra-industrial consumption by means
of rationalising production and cutting down un¬
reasonable and extfeessLve demands, especially as regards
working- clothes and footwear. In the course of 1932
regulative organs succeeded in brirgng about a slight
reduction of intra-industrial consumption and an
Iincrease in the so-called "market-funds".
Lastly, the Government began to take steps to
!
narrow, as much as possible, the number of commodities
|and commodity-groups under rationing. The Appeal of
the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the Sovnarkom
and the Centrosouys of May 12, 1931 stopped the ten¬
dency to widen the range of rationed goods and after
that date the number of such goods began to diminish,
though it remained high enougbdn the course of the
second half of 1931. In April 1932 Party and Govern¬
ment published, a. decree according to which the number of
rationed foodstuffswas reduced from 13 to 6, viz.,
bread, groats, sugar, meat, herring, animaL and vegetable
/Cf. below.
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fats. This number remained unaltered until January
1935.
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